Full Interview: Yaniv Rosnai

[gentle music] Okay, so thank you so much for talking to us, Professor Yaniv Roznai.

Um, a few days ago, we spoke to a member of Knesset, Yair Golan, who basically said, "Look, this is 1861, uh, in the United States.

This is cusp of Civil War time.

There are two camps here, each one of which has a radically different vision for the future of, uh, of Israel.

Uh, these visions are not compatible with one another, and that's why our, uh, struggle now is not just, you know, political or judicial by nature, it is really sort of world historical, [chuckles] philosophical." Do you agree with this assessment?

I wouldn't say I totally disagree, but I think I disagree with this analysis in the following sense.

Uh, of course, there are various groups, but at least when it comes to the vision concerning, let's say, the constitutional structure or the judicial system vis-a-vis the political systems, I disagree, and I'll tell you why.

In the past few years, uh, s- especially since 2023, I've been engaged in many negotiations with the so-called other side.

If you let me sit with the prominent jurors from the other side for three hours, we will reach an agreement because we, we agree and we have agreed on about 70, 80% of the things, okay? So I think, uh, this is also applicable to the larger public.

70% of the people would have agreed on about 70% percent of the issues.

The problem is with the margin of the 20%, and I can explain later why.

But also when you look at surveys concerning the people, the larger public, it's quite amazing.

We always say, "Oh, there are two camps.

Uh, we're going to a civil war." No, we're not, because the ideological polarization in Israel has not been expanded in the last few years, or at least not a lot.

What has been expanded in the last few years is the, what we call affectional polarization, the emotional polarization.

""This is what actually polarizes us.

Okay, you have to explain this to us, because one thing that continues to baffle me, and I've been following this very closely since day one, and we're talking to all these people.

Look, no one in their right mind says, "These people are suggesting that the committee to select judges would have three representatives from the coalition as opposed to four from the opposition.

I am going to march in the streets for this." This is not something [chuckles] that, you know, normal people take into, you know, these massive kind of o- opposition movements with a lot of emotion.

E-explain the emotionality to me.

What is it that people maybe on either side are thinking that they are, that they are marching for or against?

So I, I don't come from sociology or psychology, so this is not an expert opinion.

But what is interesting, if you ask the Likud voters in 2023, "Do you support the judicial reform of Yariv Levin?" You get about 60% of the people saying, "Yes, we support." You get about 40% saying no, which is, which is, to my mind, positive.

But when you ask those who support the judicial overhaul, "Why do you support the judicial overhaul?" They ask them the legal reform.

Is it because democracy is the will of the majority? Is it because our court is too activist? Is it because the Supreme Court judges are extreme left wing? Uh, is it because the court binds the IDF and doesn't allow our soldier, our brave soldiers to act? No.