[25-1083] Mullin, Sec. of Homeland Security v. Doe

Thank you, General.

Mr. Arulanantham.

Thank you, Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

Congress struck a balance in the TPS statute.

It granted the Secretary substantial discretion to designate countries at the outset, but constrained the authority to terminate TPS once people have come to rely on it through mandatory procedures and rules.

Congress struck a corresponding balance on judicial review.

It didn't broadly bar review of all policies and procedures or all questions of law and fact as in neighboring immigration statutes.

It barred review of any determination in subsection B, which are the country conditions assessments on which the Secretary would be expected to have expertise.

Congress thus preserved review to ensure compliance with other requirements in the statute, including in subsection B, like the obligation to consult and to make decisions based on country conditions.

The bottom line is this: the Secretary can terminate TPS, but he must turn square corners, follow the rules Congress set.

In contrast, as we've heard today, the government reads the statute like a blank check.

Today, they want to use it to expel non-citizens, but the power that they seek is a double-edged sword.

The Secretary could designate every country from which an undocumented person has come to the United States explicitly to provide mass immigration relief under this statute, and on their view, the courts could do nothing.

That contravenes the text, bedrock administrative law, and common sense.

On the merits, this is an easy case.

One basis for Syria's designation is armed conflict, but the Secretary never consulted the State Department about the armed conflict.

Even today, the State Department's website says armed conflict in Syria remains active.

In addition, the other basis for Syria's desig- designation, which is extraordinary and temporary conditions, she terminated based on the national interest, but the plain text makes clear that the termination must be based solely on the conditions in the foreign state.

Finally, it matters that this case is here on a preliminary relief order that just preserved TPS while the case proceeds.

People like Dr. Sarah Doe, a pediatrician giving life-saving care to children, have no later recourse if they are illegally stripped of their work authorization, let alone face detention or deportation.

Layla Doe's daughter came here at the age of three and is now about to graduate high school.

She should keep her status while the case proceeds.

I welcome the Court's questions.

Would you be kind enough to, uh, say what else is reviewable under, despite, uh, the, uh, ju- the, uh, jurisdiction-stripping provision? Because it seems pretty broad.