Respondent

The BIA explains that this regulation is consistent with its reading of the asylum statute and case law.

The BIA also explains that even though it appears DHS did not timely serve Mr. MRI or his counsel with their writ-closing argument, which had all this abandonment argument in it, and even though they apparently didn't sign some of it, which seems quite serious to me, Mr. MRI did not show prejudice from these clear errors that would probably get DHS's filing kicked in any other tribunal, and certainly if it was Respondent's counsel.

And there is no prejudice here because of all the logic about the abandonment of asylum.

Plus, the IJ apparently considered all of it and Mr. MRI's arguments later.

For the appellants, Mr. Jayden McEwen, David M. Nam, and Anna Carolina Cantler.

For the Respondent, Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Alex Hudson, Taryn Urquhart, and Ethan Plateau.

For the Respondent, Attorney General of British Columbia, Robert Danae, and Nicholas Isaac.

For the respondents, Gabrielle Liberty Wall et al., Kevin Smith, and Megan Walwin.

For the intervener, Attorney General of Canada, Joseph Chang, and Lindy Rouillard Labbé.

The general jurisdiction to answer questions of law cannot properly be interpreted to include the discretion to not apply the statute as written in order to countermand it with the charter consideration.

And so that all points to the proper object of charter review being the legislation itself, it being the legislative choice that's at issue.

Mr. Hudson, I'm wondering if you could answer here on the screen, you could answer the position taken by the Respondent Attorney General of British Columbia that in looking at 38 and I guess this is an extension of the point Justice Jamal has made on section 50 says that PIPA does not mandate a production order under 38.1b in every case, points to the soulless trust case dealing with solicitor-client privilege, and then says that it's paragraph 70 that in such cases before ordering production of a disputed record for their review the commissioner must assess whether doing so would infringe charter rights or values and if so whether that infringement is proportionate with the underlying statutory objectives that is the commissioner must conduct adore loyola analysis so i'm wondering if this problem If you acknowledge there's discretion in 38.1b, if you recognize that there are questions of law that are relevant to an inquiry under 50, why not focus on the source question? the alleged Charter violation being the discretion you know a ham-fisted exercise of discretion as opposed to the statute itself and then allow this that's a That issue is a question of correctness, and then allow at the second step for the proportionate balancing under DORE and reasonableness to apply at that stage to make sense of what AGBC calls the imprecise discretion afforded by 381B, which is potentially charter compliance.

Now, respondent says that the application reflects some internal Air Force decision to continue these activities for the next three years if Guam issues a permit.

But the if is precisely the kind of contingency that makes this not final.

Respondent also points out that the application enabled the old permit's expiration date to be told or extended.

But that is at most an incidental or indirect effect of the application, really, of Guam EPA's failure to rule on the application.

The direct and appreciable legal consequences of that extension flow from the terms of the old permit, which respondent has not challenged.

Now, respondent's claim also fails on the merits.

RCRA is a comprehensive statute specifically targeting hazardous waste and specifically specifying which environmental review must occur at each step of a reticulated permit process.

Respondent's attempt to take all of NEPA and just shove it into the application stage is not only duplicative of RCRA's requirements, which are the functional equivalent, but inconsistent with RCRA's specification of when each of those requirements should occur through the permitting process.

I actually copied part of his petition in here.

He says, "Respondent is an able-bodied person who is entirely capable of supporting herself during the pendency of this case.

Respondent is a celebrity and has income through appearances, endorsements, Bravo, and other entities.

She has businesses in a home decor line and a wig business.

She is very capable of managing her own personal expenses.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondent," so Porsha, "unreasonably continues to seek use of Petitioner's income, notwithstanding this being a marriage of less than two years, and Respondent's motion is yet another misplaced and unfortunate effort to do so.

Respondent has needlessly contacted the police, as alleged in her motion, for no other purpose but to cause havoc and turmoil in the lives of both Petitioner and his son." He alleged that she would come to his house, the premarital residence, at all hours of the night, and many of those nights she smelled like alcohol.

For the safety of Petitioner and his son, the gate to the premarital home was recently locked upon Petitioner and his son going to bed.

I'm going to read to you from the order issued by Doppel, the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, revoking this therapist's license.

Respondent acknowledges that Utah Administrative Code 156-61-502, the 1998 version, defines unprofessional conduct in relevant part as follows.

Failing to establish and maintain appropriate professional boundaries with a client or former client.

Engaging in dual or multiple relationships with a client or former client in which there is a risk of exploitation or potential harm to the client.

I think what makes this case different is that in this case, not only do you not have any sort of direction of the conduct towards Colorado, but again, the causal chain here is severely attenuated, and there is no case on which my friend relies where in the face of such an attenuated chain of causation, this Court has said that the exception to the venerable prohibition against extraterritorial regulation applies.

And I would submit that if you accept Respondent's theory, the exception would swallow the rule.

Now, just to be clear, as I indicated at the outset, we are relying on two strands of federalist principle here.

The second is extraterritoriality.

because this complaint talks a lot about misrepresentations that are made by the defendants.

Well, I think in an effort to avoid what would obviously be the preemptive force of our constitutional arguments and indeed also our Clean Air Act arguments.

Respondent has attempted to back up one step to the misrepresentation, but I want to make clear what is different here.

What is different here is that the injury is not suffered by the Colorado consumer in the traditional sense.