
Steven J. Menashi
American lawyer and jurist
2
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Jun 9, 2026
Gray Matters: Judging After Loper Bright
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5:47Aaron NielsenMODERATOR
So we'll start, I guess, with you, Judge Menasche.

Steven MenashiGUEST
It's good to be back at Scalia Law School, sort of, in this hotel, but I'm delighted to be part of it.

Steven MenashiGUEST
In terms of how you approach statutory interpretation questions, I kind of thought it would be less interesting to just say we're all textualists who start with the text and focus on it, so I thought maybe I'd sort of point out some areas where there might be disagreements even among textualists, but I have a I have a view.

Steven MenashiGUEST
So one of them is, so of course you do start with the text, and the text is what is controlling, you know, but context also matters a lot, right? So there's, Sam Bray wrote an article I really like about the mischief rule, about what the mischief is that the legislature was trying to get at.

Steven MenashiGUEST
I think that that is a legitimate thing for somebody to think about in understanding the meaning of a text, you know, the mischief against which it was directed.
9 MINS LATER

Naomi RaoGUEST
And that seems to me entirely correct and consistent with the text and structure of the Constitution.
Judging After Loper Bright
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16:30

Naomi RaoGUEST
And, and that seems to me entirely correct and consistent with the text and structure of the Constitution.

Steven MenashiGUEST
It didn't say it's unconstitutional for Congress to make delegations to, to agencies.

Steven MenashiGUEST
It just said Chevron relied on this presumption that whenever there's an ambiguity in a statute, it...

Steven MenashiGUEST
That itself is a delegation that Congress wouldn't have wanted the ambiguity resolved by the agency, and that's just an unjustified, uh, presumption, right? So the Congress said in the APA the courts decide questions of law, that is a question of law, and so the default rule is maybe Congress should decide that question.

Steven MenashiGUEST
I mean, the way I had always thought about, um, Chevron deference is that there's sort of two basic kinds of cases.
28 MINS LATER
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44:51Aaron NielsenMODERATOR
Um, since Loper Bright said courts should use their best judgment in interpreting statutes, why should courts continue to apply the major questions doctrine?