Why does gas-rich Kazakhstan need Gazprom?

This week, after an unplanned delay, we return to the podcast with a discussion of Kazakhstan’s seemingly growing reliance on Russian natural gas for its domestic needs. The country plans to buy around 11 billion cubic metres from Gazprom in 2026, almost three times last year’s volume, with another 9 billion under discussion for 2027. That sounds counterintuitive for a major oil-and-gas producer. The explanation lies less in the size of Kazakhstan’s reserves than in its ability to process the gas it extracts and turn it into marketable fuel. Disruptions at Tengiz, damage to the Russian processing plant serving Karachaganak and repeated delays to new processing capacity at Kashagan have squeezed supply just as household connections and industrial demand have expanded. Russian imports may address the immediate shortage, but the continued high volumes anticipated next year point to a more structural problem. In our other topic of discussion, we turn to the case of Mansur Movlayev, a 31-year-old Chechen dissident detained in Kazakhstan since May 2025. Russia seeks his extradition over an accusation that he financed extremist activity. Movlayev says the case is politically motivated and that Chechen security forces previously abducted and tortured him. Kazakhstan has refused him asylum and approved his extradition, although an interim-measures request from the UN Human Rights Committee calls on Kazakhstan not to remove him while it considers his complaint. After Kazakhstan’s Cassation Court upheld the refusal of asylum, Movlayev attempted to take his own life and reportedly made a second attempt while he received hospital treatment. His case tests Kazakhstan’s obligation not to return anyone to a country where they face a credible risk of torture. For our interview this week, we speak to Zebo Isakova, Doctor of Science in Economics at Kimyo International University in Tashkent. Her paper, “Corridors Without Coordination: Why Uzbekistan’s Digital Trade Reforms Have Not Yet Produced an Integrated Export System,” appears in The Argument, CAPS Unlock’s policy essay series. Isakova argues that Uzbekistan has invested heavily in roads, railways and digital trade procedures without fully connecting the agencies responsible for individual shipments. Exporters must still navigate separate systems, repeat information and wait for sequential approvals. Larger companies can absorb those costs; smaller businesses frequently cannot. Links \* Corridors Without Coordination: Why Uzbekistan’s Digital Trade Reforms Have Not Yet Produced an Integrated Export System, by Zebo Isakova \* Why Has Kazakhstan Started Deporting Political Activists?, by Temur Umarov \* Russian Gas Supplies to Kazakhstan Could Triple to 11 bcm in 2026 — Deputy Minister, Interfax Kazakhstan \* Россия захватывает газовую отрасль Казахстана? (Is Russia Taking Control of Kazakhstan’s Gas Industry?), Exclusive.kz \* “I’m Tired of Injustice”: Chechen Activist Mansur Movlayev Attempted Suicide After Kazakhstan Denied Him Asylum, Bureau.kz \* Остался только страх. Почему Казахстан отказывает в убежище уроженцу Чечни (Only Fear Remains: Why Kazakhstan Is Denying Asylum to a Chechen Native), Caucasus.Realities Get full access to Havli - A Central Asia Substack at havli.substack.com/subscribe