On the Gulf After the Iran War

Give us a bit of sort of state of play from the Gulf state perspective.

What are we seeing on this memorandum of understanding? What does it mean for the Gulf? How are the Gulf states responding to it or interpreting it? We did have the GCC statement, joint statement with the U.S., I think that was about a week ago, which notably mentioned Iran's regional activities, its missile program, things that are, you know, by and large, not part of the MOU.

So, Elisa, give us a state of play where things are in terms of the MOU, this kind of 60-day window and your analysis.

Thanks, Karen.

I'm so pleased to be here with you virtually, as well as with Robert and General Rotel to have this discussion.

I think the problem that we face right now, as you rightly pointed out, is that the large conflict may be over for the moment, but the real issues have been fascinating.

largely unresolved.

And we have to remember, I think, that the Gulf states were the front line of the war.

Their economies, their societies bore the brunt of Iran's attacks over the course of six or seven weeks.

They showed, I think, incredible resilience socially, psychologically, from the perspective of their defenses.

But they're in a difficult reality now.

They didn't want this war, but now that it's happened, they're kind of on the receiving end of what is a weakened but vengeful regime at Iran that still has an enormous amount of leverage.

And so when we look at the MOU, the Gulf states can't really be comfortable with this outcome because it kind of represents that the immense power of the U.S. military, which was meant to constrain Iran, to degrade its leverage on the region, to eliminate the threat of the nuclear program, none of those things were ultimately accomplished.

What we have instead is Iran's newfound leverage over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran's ability to sell oil now with U.S. sanctions waivers in place.

And this kind of vague MOU that kicks most of the real issues down the road, as you mentioned, doesn't talk about ballistic missiles or drones, which were the real things that Iran used to attack and threaten the Gulf.

It does not really deal with proxy forces other than its kind of reference to Lebanon in its early provisions.

And so this MOU doesn't really look like a strategic victory for the Gulf, but I think it is, at the end of the day, the best of bad options.

So what we see now, I think, is the Gulf continuing to play this active role in de-escalation.

Their mediation efforts continue, I think, quite aggressively.

We're seeing that play out in Doha today with indirect talks.

between Iranian delegation and U.S. delegations.

I think they are trying, the Gulf, to keep the parties engaged, even through the flare-ups that we've seen just in the last week.

I think they're also clearly kind of making their own bilateral arrangements with Iran.

out of necessity more than anything else.