Yep

...

the report this week, maybe yesterday.

I don't know.

Whatever it was.

Uh, they were able to take a look at, you know, w- who this individual was, and they found that this person actually didn't know very much about what they were doing.

Uh, very simple things like leaving the directory open to read.

Is this the, the background radiation? Agents are just gonna hit everything that you got forever and try and use it for, to, to further whatever they're trying to do?

... it's both pieces

... that, that actually has me thinking now, if we were to do a KNOW and do, like, an after action on this, the one thing that, that kind of jumped out at me with your analysis there is, um, I know because I've, I've been I- IT my whole life, you know? That's just my professional career is IT.

I'm not super focused on protecting government investigations and the assets that come out of that.

So because of that, all the playbooks I've built and all the playbooks I've ever reviewed and touched, they treat confidentiality as a regulatory risk for the most part.

Um, in this case though, confidentiality is a safety control.

Think about the actual people named in the cases that were leaked, or the sources, or whatever the case may be.

Hmm

...

Even then they slipped.

Certification leverage is, is, is how you move a market.

So that's the signal right there.

Um, you know, Davi, you already mentioned this, right? The exposure window is open and has been open.

State secrets, health data, uh, infrastructure designs, they have secrecy lifetimes of decades.

If an adversary is recording that traffic today, waiting for quantum computer before migrating, you know, by definition, um, that's, that's too long.

We're gonna see Y2K times 100, you know, the, the panic and, and fear.

Chris, from your perspective, are you assuming this is gonna be a de facto way to run a ransomware operation next year? And, and I guess how do we get ready for that?

So talk to us about other things that Dispense Times is doing to position our independent community pharmacies.

Yeah, Todd.

So a great example would be a, a few years ago, um, I had a pharmacy owner that had, had owned a store for about 25 years, and he fi- his wife wanted to go to San Diego, and our, a trade show just so happened to be in San Diego.

And we were able to get him and his wife out there, and they had a wonderful time, and he was able to network in a way that he'd never been able to do.

And he took me to a s- uh, he took me o- on the side after the show and he said, "Hey, I really appreciate you pushing me to do this." He said, "I've been operating in a vacuum within my four walls for 25 years thinking that that's the best thing to do, just put my head down and do what I know to do and take care of patients." And I, and, and I agreed with him.

That is the best thing to do, focus on your patients.

But there's so much out there from our peers, from, from quality vendors that care about pharmacy and don't wanna exploit pharmacy, and that's what we're trying to do, is create an ecosystem through this magazine that really is like, okay, if you get your head out of the, you know, the business and just look at, at it from above perspective, what are some of the strategic things and some of the ideas that you really need to focus on? And, and here are things, find the things that you're passionate about, uh, from a business perspective and the things that your market needs and, and hopefully those will, um, you know, intertwine a little bit, and that's where your pharmacy business, uh, will be going, right? So to bring it full circle, Dispense Times is trying to help pharmacies concentrate on ideas and concepts and vendors, and it's really just an educational opportunity for drugstore owners and, uh, uh, folks to, to help, you know, the viability of their business.

Uh, Chris, take us through a couple of these and just kind of, uh, cherry-pick maybe a couple that is near to, near and dear to your heart and, and how this bl- how these blueprints fit into the ecosystem of our independent community pharmacy owners.

Okay

...

I think in my head, trying to get anything done a- at Google is probably damn near impossible, right? Imagine now coordinating that across all of these different organizations.

I mean, that's impressive.

I, I, I'm glad that the outcome was positive.

That's impressive to me.

You know? The, the win is real.

Uh, eventually, I hope we can, you know, make the economics bad for, uh, for these criminal organizations, but I think we're a long way off that, 'cause the economics is just so good.

But according to CISA, the US has not seen an increase in Iranian cyber activity despite recent military strikes, describing the threat landscapes as steady, know if i like that while warning other actors remain active clearly there will be all types of clicking stories especially in a time of war but i'm curious chris from your perspective what is a cso to make of this in terms of you know prioritizing scarce resources we have we we've seen certainly with ukraine and russia that you know hot hot wars have very active and and ongoing cyber components to them i i'm curious like how are you contextualizing reports like this i guess

Yeah, this is tricky.

It's perfectly normal if you're reading this and saying, I have very conflicting opinions.

I don't know where to land on this.

I'm trying to use the data available to me to make a good choice here and guide my organization.

Akamai is looking at the weather, the noise and the volume, the raw data, while Sisa is looking at the war, the targeted strikes, the outcomes of like Handala.

And they're both right.

Chris, I'm curious for you, what does this bring to mind when you see a story like this?

I'm curious, Chris, what are your thoughts on this kind of ongoing situation here?

Yeah, so there's really two things.

The first one's really easy.

I was in an office with some teammates last week when this came out, and I heard somebody say, man, did you hear about that ransomware at Striker? I was like...

It wasn't ransomware guys.

This was just scorched earth.

This was not ransomware.

I'm, I'm curious, uh, Chris, for you, what are your thoughts on this new strategy here?

Chris, what about you? I mean, is behavioral the answer here or a bigger part of the solution here? What is your takeaway from this story?

Yeah, so I do agree.

Behavior is a part of it.

I try to anchor any strong opinion and some sort of security fundamental.

That way, at least I can argue it and look like I know what I'm saying.

Let's bucket behavior as one layer in the defense in depth strategy, right? This is the key under the mat exposed S3 credential.

That's a failure of basic hygiene.

I guess, does this reach a level of stability in, let's say, two, three years down the road in the near term here?

Uh, yeah, Chris, I mean, you're, you're kind of in the same thoughts here, but, but any other angles we need to think about with this?

Yeah.

So I'll, I'll expand on it a little bit, you know, um, just trained an entire nation.

click on sms links about data breaches right like every nigerian prince is high-fiving each other right now they're so excited they just opened up the floodgates to south korea but you know on on the incident response side because i spent a lot of time in my career working ir uh this is definitely an anti-pattern this represents everything not to do when communicating breach remediation um Organizations need to understand how their IR communications can create secondary attack vectors exactly like this.

The notification mechanism in this case is now a part of Coupang's attack surface.

So you've just made your job even harder.

And getting back to something you said, Pete, I agree with you on one part of it, but the other part is maybe you're wrong and maybe I'm wrong and a lot of people are wrong too.

Okay, show me an environment where you only store that and not something far more interesting.