Final Episode on Bostock v. Clayton Co (2020), Evidence Gorsuch Was Wrong, Common-Sense Epistemology

This is Kavanaugh's dissent in Bostock versus Clayton County, Georgia.

What's the issue in this case again? It's about how to interpret a statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

We've talked about this a lot on the podcast.

Like I said, this is episode 13 of this series.

We've also talked about the Civil Right- Rights Act of 1964 in other episodes, like for example, our, uh, series we're doing on Chris Caldwell's Age of Enlightenment.

Fantastic, fantastic book.

It's probably the most important book about the Civil Rights Act.

I s- I would say a close second is a book about Wi- Barry Goldwater called Before the Storm.

I'd like to do that on the podcast.

We wanna understand the '60s, we also wanna understand wokeness here on the podcast, 'cause this has been so damaging.

Kavanaugh is helping.

He says on page 159 of the slip opinion, which is actually his page 15 of the slip opinion, Kavanaugh dissenting cite as 590 US Reports blank 2020.

It might be in the volume.

I'm, I'm hoping it's in the volume at, at some point pretty soon, if it's not already.

Kavanaugh at the end there says, well, let me...

Let's get the last sentence that we did last time on July 19th.

In short, an extensive body of federal law both reflects and reinforces the widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.

Recall, this, um, had two Republicans peel off and join the Democrats, interpreting this statute to encompass in its language of sex discrimination prevention, uh, both transgender, so-called transgender discrimination, and sexual orientation discrimination, so that you have the alphabet people coming out and saying, "We're sex discriminated too, and let's, let's get some protection from this bill in 1964." And the Republicans, like Gorsuch and Roberts, said, "Yeah, that sounds great." And Kavanaugh saying, "No." Alito saying, "No." So Republicans are on the dissent.

And Kavanaugh is saying the story is the same with bills proposed in Congress.

Since the 1970s, members of Congress have introduced many bills to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.

Until very recently, all of those bills would have expressed- expressly established sexual orientation as a separately proscribed category of sex- of discrimination.

The bills did not define sex discrimination to encompass sexual orientation discrimination.

This is all about how to interpret statutes.

How do we interpret what the statute in 1964 means? And Kavanaugh is saying, no, they didn't have the so-called transgender stuff on their radar, and they didn't have the so-called gay stuff on their rad- radar either.

They were protecting women primarily.

This is Kavanaugh's dissent in Bostock versus Clayton County, Georgia.

What's the issue in this case again? It's about how to interpret a statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

We've talked about this a lot on the podcast.

Like I said, this is episode 13 of this series.

We've also talked about the Civil Right- Rights Act of 1964 in other episodes, like for example, our, uh, series we're doing on Chris Caldwell's Age of Enlightenment.

Fantastic, fantastic book.

It's probably the most important book about the Civil Rights Act.

I s- I would say a close second is a book about Wi- Barry Goldwater called Before the Storm.

I'd like to do that on the podcast.

We wanna understand the '60s, we also wanna understand wokeness here on the podcast, 'cause this has been so damaging.

Kavanaugh is helping.

He says on page 159 of the slip opinion, which is actually his page 15 of the slip opinion, Kavanaugh dissenting cite as 590 US Reports blank 2020.

It might be in the volume.

I'm, I'm hoping it's in the volume at, at some point pretty soon, if it's not already.

Kavanaugh at the end there says, well, let me...

Let's get the last sentence that we did last time on July 19th.

In short, an extensive body of federal law both reflects and reinforces the widespread understanding that sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.

Recall, this, um, had two Republicans peel off and join the Democrats, interpreting this statute to encompass in its language of sex discrimination prevention, uh, both transgender, so-called transgender discrimination, and sexual orientation discrimination, so that you have the alphabet people coming out and saying, "We're sex discriminated too, and let's, let's get some protection from this bill in 1964." And the Republicans, like Gorsuch and Roberts, said, "Yeah, that sounds great." And Kavanaugh saying, "No." Alito saying, "No." So Republicans are on the dissent.

And Kavanaugh is saying the story is the same with bills proposed in Congress.

Since the 1970s, members of Congress have introduced many bills to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace.

Until very recently, all of those bills would have expressed- expressly established sexual orientation as a separately proscribed category of sex- of discrimination.

The bills did not define sex discrimination to encompass sexual orientation discrimination.

This is all about how to interpret statutes.

How do we interpret what the statute in 1964 means? And Kavanaugh is saying, no, they didn't have the so-called transgender stuff on their radar, and they didn't have the so-called gay stuff on their rad- radar either.

They were protecting women primarily.