The trouble began with the land itself.
In the years after the Revolution, Americans poured over the Appalachian Mountains and into the West faster than anyone had imagined they would.
Kentucky, which had held a few hundred settlers before the war, held tens of thousands within a decade, and was filling faster every year.
The Ohio was a moving highway of migration.
The garrison at one federal fort on the river counted, in a single winter, 177 boats carrying more than 2,600 people, with their livestock and household goods piled aboard, floating past on the way down into the countryside.
This was not a trickle.
It was a nation being born on the far side of the mountains, and it was being born faster than anyone on the seaboard had planned for.
They had found some of the best farmland in the world, and they found very quickly that they could not sell what they grew on it.
The problem was the mountains.
The Appalachian Mountains run like a wall down the whole length of the country, and hauling a heavy, low-value cargo like grain or flour or tobacco back east over that wall by pack horse and wagon cost more than the cargo was worth by the time it arrived.
The mountains made the eastern markets useless to the western farmer.
But the west had rivers.
And every one of them, the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, ran the same direction, west and south, down into the Mississippi, and the Mississippi River ran down to the sea at New Orleans.
Water carried what mountains could not.
A farmer could build a flatboat over the winter, pile it with a whole year's surplus, tobacco, flour, corn, salt pork, whiskey, hemp.
and float the entire load a thousand miles downriver to New Orleans on the current, for almost no cost at all.
At New Orleans, he would sell the cargo to an ocean-going ship bound for the Atlantic, sell the flatboat itself for its lumber, and walk home overland up the wilderness back home with his profits in his pocket.
But all of it depended on one thing, the right to stop at New Orleans, to land the goods and hold them on the dock until a seagoing ship could take them on.
Navigation without the right of deposit was worthless.
A boat that could float down the river but not unload at the bottom of it had wasted a trip.
The Mississippi was not a convenience to the West.
It was the West's only road to the world.
Everything the region would ever grow or sell had to go down that river, or it went nowhere, and Spain owned the bottom of it.
The trouble began with the land itself.
In the years after the Revolution, Americans poured over the Appalachian Mountains and into the West faster than anyone had imagined they would.
Kentucky, which had held a few hundred settlers before the war, held tens of thousands within a decade, and was filling faster every year.
The Ohio was a moving highway of migration.
The garrison at one federal fort on the river counted, in a single winter, 177 boats carrying more than 2,600 people, with their livestock and household goods piled aboard, floating past on the way down into the countryside.
This was not a trickle.
It was a nation being born on the far side of the mountains, and it was being born faster than anyone on the seaboard had planned for.
They had found some of the best farmland in the world, and they found very quickly that they could not sell what they grew on it.
The problem was the mountains.
The Appalachian Mountains run like a wall down the whole length of the country, and hauling a heavy, low-value cargo like grain or flour or tobacco back east over that wall by pack horse and wagon cost more than the cargo was worth by the time it arrived.
The mountains made the eastern markets useless to the western farmer.
But the west had rivers.
And every one of them, the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, ran the same direction, west and south, down into the Mississippi, and the Mississippi River ran down to the sea at New Orleans.
Water carried what mountains could not.
A farmer could build a flatboat over the winter, pile it with a whole year's surplus, tobacco, flour, corn, salt pork, whiskey, hemp.
and float the entire load a thousand miles downriver to New Orleans on the current, for almost no cost at all.
At New Orleans, he would sell the cargo to an ocean-going ship bound for the Atlantic, sell the flatboat itself for its lumber, and walk home overland up the wilderness back home with his profits in his pocket.
But all of it depended on one thing, the right to stop at New Orleans, to land the goods and hold them on the dock until a seagoing ship could take them on.
Navigation without the right of deposit was worthless.
A boat that could float down the river but not unload at the bottom of it had wasted a trip.
The Mississippi was not a convenience to the West.
It was the West's only road to the world.
Everything the region would ever grow or sell had to go down that river, or it went nowhere, and Spain owned the bottom of it.
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