Graduate Institute What Matters Today
Jun 29, 2026 · 49 min · 8 segments
The recent confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has once again placed the Middle East at the centre of global attention. While a fragile ceasefire may have eased immediate…
Cyrus ShayeghGuest
Dan GrahamHost
From a historical perspective, how did the rivalry between Iran and the United States develop over the course of the 20th century, and to what extent do current events reflect that long-standing relationship?
I think they reflect that relationship, and more specifically since 1979, that sort of rivalry, if not enmity to a degree.
But perhaps as importantly as not, there is a really new sort of period that we witness here.
So let me first talk about long-term patterns and similarities and then talk about what's changed and, and why and how.
Until 1951, '53, absolutely most Iranians saw the United States not as a problem, but as part of a solution vis-à-vis, uh, European empires, most specifically Russia and Great Britain, which in different ways had been a sort of territorial and political problem for Iran since the early 19th century.
This changed in '53 because the United States, and specifically the CIA, played a central organizing, though not the exclusive role, in a coup d'état that together with the British and with Iranian royalists overthrew democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.
Now, the Shah at that point in time, Mohammad Reza Shah, was brought back to power and stayed in power partly certainly until the nin- early 1970s because he was, you know, clearly supported by the United States and all the way until 1979.
He was supported by US also in the '70s, but by that point in time, he became much more independent.
In '79, the revolution happened, which ultimately after, you know, some ups and downs, central Islamist factions around Ayatollah Khomeini won.
And at that point in time, Iran turned from a central prop and pillar of the West strategic strategy in the Middle East to a very big problem and then in fact, an ever bigger problem for the United States.
In actual fact, it is because of the Iranian Revolution and because of another very important event that happened later the same year, namely the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, that the United States became much more directly involved in the Gulf security architecture than it had been before.
The listeners need to understand that sort of structurally speaking, the security of the Gulf was, you know, managed/we could say the Gulf was colonially dominated by Great Britain from the early 19th century until Britain's exit from the Gulf and from all positions east of Suez in 1971.
From '71 to '79, it was principally Iran, secondarily Sa- the Saudis, who replaced Britain as the principal security guarantors of the Gulf, and after, supported by the United States, like very obviously and directly supported by the United States, I should add.
And that, of course, scared the United States very much, and it scared just as much Arab states and neighbors of Iran, countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to just mention a few.
It is because of this development and, as I said, because of the more or less simultaneous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that the United States started to convince themselves and were convinced by certain Arab countries in the Gulf that they need to start playing a more direct role in the security of the Gulf.
And it is at that point in time that the US administration in early 1980 passes the so-called Carter Doctrine, which states that the United States will react if necessary with military force in order to prevent any enemical, you know, non-friendly power from taking over and dominating the Persian Gulf.
... at this point in time that the Gulf started to become in the minds of US foreign policy, you know, officials and strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who at that point in time was the national security advisor of Carter, it was at this point in time that the Gulf became a third central Area of strategic global interest of the United States and directly in addition to the two others that have been such areas from 1945, and that was Western Europe and East Asia.
So what the Americans did at the start was to not have a direct, you know, foothold in the Gulf.
From a historical perspective, how did the rivalry between Iran and the United States develop over the course of the 20th century, and to what extent do current events reflect that long-standing relationship?
I think they reflect that relationship, and more specifically since 1979, that sort of rivalry, if not enmity to a degree.
But perhaps as importantly as not, there is a really new sort of period that we witness here.
So let me first talk about long-term patterns and similarities and then talk about what's changed and, and why and how.
Until 1951, '53, absolutely most Iranians saw the United States not as a problem, but as part of a solution vis-à-vis, uh, European empires, most specifically Russia and Great Britain, which in different ways had been a sort of territorial and political problem for Iran since the early 19th century.
This changed in '53 because the United States, and specifically the CIA, played a central organizing, though not the exclusive role, in a coup d'état that together with the British and with Iranian royalists overthrew democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.
Now, the Shah at that point in time, Mohammad Reza Shah, was brought back to power and stayed in power partly certainly until the nin- early 1970s because he was, you know, clearly supported by the United States and all the way until 1979.
He was supported by US also in the '70s, but by that point in time, he became much more independent.
In '79, the revolution happened, which ultimately after, you know, some ups and downs, central Islamist factions around Ayatollah Khomeini won.
And at that point in time, Iran turned from a central prop and pillar of the West strategic strategy in the Middle East to a very big problem and then in fact, an ever bigger problem for the United States.
In actual fact, it is because of the Iranian Revolution and because of another very important event that happened later the same year, namely the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, that the United States became much more directly involved in the Gulf security architecture than it had been before.
The listeners need to understand that sort of structurally speaking, the security of the Gulf was, you know, managed/we could say the Gulf was colonially dominated by Great Britain from the early 19th century until Britain's exit from the Gulf and from all positions east of Suez in 1971.
From '71 to '79, it was principally Iran, secondarily Sa- the Saudis, who replaced Britain as the principal security guarantors of the Gulf, and after, supported by the United States, like very obviously and directly supported by the United States, I should add.
And that, of course, scared the United States very much, and it scared just as much Arab states and neighbors of Iran, countries like Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates to just mention a few.
It is because of this development and, as I said, because of the more or less simultaneous Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that the United States started to convince themselves and were convinced by certain Arab countries in the Gulf that they need to start playing a more direct role in the security of the Gulf.
And it is at that point in time that the US administration in early 1980 passes the so-called Carter Doctrine, which states that the United States will react if necessary with military force in order to prevent any enemical, you know, non-friendly power from taking over and dominating the Persian Gulf.
... at this point in time that the Gulf started to become in the minds of US foreign policy, you know, officials and strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who at that point in time was the national security advisor of Carter, it was at this point in time that the Gulf became a third central Area of strategic global interest of the United States and directly in addition to the two others that have been such areas from 1945, and that was Western Europe and East Asia.
So what the Americans did at the start was to not have a direct, you know, foothold in the Gulf.
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