Dec 8, 2025 · 2 hr 30 min · 11 segments
Trump v. Slaughter Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al. Respondent: Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, et al. Advocates: D…
John SauerGuest
Brett KavanaughGuest
Ketanji Brown JacksonGuest
Elena KaganGuest
Samuel AlitoGuest
Sonia SotomayorGuest
Amy Coney BarrettGuest
Neil GorsuchGuest
John RobertsHost
Clarence ThomasGuest
General Sauer, could you give us one example of a permissible restriction on the authority to remove a principal officer?
We don't believe there are permissible restrictions on... principal officers of the United States who exercise the executive power.
In this case, in a multi-body agency such as the FTC, is there any permissible restriction?
This court in Trump against the United States held that the president's power to remove officers wielding the executive power is conclusive and preclusive.
So any review of arguably bad reasons for the president to remove an executive officer would be subject to the political process.
It would not be subject to judicial review and certainly not subject to statutes regulating that.
I think there are a lot of agencies in the federal government where It's hard to parse whether it's an executive function they're engaged in or a legislative function.
We obviously have the Perlmutter case that they're holding where you're dealing with the Library of Congress, which half of it's a library, half of it's things like the copyright.
Chief Justice, in Free Enterprise Front, this court, I think, very aptly stated that the vast and varied nature of the federal government is a reason not to make general pronouncements on issues that haven't been briefed and argued.
But by and large, the sort of insight that goes from Morrison to FCC against Arlington and to seal a law recognizes that These multi-member agencies that are exercising what this Court has repeatedly recognized as quintessential executive powers, like the FTC, rulemaking, adjudication, investigation, seeking of civil enforcement, litigation seeking civil enforcement powers, civil enforcement remedies, and so forth, those are not close cases.
Yeah, I mean, I appreciate your point about not deciding cases that aren't before us, and I meant the perimeter cases as an example.
Is this a severance issue? Do we say the agency is okay so long as, you know, half of it survives in one branch and half in the other? And if so, who gets to decide that?
For the vast majority of these agencies, I think CELA law pointed out there's maybe about two dozen executive agencies that are multi-member structure and have removal authority.
I think the logic of this court adopted it for severability in free enterprise fund and CELA law.
And Collins indicates that in the vast majority of cases there would be an excision just of the removal authority.
General Sauer, could you give us one example of a permissible restriction on the authority to remove a principal officer?
We don't believe there are permissible restrictions on... principal officers of the United States who exercise the executive power.
In this case, in a multi-body agency such as the FTC, is there any permissible restriction?
This court in Trump against the United States held that the president's power to remove officers wielding the executive power is conclusive and preclusive.
So any review of arguably bad reasons for the president to remove an executive officer would be subject to the political process.
It would not be subject to judicial review and certainly not subject to statutes regulating that.
I think there are a lot of agencies in the federal government where It's hard to parse whether it's an executive function they're engaged in or a legislative function.
We obviously have the Perlmutter case that they're holding where you're dealing with the Library of Congress, which half of it's a library, half of it's things like the copyright.
Chief Justice, in Free Enterprise Front, this court, I think, very aptly stated that the vast and varied nature of the federal government is a reason not to make general pronouncements on issues that haven't been briefed and argued.
But by and large, the sort of insight that goes from Morrison to FCC against Arlington and to seal a law recognizes that These multi-member agencies that are exercising what this Court has repeatedly recognized as quintessential executive powers, like the FTC, rulemaking, adjudication, investigation, seeking of civil enforcement, litigation seeking civil enforcement powers, civil enforcement remedies, and so forth, those are not close cases.
Yeah, I mean, I appreciate your point about not deciding cases that aren't before us, and I meant the perimeter cases as an example.
Is this a severance issue? Do we say the agency is okay so long as, you know, half of it survives in one branch and half in the other? And if so, who gets to decide that?
For the vast majority of these agencies, I think CELA law pointed out there's maybe about two dozen executive agencies that are multi-member structure and have removal authority.
I think the logic of this court adopted it for severability in free enterprise fund and CELA law.
And Collins indicates that in the vast majority of cases there would be an excision just of the removal authority.
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