Aug 3, 2026 · 34 min · 11 segments
Two years after Venezuela’s disputed 2024 election — and months after Nicolás Maduro was removed from power — who is really running the country? Clionadh Raleigh and Bron Mills are joined by ACLED’s…
Tiziano BredaGuestClionadh RaleighHost
Bron MillsHost
In the last couple of days, people have been in the news asking a little bit more as to what the US wants for the future, what has happened since Maduro was taken in January.
And so looking back to the so-called stolen election, Tiziano, feels like a, a good place to start.
I'm of the idea that we wouldn't be where we are today if it wasn't for that particular event, which was the 28th of July 2024 election.
'Cause it was the first process after a few years in which most opposition movements decided to take the chances in an electoral process instead of boycotting because of the lack of conditions or even trying to make the world recognize a, another president or a parallel government, basically the one led by Juan Guaido at the time.
And they only did that because it was the result of a negotiation process that had international mediation between the government and some opposition forces.
And a, a process in which the Biden administration back then sort of promised to lift some sanctions on the oil sector, uh, in Venezuela in exchange for precisely, you know, a sufficiently free and fair elections under certain conditions, such as the exclusion of Maria Corina Machado, the most renowned opposition figure, and in her stead, replaced by Edmundo Gonzalez, a sort of a former diplomat, certainly less charismatic and probably seen as less dangerous by the Chavista government back then.
But he also then created the conditions for the opposition to organize a network of observers throughout the country that essentially replaced the electoral authorities, did what the electoral council should have done in terms of counting the tallies, publishing the vote tallies, and essentially proving that the opposition had won by a landslide that election.
This whole process demolished Maduro's legitimacy in the region and essentially isolated him, even vis-à-vis more ideologically aligned governments such as Petro in Colombia or Lula in Brazil, that had somehow kept defending the Maduro administration, seeing it as a victim of a US blockade under the sanctions.
But after those election, those arguments failed to keep those governments near the, the Maduro administration.
And I think in essence, Trump realized that, uh, this isolation made Maduro much more vulnerable and would have made easier to carry out what he did on the 3rd of January this year than to go against a government that was either democratically elected or anyway had some regional backing.
I've got some questions first, just to kind of ladle in, 'cause it was an extremely eventful, not always in the way that people wanted, period.
But my, my first question to you is, has Maduro ever won an election legitimately?
There were calls by then already by some opposition movements that he had stolen that election as well.
But overall, the Chavista popular support and the climate in the country still allowed for claims of frauds or irregularities to not have so much strength as they did in 2024.
But that was the only time in which he essentially possibly won an election or at least got a significant support by the population, 'cause the following elections were in 2018, and those were the elections in which the opposition sort of boycotted, uh, the process because of lack of conditions, and then came the 2024 elections.
Maduro's been in power for between 10 and 11 years, right? So who had gained from that, those, that period and who had lost? So who were the supporters of any alternative to Maduro?
Who, let's say, benefit from the Maduro government was certainly a small circle of allies.
The, the Maduro administration has certainly proven inability to make use of the country's immense resources for the good of the country's population, which was in essence what Chavez had, you know, tried to do at a time, of course, in which oil prices were much higher.
But in essence, public policies that Chavez brought forward meant to balance, not the enrichment of a certain political class with some improvements in everyday lives of certain, of large swaths of the country's population.
In the last couple of days, people have been in the news asking a little bit more as to what the US wants for the future, what has happened since Maduro was taken in January.
And so looking back to the so-called stolen election, Tiziano, feels like a, a good place to start.
I'm of the idea that we wouldn't be where we are today if it wasn't for that particular event, which was the 28th of July 2024 election.
'Cause it was the first process after a few years in which most opposition movements decided to take the chances in an electoral process instead of boycotting because of the lack of conditions or even trying to make the world recognize a, another president or a parallel government, basically the one led by Juan Guaido at the time.
And they only did that because it was the result of a negotiation process that had international mediation between the government and some opposition forces.
And a, a process in which the Biden administration back then sort of promised to lift some sanctions on the oil sector, uh, in Venezuela in exchange for precisely, you know, a sufficiently free and fair elections under certain conditions, such as the exclusion of Maria Corina Machado, the most renowned opposition figure, and in her stead, replaced by Edmundo Gonzalez, a sort of a former diplomat, certainly less charismatic and probably seen as less dangerous by the Chavista government back then.
But he also then created the conditions for the opposition to organize a network of observers throughout the country that essentially replaced the electoral authorities, did what the electoral council should have done in terms of counting the tallies, publishing the vote tallies, and essentially proving that the opposition had won by a landslide that election.
This whole process demolished Maduro's legitimacy in the region and essentially isolated him, even vis-à-vis more ideologically aligned governments such as Petro in Colombia or Lula in Brazil, that had somehow kept defending the Maduro administration, seeing it as a victim of a US blockade under the sanctions.
But after those election, those arguments failed to keep those governments near the, the Maduro administration.
And I think in essence, Trump realized that, uh, this isolation made Maduro much more vulnerable and would have made easier to carry out what he did on the 3rd of January this year than to go against a government that was either democratically elected or anyway had some regional backing.
I've got some questions first, just to kind of ladle in, 'cause it was an extremely eventful, not always in the way that people wanted, period.
But my, my first question to you is, has Maduro ever won an election legitimately?
There were calls by then already by some opposition movements that he had stolen that election as well.
But overall, the Chavista popular support and the climate in the country still allowed for claims of frauds or irregularities to not have so much strength as they did in 2024.
But that was the only time in which he essentially possibly won an election or at least got a significant support by the population, 'cause the following elections were in 2018, and those were the elections in which the opposition sort of boycotted, uh, the process because of lack of conditions, and then came the 2024 elections.
Maduro's been in power for between 10 and 11 years, right? So who had gained from that, those, that period and who had lost? So who were the supporters of any alternative to Maduro?
Who, let's say, benefit from the Maduro government was certainly a small circle of allies.
The, the Maduro administration has certainly proven inability to make use of the country's immense resources for the good of the country's population, which was in essence what Chavez had, you know, tried to do at a time, of course, in which oil prices were much higher.
But in essence, public policies that Chavez brought forward meant to balance, not the enrichment of a certain political class with some improvements in everyday lives of certain, of large swaths of the country's population.
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