just walk through the halls here.

Yeah.

Yeah.

Yeah.

It's amazing.

So just the feel of it.

I knew the Lord was working here, and he just kept calling me.

Okay.

Or she, 'cause Dor-

The church, uh, yeah, the Church has not spoken on it, so it's...

Um, and I think because there was a controversy necessarily, but there was discussion about, you know, we certainly have the, the tradition of the, the witness of the Eastern Churches that Mary died at the end of her life.

And in fact, there are two tombs of Mary.

Uh, there's one in Ephesus, and then there's one in, in, uh, Jerusalem as well.

So, um, you can actually go to the, the Church of the Dormition in, uh, in Jerusalem.

I've been there.

[laughs]

Thanks for coming on

the show.

So tell us a little bit about Alteltier, the robotic esky.

So what we've done here is we're the first to bring to market the opportunity to store in our ASR system, PerfectKick and or Infinity, and have multiple temperature zones through the utilization of what we call ACTs or actively cooled totes.

Yep.

So our partnership with Peltier, this particular tote is keeping our bottles of water nice and cold.

In Lake Warren? Yeah.

guys can

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

Respondents here seek judicial review of the secretary's decisions to terminate temporary protected status for Syria and Haiti.

Yet, Section twelve fifty-four A, B, five A provides that there is no judicial review of any determination of the secretary with respect to the designation or termination or extension of a designation of a foreign state for temporary protected status.

That provision means what it says.

Determination is hardly a rarely used word that broadly includes the secretary's decisions, conclusions, or opinions.

Justice Kagan, anything further? Justice Gorsuch? Kavanaugh? Justice Barrett? Justice Jackson? Thank you, counsel Rebuttal, General?

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

Respondents here seek judicial review of the secretary's decisions to terminate temporary protected status for Syria and Haiti.

Yet, Section twelve fifty-four A, B, five A provides that there is no judicial review of any determination of the secretary with respect to the designation or termination or extension of a designation of a foreign state for temporary protected status.

That provision means what it says.

Determination is hardly a rarely used word that broadly includes the secretary's decisions, conclusions, or opinions.

Justice Kagan, anything further? Justice Gorsuch? Kavanaugh? Justice Barrett? Justice Jackson? Thank you, counsel Rebuttal, General?

Chief

Justice, and may it please the Court, respondents here seek judicial review of the Secretary's decisions to terminate temporary protected status for Syria and Haiti.

Yet Section 1254A.B.5.A. provides that there is no judicial review of any determination of the Secretary in with respect to the designation or termination or extension of a designation of a foreign state for temporary protected status.

That provision means what it says.

Determination is hardly a rarely used word that broadly includes the Secretary's decisions, conclusions, or opinions.

Both any and with respect to have an expansive meaning and a broadening effect.

The provision thus bars judicial review of both the Secretary's ultimate decision whether to designate, extend, or terminate, and of each antecedent step along the way to that determination.

Rebuttal, General?

And given the long history of this country's understanding about birthright citizenship, what would it take, what do you think it should take to accept that story in terms of the magnitude of the evidence that we would need to see in in order to accept this revisionist theory and in order to change what I think people have thought the rule was for more than a century.

Let me make two points in response to that, one historical and one legal.

Historical point, I disagree with the way you've characterized the understanding of Wong Kim Ark, and I would point to something that's emphasized in their and Miki's briefs, which is in 1921, Richard Flournoy, who becomes a senior State Department official in the Roosevelt administration and pushes their theory as to temporary sojourners, writes a law review article in 1921 where he says, I think the children of temporary visitors should be citizens.

But he admits that is not the understanding of Wong Kamak.

He admits Wong Kamak did not hold that.

And he admits that there's an array of authorities that go against him.

He talks about careful and reliable high authorities.

Rebuttal, General Sauer.

And given the long history of this country's understanding about birthright citizenship, what would it take, what do you think it should take to accept that story in terms of the magnitude of the evidence that we would need to see in in order to accept this revisionist theory and in order to change what I think people have thought the rule was for more than a century.

Let me make two points in response to that, one historical and one legal.

Historical point, I disagree with the way you've characterized the understanding of Wong Kim Ark, and I would point to something that's emphasized in their and Miki's briefs, which is in 1921, Richard Flournoy, who becomes a senior State Department official in the Roosevelt administration and pushes their theory as to temporary sojourners, writes a law review article in 1921 where he says, I think the children of temporary visitors should be citizens.

But he admits that is not the understanding of Wong Kamak.

He admits Wong Kamak did not hold that.

And he admits that there's an array of authorities that go against him.

He talks about careful and reliable high authorities.

Rebuttal, General Sauer.

And given the long history of this country's understanding about birthright citizenship, what would it take, what do you think it should take to accept that story in terms of the magnitude of the evidence that we would need to see in order to to accept this revisionist theory and in order to change what I think people have thought the rule was for more than a century.

Let me make two points in response to that, one historical and one legal.

Historical point, I disagree with the way you've characterized the understanding of Wong Kim Ark, and I would point to something that's emphasized in their and Miki's briefs, which is in 1921, Richard Flournoy, who becomes a senior State Department official in the Roosevelt administration and pushes their theory as to temporary sojourners, writes a law review article in 1921 where he says, I think the children of temporary visitors should be citizens.

But he admits that is not the understanding of Wonkamark.

He admits Wonkamark did not hold that.

And he admits that there's an array of authorities that go against him.

He talks about careful and reliable high authorities.

Rebuttal, General Sauer.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

As the argument so far reflects, Mississippi's theory of election is so general and permissive that it would authorize statutes that Congress could not possibly have approved in the 19th century.

Defining election as merely private choice alone would authorize statutes where the voters mark their ballots and give them to a private party, such as a ballot harvester or a party operative, or even hand them in three weeks later and just say or attest that they made the decision on election day.

Official receipt is at the definitional heart of election.

Every source from the 1840s onward that addresses the specific question treats official receipt as essential to an election.

I mean, once we go down this road, once we say that these statutes, which don't say anything, actually have some significant preemptive effect, where are we going to end up? I

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

As the argument so far reflects, Mississippi's theory of election is so general and permissive that it would authorize statutes that Congress could not possibly have approved in the 19th century.

Defining election as merely private choice alone would authorize statutes where the voters mark their ballots and give them to a private party, such as a ballot harvester or a party operative, or even hand them in three weeks later and just say or attest that they made the decision on election day.

Official receipt is at the definitional heart of election.

Every source from the 1840s onward that addresses the specific question treats official receipt as essential to an election.

I mean, once we go down this road, once we say that these statutes, which don't say anything, actually have some significant preemptive effect, where are we going to end up?

General Sauer.

Deceit or gross negligence by a financial regulator in financial transactions is cause for removal.

In a two-week period in 2021, Lisa Cook submitted mortgage applications for two properties in Michigan and Georgia.

In both, she told the lender that, within 60 days, she would occupy that property for one year as her principal residence.

As President Trump stated in removing her, it is inconceivable that she was unaware of the first commitment when making the second, and it is impossible that she intended to honor both.

Such behavior impugns Cook's conduct, fitness, ability, or competence to serve as a governor of the Federal Reserve.

The American people should not have their interest rates determined by someone who was, at best, grossly negligent in obtaining favorable interest rates for herself.

Rebuttal,

General Sauer.

Deceit or gross negligence by a financial regulator in financial transactions is cause for removal.

In a two-week period in 2021, Lisa Cook submitted mortgage applications for two properties in Michigan and Georgia.

In both, she told the lender that, within 60 days, she would occupy that property for one year as her principal residence.

As President Trump stated in removing her, it is inconceivable that she was unaware of the first commitment when making the second, and it is impossible that she intended to honor both.

Such behavior impugns Cook's conduct, fitness, ability, or competence to serve as a governor of the Federal Reserve.

The American people should not have their interest rates determined by someone who was, at best, grossly negligent in obtaining favorable interest rates for herself.

Rebuttal,

General Sauer.

Deceit or gross negligence by a financial regulator in financial transactions is cause for removal.

In a two-week period in 2021, Lisa Cook submitted mortgage applications for two properties in Michigan and Georgia.

In both, she told the lender that, within 60 days, she would occupy that property for one year as her principal residence.

As President Trump stated in removing her, it is inconceivable that she was unaware of the first commitment when making the second, and it is impossible that she intended to honor both.

Such behavior impugns Cook's conduct, fitness, ability, or competence to serve as a governor of the Federal Reserve.

The American people should not have their interest rates determined by someone who was, at best, grossly negligent in obtaining favorable interest rates for herself.

Thank

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

In CELA law, this Court held that the President's power to remove and thus supervise those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article 2, was settled by the first Congress, and has been confirmed by precedent, including at least nine decisions of this Court from ex parte Hennin, through Trump against the United States.

Humphrey's executor stands as an indefensible outlier from that line of authority.

Its holding that federal agencies can exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers that form no part of the executive power has not withstood the test of time.

That holding was gutted and refurbished in Morrison, but this court correctly rejected the refurbished version as providing an amorphous test with no limiting principles.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

In CELA law, this Court held that the President's power to remove and thus supervise those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article 2, was settled by the first Congress, and has been confirmed by precedent, including at least nine decisions of this Court from ex parte Hennin, through Trump against the United States.

Humphrey's executor stands as an indefensible outlier from that line of authority.

Its holding that federal agencies can exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers that form no part of the executive power has not withstood the test of time.

That holding was gutted and refurbished in Morrison, but this court correctly rejected the refurbished version as providing an amorphous test with no limiting principles.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

In CELA law, this Court held that the President's power to remove and thus supervise those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article 2, was settled by the first Congress, and has been confirmed by precedent, including at least nine decisions of this Court from ex parte Hennin, through Trump against the United States.

Humphrey's executor stands as an indefensible outlier from that line of authority.

Its holding that federal agencies can exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers that form no part of the executive power has not withstood the test of time.

That holding was gutted and refurbished in Morrison, but this court correctly rejected the refurbished version as providing an amorphous test with no limiting principles.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

In CELA law, this Court held that the President's power to remove and thus supervise those who wield executive power on his behalf follows from the text of Article 2, was settled by the first Congress, and has been confirmed by precedent, including at least nine decisions of this Court from ex parte Hennin through Trump against United States.

Humphrey's executor stands as an indefensible outlier from that line of authority.

Its holding that federal agencies can exercise quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers that form no part of the executive power has not withstood the test of time.

That holding was gutted and refurbished in Morrison, but this court correctly rejected the refurbished version as providing an amorphous test with no limiting principles.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

On April 2nd, President Trump determined that our exploding trade deficits had brought us to the brink of an economic and national security catastrophe.

He further pronounced that the traffic of fentanyl and other opioids into our country has created a public health crisis taking hundreds of thousands of American lives.

President Trump has declared that these emergencies are country-killing and not sustainable, that they threaten the bedrock of our national and economic security, and that fixing them will make America a strong, financially viable, and respected country again.

Due to IEPA tariffs, President Trump has negotiated agreements worth trillions of dollars with major trading partners, including most recently China.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

On April 2nd, President Trump determined that our exploding trade deficits had brought us to the brink of an economic and national security catastrophe.

He further pronounced that the traffic of fentanyl and other opioids into our country has created a public health crisis taking hundreds of thousands of American lives.

President Trump has declared that these emergencies are country-killing and not sustainable, that they threaten the bedrock of our national and economic security, and that fixing them will make America a strong, financially viable, and respected country again.

Due to IEPA tariffs, President Trump has negotiated agreements worth trillions of dollars with major trading partners, including most recently China.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.

On April 2nd, President Trump determined that our exploding trade deficits had brought us to the brink of an economic and national security catastrophe.

He further pronounced that the traffic of fentanyl and other opioids into our country has created a public health crisis taking hundreds of thousands of American lives.

President Trump has declared that these emergencies are country-killing and not sustainable, that they threaten the bedrock of our national and economic security, and that fixing them will make America a strong, financially viable, and respected country again.

Due to IEPA tariffs, President Trump has negotiated agreements worth trillions of dollars with major trading partners, including most recently China.

Thank you, Counsel.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14160, protecting the meaning and value of American citizenship.

This order reflects the original meaning of the 14th Amendment and which guaranteed citizenship to the children of former slaves, not to illegal aliens or temporary visitors.

Multiple district courts promptly issued nationwide or universal injunctions blocking this order, and a cascade of such universal injunctions followed.

Since January 20th, district courts have now issued 40 universal injunctions against the federal government, including 35 from the same five judicial districts.

This is a bipartisan problem that has now spanned the last five presidential administrations.

Rebuttal, General Sauer.

General Sauer.

Mr.

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, on January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14160, protecting the meaning and value of American citizenship.

This order reflects the original meaning of the 14th Amendment and which guaranteed citizenship to the children of former slaves, not to illegal aliens or temporary visitors.

Multiple district courts promptly issued nationwide or universal injunctions blocking this order, and a cascade of such universal injunctions followed.

Since January 20th, district courts have now issued 40 universal injunctions against the federal government, including 35 from the same five judicial districts.

This is a bipartisan problem that has now spanned the last five presidential administrations.

Rebuttal, General Sauer.

Would you elaborate on that?

Absolutely, Justice Thomas.

We've taken the position that viewing this through the lens of private actors engaged in state action is not the appropriate kind of framework to view it under.

And actually, I think we have clear agreement from that from the respondent in page 18 of their brief where they say that is not the correct framework.

Obviously, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did rely on those cases most as to entwinement and also as to traditional exclusive public function.

But the point that we make is there is not a clear mapping onto the two concepts of do you have constitutional rights of your own and are you engaged in state action with respect to the constitutional rights of others? So in Linkey, for example, recently, and in Garcetti, in that line of cases, there's a recognition that those are conceptually two distinct questions.

And that's why we think that that's really not the proper framework.

To the extent that the State is saying we see a distinction between religious schools, which require all of these religious rites and proselytize and do whatever, we see a distinction between those kinds of schools and public schools, and we only want to set up public schools because our compelling interest is to prevent the entanglement of the State with funding those kinds of schools.