#95 - Rabbi Moshe Feinstein: The Theory of Halakhic Decision, Part 2

He begins by describing just what a chutzpah it is for anybody to declare on any question that this is the halakha, this is what the Torah would have us do.

It's a chutzpah because it's presumably the job of the poseik, the halakhic authority, to discern emet, halakhic truth, to arrive at amitut ha-din, the unquestionably correct ruling on a question of halakha.

And that standard, he says, is too much for us.

If the Rishonim, our great rabbinic predecessors, could identify the correct answer out of all the uncertainty and controversy in the Talmud and in the subsequent halakhic literature, then we, who most definitely do not measure up to their intellectual capabilities, we simply can't do that.

According to Feinstein, it is this perception of our limitations that explains why so many knowledgeable rabbis refuse to rule on halakhic questions and certainly refuse to publish those rulings.

And, he says, that's why he himself was originally reluctant to put his own responsa into practice.

print.

But, of course, he obviously overcame that reluctance.

He became the authoritative posse for North American orthodoxy.

He published many volumes of to-shoe vote, of responsa.

So how does he account for that turn? Well, that's the question on which we ended our last installment.

Feinstein's introduction continues with his answer, which begins on line three of the source sheet.

He begins by describing just what a chutzpah it is for anybody to declare on any question that this is the halakha, this is what the Torah would have us do.

It's a chutzpah because it's presumably the job of the poseik, the halakhic authority, to discern emet, halakhic truth, to arrive at amitut ha-din, the unquestionably correct ruling on a question of halakha.

And that standard, he says, is too much for us.

If the Rishonim, our great rabbinic predecessors, could identify the correct answer out of all the uncertainty and controversy in the Talmud and in the subsequent halakhic literature, then we, who most definitely do not measure up to their intellectual capabilities, we simply can't do that.

According to Feinstein, it is this perception of our limitations that explains why so many knowledgeable rabbis refuse to rule on halakhic questions and certainly refuse to publish those rulings.

And, he says, that's why he himself was originally reluctant to put his own responsa into practice.

print.

But, of course, he obviously overcame that reluctance.

He became the authoritative posse for North American orthodoxy.

He published many volumes of to-shoe vote, of responsa.

So how does he account for that turn? Well, that's the question on which we ended our last installment.

Feinstein's introduction continues with his answer, which begins on line three of the source sheet.