WW1: Unusual Tales from The Great War.
Sep 26, 2026 · 19 min · 9 segments
In August 1914, under Admiral von Spee, the German Navy crossed the Pacific to inflict a terrible defeat on the British at the Battle of Coronel. A few months later their fate was sealed at the Battle…
Last heard of as the Japanese were preparing to land their forces on the Chinese coast headed for Tsingtao when the ships left the natural protection of Zhizhou Harbor to escape into the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean.
Let's start by looking at the strategic purpose of Germany having a fairly powerful naval presence in Asia.
Firstly, considered to be one of the causes of international friction in the years before World War I, was the Anglo-German naval arms race.
This started as Germany grew in economic and military power after unification in 1871.
With the British Navy globally dominant, we tried to maintain a two power standard, which meant the Royal Navy was at least as large as the next two largest navies combined.
By 1897, the German Admiral Tirpitz was devising ideas to strategically influence the potential actions of the British Navy without matching its power ship for ship.
The first recorded use of the term was in 1690 by Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington, commanding the Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Battle of Beachy Head.
With a superior French fleet, he believed maintaining a credible naval deterrent was enough to deter the threat of French invasion.
In the late 19th century Alfred Thayer Mahon, an American naval strategist, refined the concept to a defensive active posture, essentially a way for a weaker navy to tie down a stronger opponent without engagement.
This was based on three principles relying on deterrence , force multiplication , and operational restriction .
Mahon's fleet in being is about using a credible presence and capability to influence the actions of the enemy without combat.
The German navy never needed to be as large as the British, just credible and capable wherever it chose to be present.
In 1905, German naval doctrine said, "...damaging of British trade was the main goal of all operations.
If conditions were favorable, an attack on enemy warships could be considered in order to cripple British trade and to achieve superiority at sea.
From the late 1890s, Germany passed a series of German Fleet Acts, creating the funding and ambition for the expansion of its navy.
Only then did Britain respond with a plan to build six of the new dreadnought class battleships.
Last heard of as the Japanese were preparing to land their forces on the Chinese coast headed for Tsingtao when the ships left the natural protection of Zhizhou Harbor to escape into the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean.
Let's start by looking at the strategic purpose of Germany having a fairly powerful naval presence in Asia.
Firstly, considered to be one of the causes of international friction in the years before World War I, was the Anglo-German naval arms race.
This started as Germany grew in economic and military power after unification in 1871.
With the British Navy globally dominant, we tried to maintain a two power standard, which meant the Royal Navy was at least as large as the next two largest navies combined.
By 1897, the German Admiral Tirpitz was devising ideas to strategically influence the potential actions of the British Navy without matching its power ship for ship.
The first recorded use of the term was in 1690 by Admiral Arthur Herbert, 1st Earl of Torrington, commanding the Anglo-Dutch fleet in the Battle of Beachy Head.
With a superior French fleet, he believed maintaining a credible naval deterrent was enough to deter the threat of French invasion.
In the late 19th century Alfred Thayer Mahon, an American naval strategist, refined the concept to a defensive active posture, essentially a way for a weaker navy to tie down a stronger opponent without engagement.
This was based on three principles relying on deterrence , force multiplication , and operational restriction .
Mahon's fleet in being is about using a credible presence and capability to influence the actions of the enemy without combat.
The German navy never needed to be as large as the British, just credible and capable wherever it chose to be present.
In 1905, German naval doctrine said, "...damaging of British trade was the main goal of all operations.
If conditions were favorable, an attack on enemy warships could be considered in order to cripple British trade and to achieve superiority at sea.
From the late 1890s, Germany passed a series of German Fleet Acts, creating the funding and ambition for the expansion of its navy.
Only then did Britain respond with a plan to build six of the new dreadnought class battleships.
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