What's Next for Hamas, 3 Years After October 7th

I will say on the issue of Qatar and Turkey, because the Board of Peace's interpretation goes like this.

They wanted to play the mediators off against each other, Egypt off against Qatar and Turkey, and assuming Turkey and Qatar were more friendlier to Hamas, and they wanted to link their future to the Iran MOU, that was the U.S. Iran war, memorandum of understanding, which Lebanon is linked into, and Hamas failed.

They didn't play the mediators off against each other.

So I'm trying to understand, did they fail in these talks, that they didn't get the mediators on their side, they didn't drive wedges against them? In that regard, as the Board of Peace says.

Matt, I'll start with you.

Look,

David, It's true.

They were not able to play the mediators off each other the way they wanted.

I think the bigger picture is they've got no concern whatsoever about losing the backing of any of their backers who are able to remain mediators.

I recall shortly after October 7th and Qatari officials told Reuters, when all is said and done, when the hostages are out, when all is said and done, we're going to have to have a conversation with Hamas, but no longer staying here.

And purportedly, some of the leaders have left Doha for Turkey.

I think that the line that the Turkish government is using with Hamas may actually be effective vis-a-vis Hamas, but it's not one that the rest of us should be comfortable with.

The ceasefire, the 20-point plan is very clear.

Hamas should have no role in what comes next because of what they did on October 7th, not just to Israel.

but to fellow Palestinians, right? How many senior officials do we need to be able to quote? And your listeners can Google it, saying we needed the blood of Palestinians to spill.

They built hundreds of miles of bunkers to protect their fighters and not a single bomb shelter for fellow Palestinians.

I don't think that a winning argument at the end of the day in terms of the long-term vision of actually securing some type of stability in this region involves have Hamas minimize the number of guns they have, at least in Gaza, and go political.

Hamas needs to be sidelined politically in Gaza.

There cannot be a role for it moving forward.

The NCAG needs to move in and have a technocratic government that is actually representing all Palestinians there and sidelining those that brought this tremendous pain on Israel and ruin on Gaza.

And so to me, the issue isn't so much, oh, great, they weren't able to play the mediators off one another.

To me, the bigger thing is the mediators haven't stepped up and said, you went so far beyond the pale.

And now we need to move beyond.

We need to get to a point where Gazans can have running water and sanitary conditions and live in something other than muddy tents.

And ultimately, the power that is preventing that is Hamas.

I will say on the issue of Qatar and Turkey, because the Board of Peace's interpretation goes like this.

They wanted to play the mediators off against each other, Egypt off against Qatar and Turkey, and assuming Turkey and Qatar were more friendlier to Hamas, and they wanted to link their future to the Iran MOU, that was the U.S. Iran war, memorandum of understanding, which Lebanon is linked into, and Hamas failed.

They didn't play the mediators off against each other.

So I'm trying to understand, did they fail in these talks, that they didn't get the mediators on their side, they didn't drive wedges against them? In that regard, as the Board of Peace says.

Matt, I'll start with you.

Look,

David, It's true.

They were not able to play the mediators off each other the way they wanted.

I think the bigger picture is they've got no concern whatsoever about losing the backing of any of their backers who are able to remain mediators.

I recall shortly after October 7th and Qatari officials told Reuters, when all is said and done, when the hostages are out, when all is said and done, we're going to have to have a conversation with Hamas, but no longer staying here.

And purportedly, some of the leaders have left Doha for Turkey.

I think that the line that the Turkish government is using with Hamas may actually be effective vis-a-vis Hamas, but it's not one that the rest of us should be comfortable with.

The ceasefire, the 20-point plan is very clear.

Hamas should have no role in what comes next because of what they did on October 7th, not just to Israel.

but to fellow Palestinians, right? How many senior officials do we need to be able to quote? And your listeners can Google it, saying we needed the blood of Palestinians to spill.

They built hundreds of miles of bunkers to protect their fighters and not a single bomb shelter for fellow Palestinians.

I don't think that a winning argument at the end of the day in terms of the long-term vision of actually securing some type of stability in this region involves have Hamas minimize the number of guns they have, at least in Gaza, and go political.

Hamas needs to be sidelined politically in Gaza.

There cannot be a role for it moving forward.

The NCAG needs to move in and have a technocratic government that is actually representing all Palestinians there and sidelining those that brought this tremendous pain on Israel and ruin on Gaza.

And so to me, the issue isn't so much, oh, great, they weren't able to play the mediators off one another.

To me, the bigger thing is the mediators haven't stepped up and said, you went so far beyond the pale.

And now we need to move beyond.

We need to get to a point where Gazans can have running water and sanitary conditions and live in something other than muddy tents.

And ultimately, the power that is preventing that is Hamas.