Oct 11, 2026 · 29 min · 9 segments
In episode 59 of the Supreme Court Opinions read podcast, we read the Supreme Court's opinion in *Abouammo v United States*. At issue in this case, whether the trial venue for a violation of 18 USC…
This case presents the question whether a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
Section 1519, which makes it a crime to knowingly falsify a document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation, must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred, or whether he may alternatively be tried in the district where the federal investigation was located.
While employed by Twitter at its San Francisco office, petitioner Ahmad Abuhamo provided confidential information to a high-level Saudi official about Saudi dissidents posting on the company's platform.
In exchange, the official wired Abuhamo three hundred thousand dollars.
Two San Francisco-based FBI agents who were investigating unauthorized disclosures of Twitter account information later flew to Seattle to interview Abuhamo at his home.
During the interview, Abuhamo denied giving the Saudi official confidential information, claiming that the payments were for consulting work.
When the agents asked for supporting documentation, Abuhamo went upstairs, created a fake invoice, and emailed it to one of the agents.
Back in San Francisco, the agents discovered from the emailed document's date and time metadata what Abuhamo had just done.
Abuhamo was indicted in the Northern District of California for falsifying a record under Section 1519.
He moved to dismiss the charge for improper venue, arguing that he could be tried only where the alleged falsification occurred.
The district court denied the motion, finding venue also proper in the place where the FBI investigation was located, and a jury convicted Abuhamo.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Section 1519's intent requirement with the intent to obstruct an investigation made the contemplated effects of the falsification part of the essential conduct of the offense, thereby permitting trial where the investigation the defendant intended to stymie was ongoing or contemplated.
Held, a defendant charged with violating Section 1519 must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred.
He cannot be tried in a different district where the investigation was located because no conduct constituting the offense happened there.
The Constitution twice safeguards a defendant's venue right.
Article III instructs that the trial of all crimes shall be held in the state where the crimes shall have been committed, and the Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to a jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
To implement that constitutional rule, courts generally determine the location of the offense's essential conduct elements by identifying the conduct constituting the offense, the things a defendant must do to violate the statute, and then ascertaining the place where those criminal acts occurred.
Under this framework, the venue for trying a Section 1519 offense must be where the document's falsification happened, which here was in Seattle.
Section 1519 imposes criminal liability on a person who knowingly falsifies a record or document with the intent to impede or obstruct a federal investigation.
The only prohibited act is the falsification of a document.
Once a person has committed that act with the requisite intent, he need do nothing more to violate the law.
Because the only proscribed conduct is falsification, venue must be where falsification occurred.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view, Section 1519's special intent provision does not lead to a different result.
This court has never looked to a statute's mens rea elements in considering venue, nor would it make much sense to do so.
This case presents the question whether a defendant charged with violating 18 U.S.C.
Section 1519, which makes it a crime to knowingly falsify a document with the intent to obstruct a federal investigation, must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred, or whether he may alternatively be tried in the district where the federal investigation was located.
While employed by Twitter at its San Francisco office, petitioner Ahmad Abuhamo provided confidential information to a high-level Saudi official about Saudi dissidents posting on the company's platform.
In exchange, the official wired Abuhamo three hundred thousand dollars.
Two San Francisco-based FBI agents who were investigating unauthorized disclosures of Twitter account information later flew to Seattle to interview Abuhamo at his home.
During the interview, Abuhamo denied giving the Saudi official confidential information, claiming that the payments were for consulting work.
When the agents asked for supporting documentation, Abuhamo went upstairs, created a fake invoice, and emailed it to one of the agents.
Back in San Francisco, the agents discovered from the emailed document's date and time metadata what Abuhamo had just done.
Abuhamo was indicted in the Northern District of California for falsifying a record under Section 1519.
He moved to dismiss the charge for improper venue, arguing that he could be tried only where the alleged falsification occurred.
The district court denied the motion, finding venue also proper in the place where the FBI investigation was located, and a jury convicted Abuhamo.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Section 1519's intent requirement with the intent to obstruct an investigation made the contemplated effects of the falsification part of the essential conduct of the offense, thereby permitting trial where the investigation the defendant intended to stymie was ongoing or contemplated.
Held, a defendant charged with violating Section 1519 must be tried in the district where the falsification occurred.
He cannot be tried in a different district where the investigation was located because no conduct constituting the offense happened there.
The Constitution twice safeguards a defendant's venue right.
Article III instructs that the trial of all crimes shall be held in the state where the crimes shall have been committed, and the Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to a jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
To implement that constitutional rule, courts generally determine the location of the offense's essential conduct elements by identifying the conduct constituting the offense, the things a defendant must do to violate the statute, and then ascertaining the place where those criminal acts occurred.
Under this framework, the venue for trying a Section 1519 offense must be where the document's falsification happened, which here was in Seattle.
Section 1519 imposes criminal liability on a person who knowingly falsifies a record or document with the intent to impede or obstruct a federal investigation.
The only prohibited act is the falsification of a document.
Once a person has committed that act with the requisite intent, he need do nothing more to violate the law.
Because the only proscribed conduct is falsification, venue must be where falsification occurred.
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's view, Section 1519's special intent provision does not lead to a different result.
This court has never looked to a statute's mens rea elements in considering venue, nor would it make much sense to do so.
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