First Offensive- The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal
Sep 12, 2026 · 8 hr 3 min · 57 segments
U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume 1 The Pusan Perimeter by Nicholas Canzona and Lynn Montross delves into the critical early stages of the Korean War, focusing on the strategic and…
Chapter One, Part One of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty-three, Volume One, The Pusan Perimeter, by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
Korea, Doorstep of Strategy.
It meant little to most Americans on twenty-five June nineteen fifty to read in their Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea.
They could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year.
Yet the danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World War II when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.
The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the Cairo Conference of December nineteen forty-three.
With Soviet Russia not yet being represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed that, in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.
Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea's status as a Japanese possession since 1910.
Government, industry, commerce, agriculture, transportation, every phase of Korean life had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan.
As a consequence, the 25 million inhabitants of the peninsula were woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of independence.
Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring for recognition of his Korean government in exile.
The United States hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally.
Moscow had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan.
Such an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese kamikaze tactics.
In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin.
The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that Korea should be independent, and that, if a transition period were necessary, a trusteeship should be established, according to James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State.
He added in his memoirs that a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration for President Roosevelt's acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.
The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice.
Although Tsar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger in communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the wrongs resulting from the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later.
The price of Soviet military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905.
The historical background.
It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any such readjustment.
Korea is one of those tragic areas of the Earth's surface which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy.
As the focal point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula offers each of these powers a threshold for aggression against either of the other two.
Chapter One, Part One of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, nineteen fifty to nineteen fifty-three, Volume One, The Pusan Perimeter, by Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona.
This LibriVox recording is in the public domain.
Korea, Doorstep of Strategy.
It meant little to most Americans on twenty-five June nineteen fifty to read in their Sunday newspapers that civil strife had broken out in Korea.
They could hardly have suspected that this remote Asiatic peninsula was to become the scene of the fourth most costly military effort of American history, both in blood and money, before the end of the year.
Yet the danger of an explosion had been present ever since the end of World War II when the United States and the Soviet Union rushed into the political vacuum created in Korea by the defeat of Japan.
The Korean question came up officially for the first time at the Cairo Conference of December nineteen forty-three.
With Soviet Russia not yet being represented as a belligerent in the Far East, the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed that, in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.
Any discussion of this issue had to take into consideration Korea's status as a Japanese possession since 1910.
Government, industry, commerce, agriculture, transportation, every phase of Korean life had been administered by Japanese for the benefit of Japan.
As a consequence, the 25 million inhabitants of the peninsula were woefully lacking in experience to fit them for the responsibilities of independence.
Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean patriot, had long been clamoring for recognition of his Korean government in exile.
The United States hung back because of reluctance to offend Joseph Stalin, the Soviet dictator, at a time when Russia was a powerful military ally.
Moscow had a strong bargaining point, moreover, in the prospect of giving military aid to the United States in the fight against Japan.
Such an alliance was particularly desirable from the American viewpoint early in 1945 because of the losses resulting from Japanese kamikaze tactics.
In the belief that active Soviet participation might shorten the war and save thousands of American lives, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was disposed to compromise with Stalin.
The two agreed informally at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that Korea should be independent, and that, if a transition period were necessary, a trusteeship should be established, according to James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State.
He added in his memoirs that a desire to help the Koreans develop the skills and experience that would enable them to maintain their independence was the inspiration for President Roosevelt's acquiescence in the trusteeship idea.
The Soviet dictator made a plea at Yalta for historical justice.
Although Tsar Nicholas II had been execrated as a tyrant and warmonger in communist doctrine, Stalin demanded that the wrongs resulting from the Russo-Japanese War be righted 40 years later.
The price of Soviet military aid against Japan, in short, was the restoration of Russian territory in the Far East that had been lost in the defeat of 1905.
The historical background.
It was inevitable that the fate of Korea would be involved in any such readjustment.
Korea is one of those tragic areas of the Earth's surface which are destined in all ages to be a doorstep of strategy.
As the focal point of the China-Russia-Japan triangle, the peninsula offers each of these powers a threshold for aggression against either of the other two.
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