Dec 9, 2025 · 2 hr 11 min · 12 segments
National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Federal Election Commission Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2025. Petitioner: National Republican Senatorial Committee. Respondent: Federal…
Noel J. FranciscoGuest
Sarah M. HarrisGuestRoman MartinezGuest
Marc E. EliasGuest
Sonia SotomayorGuest
Elena KaganGuest
Ketanji Brown JacksonGuest
Samuel AlitoGuest
Brett KavanaughGuest
John RobertsHost
Clarence ThomasGuestQuestioning JusticeGuest
Secondly, we began on jurisdiction with Vice President Vance because it's frankly indisputable that the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction and statutory authority over Vice President Vance at the time that it ruled.
He was not yet elected to the Vice Presidency, so he was still a sitting United States Senator, even under my friend's view.
That would be within the Article III jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit.
And as a voter, he had the authority to trigger 30110's independent cause of action.
What matters in this Court is that you have authority under the cert statute.
And that you have Article III jurisdiction, which you do with respect to Vice President Vance for all of the reasons discussed, and which you also have with respect to the committees.
His only argument there is that the committee's authority arises from a 50-year-old regulation.
In Loper, you made clear that that regulation survives as a matter of statutory stare decisis.
And in 2014, Congress ratified that regulation when it adopted exceptions to the coordinated spending limits and explicitly applied those exceptions to the congressional committees.
That makes no sense unless the limits apply to the committees in the first place.
My third point goes to the merits, and it goes to Justice Alito, your question.
The base limits here show almost to a metaphysical certitude that the coordinated spending limits have nothing to do with quid pro quo bribery.
Secondly, we began on jurisdiction with Vice President Vance because it's frankly indisputable that the Sixth Circuit had jurisdiction and statutory authority over Vice President Vance at the time that it ruled.
He was not yet elected to the Vice Presidency, so he was still a sitting United States Senator, even under my friend's view.
That would be within the Article III jurisdiction of the Sixth Circuit.
And as a voter, he had the authority to trigger 30110's independent cause of action.
What matters in this Court is that you have authority under the cert statute.
And that you have Article III jurisdiction, which you do with respect to Vice President Vance for all of the reasons discussed, and which you also have with respect to the committees.
His only argument there is that the committee's authority arises from a 50-year-old regulation.
In Loper, you made clear that that regulation survives as a matter of statutory stare decisis.
And in 2014, Congress ratified that regulation when it adopted exceptions to the coordinated spending limits and explicitly applied those exceptions to the congressional committees.
That makes no sense unless the limits apply to the committees in the first place.
My third point goes to the merits, and it goes to Justice Alito, your question.
The base limits here show almost to a metaphysical certitude that the coordinated spending limits have nothing to do with quid pro quo bribery.
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