Tell us about that.

I'm of the idea that we wouldn't be where we are today if it wasn't for that particular event, which was the 28th of July 2024 election.

'Cause it was the first process after a few years in which most opposition movements decided to take the chances in an electoral process instead of boycotting because of the lack of conditions or even trying to make the world recognize a, another president or a parallel government, basically the one led by Juan Guaido at the time.

And they only did that because it was the result of a negotiation process that had international mediation between the government and some opposition forces.

And a, a process in which the Biden administration back then sort of promised to lift some sanctions on the oil sector, uh, in Venezuela in exchange for precisely, you know, a sufficiently free and fair elections under certain conditions, such as the exclusion of Maria Corina Machado, the most renowned opposition figure, and in her stead, replaced by Edmundo Gonzalez, a sort of a former diplomat, certainly less charismatic and probably seen as less dangerous by the Chavista government back then.

But he also then created the conditions for the opposition to organize a network of observers throughout the country that essentially replaced the electoral authorities, did what the electoral council should have done in terms of counting the tallies, publishing the vote tallies, and essentially proving that the opposition had won by a landslide that election.

This whole process demolished Maduro's legitimacy in the region and essentially isolated him, even vis-à-vis more ideologically aligned governments such as Petro in Colombia or Lula in Brazil, that had somehow kept defending the Maduro administration, seeing it as a victim of a US blockade under the sanctions.

So What's going on within the internal power structures to secure whatever there is now from what was there post-election, and why isn't there room for somebody like Machado in that?

It's a very, uh, different situation now, isn't it? Delcy Rodríguez has said, "Look, you know, we welcome all help." The fact that she can, c- can count on the US because she is cooperating with the Trump administration, I mean, is that gonna help her, do you think?

Certainly the country couldn't make it alone, frankly.

Um, the fact that she's in power, the consequence of the US operation against Maduro, and basically the reopening now, the, the restart of diplomatic relations between Venezuela and the US, but also other Latin American countries, other European countries, it's certainly an opportunity, you know, a plus that helps ease the arrival of, uh, aid, of, uh, humanitarian missions and so on and so forth.

But of course, Delcy's and Venezuela's sort of destiny is very much intertwined with, with Trump.

I mean, it's a great priority for the US to have a stable Venezuela, a Venezuela that does not collapse again and that does not result in another exodus of people that have been affected, displaced, that lost everything and they try to resettle elsewhere in the region because that would also mean the collapse of one, if not the only, Trump's foreign policy success so far, you know, which would be, of course, harmful for, for the midterm elections as well.

I mean, how, how do they play this, do you think?

Well, there's a great risk that this, uh, situation sort of repeats what happened in 2019, for example, now when there was, the country was r- experiencing an, already the economic collapse of the weight of the US sanctions, so on and so forth.

And the US push under the first term, term to get humanitarian aid into the country was used politically by both the Maduro government and the opposition.

What are the current peace and security issues? What's it look like in Guatemala right now?

So in Guatemala, if you allow me to take a step back, it's a country that just 15 years ago used to be the most violent in Central America, which was already one of the most violent regions in Latin America and so in the world.

So in 2009, it had over 40 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.

And much of this violence originated from criminal structure that were basically encrusted in the state and had participation of political, military and economic actors.

So the SISIG came in, this UN SISIG, anti-impunity commission.

And through the strengthening of investigative capacities of authorities, the promotion of some legal reforms that provided more tools to authorities to actually go after violent organizations, this essentially allowed the country to dismantle over 70 criminal organizations in the span of a decade.

And this contributed, some argue, to a certain extent to a decrease in the numbers of violence and the levels of homicides.

So what can we expect really now of this? It's quite seismic change taking place in the country.