Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)
Jun 30, 2026 · 3 hr 17 min · 11 segments
In the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, the appellant was acquitted by a jury of one count of sexual assault. The appellant and complainant had three sexual encounters. It is alleged that before the…
Andrew S. BargeGuest
Sheilah MartinPanelistMalcolm RowePanelist
Blair McPhersonGuest
Richard WagnerHostRikash WaltersGuest
Mark C. HalfyardGuest
Mila ShahGuestCurtis ThievesGueston behalf of the appellant Mr. Belinsky, my oral submissions will consist of three parts.
First, I will discuss the overview of the appellant's position on this appeal, as well as points of agreement with the respondent and intervener in this file, as well as areas of contention.
Second, I will discuss the legal principles and policy considerations associated with proof of mens rea of the crime of sexual assault.
as well as the jury instructions and principles of horizontal stare decisis and statutory interpretation that apply to this case.
And third, I will briefly outline the relevant legal considerations pertaining to Mr. Bulinski's appeal as of right.
The fundamental question to be answered on this appeal is as follows must the crown prove an essential element of an offense where an accused does not raise an affirmative defense our system of law requires that the answer to that question be yes the outcome of this appeal on both questions must be corollary to that answer and I want to discuss some of the points of agreement and contention, specifically with respect to the respondent.
I appreciate my friend's very significant submissions on the quote-unquote changes of language that we've seen.
What I will say is that Mr. Balinski disagrees with the interpretation of Robertson advanced by the respondent.
which have repeatedly emphasized that there is a second element of mens rea that must be proven in the sexual assault case in terms of the robertson decision itself i've had the opportunity to review it again even this morning and i do note that paragraph 26 of that decision specifically states that there's disagreement within the court about and I will just go to that paragraph.
It says, although there has been some difference of view on the court as to whether the accused's knowledge of lack of consent is described as an element of the offense or a defense of mistake of fact, the court has been unanimous in its agreement in one proposition, there must be evidence that gives an air of reality to the accused's argument that he believed the complainant was consenting before the issue goes to the jury.
What it does is it then reaffirms that, in fact, there is a mens rea element relating to knowledge, and then further confirms where the burden is in terms of the defense and the defense of honest but mistaken belief and consent, and then explains that there is a requirement on the accused, that it can't go to the jury without an air of reality.
But the last paragraph of Robertson is very instructive Because the court then goes on to say, applying the statutory test to the evidence in this case, I find that there was no error in the trial.
Judges charged the jury.
And that's important because The following text discusses the very specific evidentiary factual matrix that underpinned the jury charge in that case.
So maybe in that case, it wasn't an error of law.
But in other cases, it might be.
And again, my concern with applying Robertson broadly is that it's very difficult to reconcile with other decisions of this court including the decision in Barton where this court had the opportunity to specifically articulate the defense of honest but mistaken belief and consent and there was never essentially what the respondent is attempting to persuade the court of, there was never an attempt to collapse the two concepts together.
Can I ask you this? When you look at the cases like Robertson and Papajohn, in particular Chief Justice Dixon's comments, and even reflected to a certain extent in you and Chuck, there's this discussion of mistake of fact, mens rea, being really two sides of the same coin, both of them speaking to blameworthiness.
Can we read the legislation that Parliament passed at that point in time to be a reflection that the reasonable steps requirement for an honest belief in non-consent is really a reflection of both sides of that coin of blameworthiness?
on behalf of the appellant Mr. Belinsky, my oral submissions will consist of three parts.
First, I will discuss the overview of the appellant's position on this appeal, as well as points of agreement with the respondent and intervener in this file, as well as areas of contention.
Second, I will discuss the legal principles and policy considerations associated with proof of mens rea of the crime of sexual assault.
as well as the jury instructions and principles of horizontal stare decisis and statutory interpretation that apply to this case.
And third, I will briefly outline the relevant legal considerations pertaining to Mr. Bulinski's appeal as of right.
The fundamental question to be answered on this appeal is as follows must the crown prove an essential element of an offense where an accused does not raise an affirmative defense our system of law requires that the answer to that question be yes the outcome of this appeal on both questions must be corollary to that answer and I want to discuss some of the points of agreement and contention, specifically with respect to the respondent.
I appreciate my friend's very significant submissions on the quote-unquote changes of language that we've seen.
What I will say is that Mr. Balinski disagrees with the interpretation of Robertson advanced by the respondent.
which have repeatedly emphasized that there is a second element of mens rea that must be proven in the sexual assault case in terms of the robertson decision itself i've had the opportunity to review it again even this morning and i do note that paragraph 26 of that decision specifically states that there's disagreement within the court about and I will just go to that paragraph.
It says, although there has been some difference of view on the court as to whether the accused's knowledge of lack of consent is described as an element of the offense or a defense of mistake of fact, the court has been unanimous in its agreement in one proposition, there must be evidence that gives an air of reality to the accused's argument that he believed the complainant was consenting before the issue goes to the jury.
What it does is it then reaffirms that, in fact, there is a mens rea element relating to knowledge, and then further confirms where the burden is in terms of the defense and the defense of honest but mistaken belief and consent, and then explains that there is a requirement on the accused, that it can't go to the jury without an air of reality.
But the last paragraph of Robertson is very instructive Because the court then goes on to say, applying the statutory test to the evidence in this case, I find that there was no error in the trial.
Judges charged the jury.
And that's important because The following text discusses the very specific evidentiary factual matrix that underpinned the jury charge in that case.
So maybe in that case, it wasn't an error of law.
But in other cases, it might be.
And again, my concern with applying Robertson broadly is that it's very difficult to reconcile with other decisions of this court including the decision in Barton where this court had the opportunity to specifically articulate the defense of honest but mistaken belief and consent and there was never essentially what the respondent is attempting to persuade the court of, there was never an attempt to collapse the two concepts together.
Can I ask you this? When you look at the cases like Robertson and Papajohn, in particular Chief Justice Dixon's comments, and even reflected to a certain extent in you and Chuck, there's this discussion of mistake of fact, mens rea, being really two sides of the same coin, both of them speaking to blameworthiness.
Can we read the legislation that Parliament passed at that point in time to be a reflection that the reasonable steps requirement for an honest belief in non-consent is really a reflection of both sides of that coin of blameworthiness?
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