Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio)
Oct 9, 2026 · 4 hr 14 min · 13 segments
The respondent, Abdel Karim Chemlal, was convicted of three charges, namely possession and concealed carrying of a prohibited firearm and possession of crack. The weapon was discovered by a police…
Society asks police officers to expose themselves to danger, to acquit themselves of their mission, which is to defend peace and people's safety, respecting the law.
The court has always respect-- recognized this danger and recognized the, uh, right for police officers to avoid danger as much as possible, and that's what we are discussing today.
This court has to confirm that a police officer that believes objectively that they may be faced with an armed individual should be able to act to ensure their security and the security of the public.
The alternative is intolerable, in our opinion.
If they have a reason-- They need reasonable grounds to suspect.
Police officers need-- cannot be placed between a rock and a hard place between someone getting injured and unreasonably strict constitutional interpretations.
I would like to talk about the sense and meaning given to the McDonald decision, see if it has to be clarified or if it has to be set aside.
Then my colleague will talk about the legality of the search and section twenty-four too.
I'd like to highlight that our colleague, Justice Abonsawin, is sitting remotely today.
I must also note from the very beginning that this case is not one of racial profiling.
In the initial, initial request and in the questions asked to the witness and during the trial, there were no suggestions or trace of any racial profiling in the police intervention.
It was not mentioned during the appeal either.
The respondent says that his reaction could have been due to his pus-- his being part of a racial minority, but...
Mr. Fitzgerald, will you talk to us-- Well, you're going to talk to us, of course, about your interpretation of the McDonald decision and if it should be set aside or not.
When it comes to reasonable doubt-- uh, reasonable suspicion rather, the first judge said that there was no prof-- uh, racial profiling, but will you talk to us about the possible impact of reasonable suspicion standards on racial profiling? Answer: Yes, absolutely, I will talk about it.
The standard that we propose allows us to, uh, reduce this risk.
It's important to think about racial profiling and potential-- and the potential for it to be used in an abusive way and in an unreasonable way.
So I would like us to tackle the idea of racial profiling, but on a more theoretical level when it comes to setting legal standards.
But the reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one to have proof that supports reasonable suspicion, so it's important to have facts that, uh, can, uh, support this.
Yes, absolutely.
Well, I'll go into something I wanted to mention later on, but I think that reasonable suspicion, it involves a, an objective fact, objective standards.
Having an objective standard is all that common law can do to control police abuse when it comes to, uh, powers given to the police, and that's the best we can do.
This court has already decided a number of times that reasonable suspicion was drafted to, uh, avoid police abuse, to avoid discrimination and racial profiling.
We see this in the Amad, uh, decision at, uh, tab twenty-five.
Society asks police officers to expose themselves to danger, to acquit themselves of their mission, which is to defend peace and people's safety, respecting the law.
The court has always respect-- recognized this danger and recognized the, uh, right for police officers to avoid danger as much as possible, and that's what we are discussing today.
This court has to confirm that a police officer that believes objectively that they may be faced with an armed individual should be able to act to ensure their security and the security of the public.
The alternative is intolerable, in our opinion.
If they have a reason-- They need reasonable grounds to suspect.
Police officers need-- cannot be placed between a rock and a hard place between someone getting injured and unreasonably strict constitutional interpretations.
I would like to talk about the sense and meaning given to the McDonald decision, see if it has to be clarified or if it has to be set aside.
Then my colleague will talk about the legality of the search and section twenty-four too.
I'd like to highlight that our colleague, Justice Abonsawin, is sitting remotely today.
I must also note from the very beginning that this case is not one of racial profiling.
In the initial, initial request and in the questions asked to the witness and during the trial, there were no suggestions or trace of any racial profiling in the police intervention.
It was not mentioned during the appeal either.
The respondent says that his reaction could have been due to his pus-- his being part of a racial minority, but...
Mr. Fitzgerald, will you talk to us-- Well, you're going to talk to us, of course, about your interpretation of the McDonald decision and if it should be set aside or not.
When it comes to reasonable doubt-- uh, reasonable suspicion rather, the first judge said that there was no prof-- uh, racial profiling, but will you talk to us about the possible impact of reasonable suspicion standards on racial profiling? Answer: Yes, absolutely, I will talk about it.
The standard that we propose allows us to, uh, reduce this risk.
It's important to think about racial profiling and potential-- and the potential for it to be used in an abusive way and in an unreasonable way.
So I would like us to tackle the idea of racial profiling, but on a more theoretical level when it comes to setting legal standards.
But the reasonable suspicion standard is an objective one to have proof that supports reasonable suspicion, so it's important to have facts that, uh, can, uh, support this.
Yes, absolutely.
Well, I'll go into something I wanted to mention later on, but I think that reasonable suspicion, it involves a, an objective fact, objective standards.
Having an objective standard is all that common law can do to control police abuse when it comes to, uh, powers given to the police, and that's the best we can do.
This court has already decided a number of times that reasonable suspicion was drafted to, uh, avoid police abuse, to avoid discrimination and racial profiling.
We see this in the Amad, uh, decision at, uh, tab twenty-five.
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