Sep 20, 2026 · 42 min · 11 segments
In episode 55 of the Supreme Court Opinions read podcast, we read the Supreme Court's opinion in *Allen v Milligan*. At issue in this case, whether Alabama is entitled to a stay of a federal District…
In Louisiana v. Calais, to resolve the tension between vote dilution claims and the colorblind Constitution, the court updated standards for Section 2 liability under Thornburg v. Jingles.
As relevant here, the court held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Jingles precondition, a plaintiff's alternative map must meet all the state's legitimate districting objectives just as well as the state's own map.
A plaintiff also cannot use race as a districting criterion in preparing the alternative map.
And, to prove the second and third Jingles preconditions, a plaintiff must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation and show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.
After Kalay, the court vacated district court injunctions that prevented Alabama from using a congressional map that it enacted in 2023.
Two weeks after the injunctions were vacated, the district court entered another injunction on largely the same grounds.
State officials immediately applied to this court for a stay of that injunction.
Held.
At this preliminary stage, the state has shown that it is entitled to interim relief from the district court's injunction.
The state is likely to succeed on the merits as to both the intentional vote dilution and Section 2 claims.
As to the intentional vote dilution claim, the district court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith because it interpreted the state's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus.
And as to both claims, the district court likely erred because it found a violation even though the plaintiff's alternative map would not perform just as well as to the state's constitutionally permissible criteria of keeping together a community of interest and avoiding the pairing of incumbents.
The district court also failed to follow Kalay's instruction that the mere fact that voters of different races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving racially polarized voting patterns.
The state has also made a strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor it.
The court has repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.
Here, the district court interposed itself into Alabama's ongoing efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections.
Its view that conducting the elections under court-imposed maps would be more convenient for the state was not a valid justification for that intervention.
And now onto the opinion which was written per curiam.
In Louisiana v. Calais, to resolve the tension between vote dilution claims and the colorblind Constitution, the court updated standards for Section 2 liability under Thornburg v. Jingles.
As relevant here, the court held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Jingles precondition, a plaintiff's alternative map must meet all the state's legitimate districting objectives just as well as the state's own map.
A plaintiff also cannot use race as a districting criterion in preparing the alternative map.
And, to prove the second and third Jingles preconditions, a plaintiff must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation and show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.
After Kalay, the court vacated district court injunctions that prevented Alabama from using a congressional map that it enacted in 2023.
Two weeks after the injunctions were vacated, the district court entered another injunction on largely the same grounds.
State officials immediately applied to this court for a stay of that injunction.
Held.
At this preliminary stage, the state has shown that it is entitled to interim relief from the district court's injunction.
The state is likely to succeed on the merits as to both the intentional vote dilution and Section 2 claims.
As to the intentional vote dilution claim, the district court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith because it interpreted the state's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus.
And as to both claims, the district court likely erred because it found a violation even though the plaintiff's alternative map would not perform just as well as to the state's constitutionally permissible criteria of keeping together a community of interest and avoiding the pairing of incumbents.
The district court also failed to follow Kalay's instruction that the mere fact that voters of different races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving racially polarized voting patterns.
The state has also made a strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor it.
The court has repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.
Here, the district court interposed itself into Alabama's ongoing efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections.
Its view that conducting the elections under court-imposed maps would be more convenient for the state was not a valid justification for that intervention.
And now onto the opinion which was written per curiam.
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