RUSSIA VS. EUROPE

So it's not as if Russian attacks on European infrastructure are a new thing.

There was that swarm of drones that flew into Poland, the explosives placed on a rail line in Poland, the jamming of aviation systems over Sweden, the hacking of a dam in Norway, and the plot to place explosive devices on cargo planes, just to name a few.

Lithuanian officials recently arrested nine people accused of plotting assassinations and sabotage across Europe on behalf of Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU.

James, we've done the past several podcasts looking at how Russia's war against Ukraine is flailing from various angles.

Given that context, what's the strategic reason for Russia to escalate against Europe at this point?

There is a strategic reason.

Mm.

And it's, and it's hardly been discussed at all.

Mm.

The, uh, [sighs] the Russians perceive a mental revolution has taken place in Europe, and it has triggered something of a revolution in Russians' understanding of it, of its threats.

And it really pretty much dates from the period just after the Alaska Summit, when senior European leaders en bloc went to confront Trump and basically said to him, "Whatever your views are about Ukraine, this is a vital interest for us, and we're not going to let Ukraine fail." The Russians, all along in my entire life, have seen Europe as a vassal of the United States, as a platform, uh, for US weapon systems and US capabilities, uh, but not as a cohesive actor in its own right.

What they are seeing now, and I think with a degree of justice, is that in much of Europe, in the key parts of Europe, there's been a realization of that, uh, e- even if it is not publicly articulated for diplomatic reasons, that it's up to us now.

We have to take the lead when it comes to shoring up, um, and backing Ukraine.

We need, on our own, an answer to the question: how do we deter and contain Russia going forward? Uh, I think I have mentioned once on your program that even before Trump was reelected, the, uh, former, let's just say a former h- very high-ranking British military officer said, "We m- must plan for the next war on the assumption that the United States will not be there." Well, this kind of thinking, at least privately, has advanced, and the, um, the Russians have been alerted to it.

And let me just make a c- a contrast, uh, to underscore this point.

Western threat assessments, in my view at least, are primarily capabilities generated.

The Russians take with the utmost seriousness not just what we call intentions, but identities, attitudes, mentalities, belief systems, mindsets-And even though they emphasize all the weaknesses and capabilities in Europe that we do, the, uh, th- the, this other dimension, uh, has commanding significance for them.

So I think this is new, and then they have to think about how they respond to this going forward.

Mm.

Now, the interesting thing, Brian, it was not just in your summary and it was not just in the GCHQ, uh, Q director's assessment.

Everything she cites as examples of what we need to be worried about fall into the category of gray zone warfare, which of course contains many kinetic elements.

Mm-hmm.

But this is not the kind of warfare that is likely to, and certainly not intended to trigger, uh, a collective response from NATO.

Um, so it says these activities in themselves don't suggest anything fundamentally new about Russians preparing for a larger war, uh, with NATO.

Um, and one should not exclude that possibility at all, particularly in the light of this change that I mentioned.