Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap up
Oct 2, 2026 · 26 min · 11 segments
Send us Fan Mail 🕵️ Is CSIS Breaking the Law? | Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up When can intelligence officers legally undertake activities…
Neil BissonHost
We begin this week's episode with our main story out of Ottawa, where the latest intelligence watchdog findings concerns an authority that many Canadians may not know exists.

Under specific conditions, CSIS employees and people acting under their direction can undertake activities that would otherwise constitute criminal offenses.

Intelligence officers need to collect information effectively, including in environments where their activities could otherwise expose them to criminal liability, but the protection is limited.

Employees must be designated, the permitted categories of activity require minister of determination and intelligence commissioner approval, and the framework does not authorize violations of charter rights.

Collecting intelligence from inside a terrorist organization may require working with someone who already has access to it.

Collecting information about foreign interference may involve debriefing a source who has used myths and disinformation to manipulate the voting of a diaspora community.

Collecting information concerning a state-sponsored sabotage attack on critical infrastructure may involve tasking previously identified foreign state proxy agents.

That creates difficult legal and ethical questions about what the source can do what an officer can direct, and how those activities are controlled.

According to the updated Canadian Press Report, Insira examined operations in 2022 and 2023 and identified what they categorized as possible failures involving employee designation, authorization to direct others, and jurisdictional records and reporting.

Importantly, it also found compliance with restrictions on the types of offenses permitted.

An activity can fall within a permitted category while still failing to satisfy the requirements governing who undertakes it and how it is authorized.

It also protects officers and sources from being placed in situations where their legal position is uncertain.

This is a callback to a previous episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up on October 17th, 2025.

In that episode, we examined and serious criticism of CSIS's management of secret technical capability, including concerns about consultation, operational procedures, and the authority for retaining collected information.

We also discussed CSIS's response and its disagreement with some of Insura's findings.

Insura's published 2024 annual report independently documented those concerns, including inadequate procedures and retention without a clearly articulated authority.

When intelligence capability is available, are the rules, approvals, and records supporting its use sufficiently clear? This is another useful distinction in Insura's earlier work.

Its 2025 report on public safety and CSIS accountability mechanisms explains that the jurisdictional framework can mitigate certain Canadian criminal law risks but offers no protection under foreign domestic law and does not resolve Canada's international law obligations.

We begin this week's episode with our main story out of Ottawa, where the latest intelligence watchdog findings concerns an authority that many Canadians may not know exists.

Under specific conditions, CSIS employees and people acting under their direction can undertake activities that would otherwise constitute criminal offenses.

Intelligence officers need to collect information effectively, including in environments where their activities could otherwise expose them to criminal liability, but the protection is limited.

Employees must be designated, the permitted categories of activity require minister of determination and intelligence commissioner approval, and the framework does not authorize violations of charter rights.

Collecting intelligence from inside a terrorist organization may require working with someone who already has access to it.

Collecting information about foreign interference may involve debriefing a source who has used myths and disinformation to manipulate the voting of a diaspora community.

Collecting information concerning a state-sponsored sabotage attack on critical infrastructure may involve tasking previously identified foreign state proxy agents.

That creates difficult legal and ethical questions about what the source can do what an officer can direct, and how those activities are controlled.

According to the updated Canadian Press Report, Insira examined operations in 2022 and 2023 and identified what they categorized as possible failures involving employee designation, authorization to direct others, and jurisdictional records and reporting.

Importantly, it also found compliance with restrictions on the types of offenses permitted.

An activity can fall within a permitted category while still failing to satisfy the requirements governing who undertakes it and how it is authorized.

It also protects officers and sources from being placed in situations where their legal position is uncertain.

This is a callback to a previous episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up on October 17th, 2025.

In that episode, we examined and serious criticism of CSIS's management of secret technical capability, including concerns about consultation, operational procedures, and the authority for retaining collected information.

We also discussed CSIS's response and its disagreement with some of Insura's findings.

Insura's published 2024 annual report independently documented those concerns, including inadequate procedures and retention without a clearly articulated authority.

When intelligence capability is available, are the rules, approvals, and records supporting its use sufficiently clear? This is another useful distinction in Insura's earlier work.

Its 2025 report on public safety and CSIS accountability mechanisms explains that the jurisdictional framework can mitigate certain Canadian criminal law risks but offers no protection under foreign domestic law and does not resolve Canada's international law obligations.
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