The Philosophy of Free Will - Prof. Taylor Cyr - #61

I sort of follow the, the norm in the last few decades, which is to treat free will as a kind of technical term, where it, it picks out the kind of control that we have over our behavior, um, that's relevant for moral responsibility.

And that's related to the things that you're talking about in, um, in law, and especially in, um, criminal law and holding people responsible, especially punishment.

But what kind of control would we need to have over our behavior in order for us to be accountable for having done what we did or not done what we d- didn't do? Um, that's how I think about free will.

So if you kind of tether it to the concept of moral responsibility or accountability in particular, then the question becomes, well, what sort of free will or what sort of control is necessary for responsibility? Um, I think, you know, before the last few decades, um, philosophers had to be very careful to say what they meant by free will because it, it, I mean, it just...

Even now, it's used in all-- that term is used in all sorts of ways.

Um, even, I mean, the term free will is used outside of science and outside of philosophy and outside the law.

But if you ask 10 different people what they mean by free will, you'll probably get 10 different answers, even outside of academia.

So i- it's complicated, and I think the thing that, uh, is sorta like the common thread or maybe the like- The thing that most conceptions of free will sort of have a family resemblance to is something like this notion of control.

And, y-you know, it's been helpful in the last few decades to focus on the control required for moral responsibility.

But I think we've always been interested in are we in control? Um, is what we do up to us? That's the sort of thing that people have in mind with free will.

Um, so then if you think free will is just whatever control is required for moral responsibility, if that's how we choose to use that term, um, we could ask questions like, well, does moral responsibility require the freedom to be able to do differently than what you actually do? Or does it require, um, you know, not being caused by something outside of yourself? Or we could ask all these sorts of questions, and this is really what the heart of the free will debate in philosophy is, is what is this, um, kind of control that's necessary for responsibility?

Yeah, and how do you think, uh, does free will enter into our daily lives? Because it's a very famous topic within philosophy, of course.

Uh, it is also a, a very important topic within confines of the law, like we've briefly discussed.

Uh, but other than that, do you think, uh, when we have these discussions, how does that translate into our lives? And, and why is it so important to think about, uh, having free will and, and one's, uh, capacity to show agency and, and, and, and has, yeah, responsibility?

Right.

Yeah, for me, I think the most important thing are the, the, um, practices surrounding moral responsibility.

So when I, [clears throat] you know, express gratitude to my friend for helping me out when I needed it, um, I'm expressing praise in a way that I'm, I'm holding them accountable for the good thing that they've done.

It's a sort of positive accountability.

And, you know, if I didn't think that my friend had any kind of control over their behavior, I wouldn't have the same grounds for expressing that gratitude, right? Saying thank you might be a nice pleasantry, but it wouldn't have the same weight behind it.

And then on the negative side, and this is where I think we need even more justification for the practices, but, like, if I'm gonna express, you know, resentment or indignation or some other negative attitude because someone's done something wrong, right? If, if they couldn't help it, if they didn't have any control, if, if they weren't free in the relevant sense, it seems unfair and really unjust to, to chide them for, for doing wrong.

So I think our practices really depend on having this sense of free will or control.

Um, and then, you know, it, it could be that there's other practices that are sort of more peripheral to that but that are related.

I think even, like, the way we regard ourselves as, um, with, you know, pride over our accomplishments or guilt over the bad things that we've done, I, I think those wouldn't be fitting in the same way if we didn't have free will.

Uh, so it really, it really matters for those reasons.

Now, philosophers often stop there, although a few-- there are a few pla-places, especially at like in introduction volumes to the topic of free will, where people will say, "Well, here's all these other things that might be, you know, that free will might be necessary for and that are good things." It might be that, like, I don't know, creativity requires a kind of free will, or genuine love between persons requires that the people in love, um, are free, uh, in a certain sense, and all sorts of things too.