Sep 28, 2026 · 1 hr 7 min · 11 segments
When the court’s opinion blocking the proposed JetBlue-Spirit merger was released, it was hailed as evidence of a new wave of aggressive airlines antitrust enforcement. Two years later, after Spirit…
Dave GelfandGuestJohn ThornburgGuestStevie PearlGuestDennis McQueenieGuestNicholas HillHostSo for those who aren't familiar with the deal, JetBlue is a low-cost carrier, sometimes referred to as an LCC.
So this is an airline that typically has lower fares but still has some amenities.
Spirit was what is known as an ultra-low-cost carrier, sometimes referred to as a ULCC.
Those types of carriers typically have very low fares, but you may pay for other amenities.
So JetBlue and Spirit, I think we can, all the people on the call can agree, were a modest part of US domestic flights.
But typically in airline mergers, we think about competition at a route by route level.
So if you think of a route as a flight from, say, Boston to Washington, that's often the level we think about it at.
And there, there were material overlaps between JetBlue and Spirit on a number of routes.
What's more, some of those routes were what are known as gate or slot controlled.
So on those types of routes, a slot is a permission to have a takeoff or a landing, and you need those to compete.
So I think there was general agreement that on some of these routes where there was overlap between JetBlue and Spirit and there weren't a lot of other competitors, there was likely to be some harm absent entry and repositioning by rivals, pro-competitive effects generated by the deal or a failing firm defense.
And finally, one piece of background Frontier, a third airline, also an ultra-low-cost carrier like Spirit, was also trying to acquire Spirit at the time that JetBlue and Spirit signed their merger agreement.
So, John, could you kick us off by giving a brief description of what DOJ argued in the case?
So for those who aren't familiar with the deal, JetBlue is a low-cost carrier, sometimes referred to as an LCC.
So this is an airline that typically has lower fares but still has some amenities.
Spirit was what is known as an ultra-low-cost carrier, sometimes referred to as a ULCC.
Those types of carriers typically have very low fares, but you may pay for other amenities.
So JetBlue and Spirit, I think we can, all the people on the call can agree, were a modest part of US domestic flights.
But typically in airline mergers, we think about competition at a route by route level.
So if you think of a route as a flight from, say, Boston to Washington, that's often the level we think about it at.
And there, there were material overlaps between JetBlue and Spirit on a number of routes.
What's more, some of those routes were what are known as gate or slot controlled.
So on those types of routes, a slot is a permission to have a takeoff or a landing, and you need those to compete.
So I think there was general agreement that on some of these routes where there was overlap between JetBlue and Spirit and there weren't a lot of other competitors, there was likely to be some harm absent entry and repositioning by rivals, pro-competitive effects generated by the deal or a failing firm defense.
And finally, one piece of background Frontier, a third airline, also an ultra-low-cost carrier like Spirit, was also trying to acquire Spirit at the time that JetBlue and Spirit signed their merger agreement.
So, John, could you kick us off by giving a brief description of what DOJ argued in the case?
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