Nicholas Kasirer

You know, even my friends from the Canadian Gaming Association and their factum acknowledge that for normal people from the perspective of players, this is one game.

All I'm trying to say, Justice Kasirer, is that from a statutory perspective, it, the, our primary position is it's also one game, and Justice Van Rensburg's dissent beginning at, beginning at paragraph 245, that is her position.

I think all she's saying at paragraph 301, which is what you're alluding to, is that if you, if you conceive this as two games, it doesn't change the analysis, and we agree with that because you would still be en- entering into extraterritorial entanglements.

But the, the simplest analytical path, both as a matter of common sense and as a matter of statutory interpretation, is this is one game.

The court should presume that that will be the case, that we will exclude on, people in Canada outside of Ontario on that basis.

What the appellants suggest is that the court should decide the reference on a different basis, that they should assume that we aren't going to do something that we say, we say we will, and decide the case on that, on that basis.

A- and we say that would be answering a different question, sorry, Justice Kasirer.

How can it be that definitive when the schedule talks about, um, in the absence of an agreement? I mean, it, it, it will be o- ob- obviously not a situation of participation in the absence of an agreement, and the agreement then opens the door to participation of other Canadians.

You know, even my friends from the Canadian Gaming Association and their fact and acknowledge that for normal people from the perspective of players, this is one game.

All I'm trying to say, Justice Kasirer, is that from a statutory perspective, it-- the-- our primary position is it's also one game.

And Justice Van Rensburg's dissent beginning at, beginning at paragraph two forty-five, that is her position.

I think all she's saying at paragraph three oh one, which is what you're alluding to, is that if you, if you conceive this as two games, it doesn't change the analysis, and we agree with that because you would still be en-entering into extraterritorial entanglements.

The court should presume that that will be the case, that we will exclude on-- people in Canada outside of Ontario on that basis.

What the appellant suggests is that the court should decide the reference on a different basis, that they should assume that we aren't going to do something that we say, we say we will, and decide the case on that, on that basis.

A-and we say that would be answering a different question, sorry, Justice Kasirer.

How can it be that definitive when the schedule talks about, um, in the absence of an agreement? I mean, it, it, it will be o-ob-obviously not a situation of participation in the absence of an agreement, and the agreement then opens the door to participation of other Canadians.

It, I, it-- maybe I've got that wrong, but that's, that's how I see the, the dissenting judges having attended to your, your, your issue.

Thank you, Justice Kasirer.

Um, so the, the best answer I have for the question is that this is an ambiguous and unusual case.

I think we can all agree with that.