Are, are they in an even stronger position than they were under the terms of the agreement that was negotiated by Barack Obama's administration?

Oh, I would say, yeah, in certain ways they are in a much stronger position than under the JCPOA.

One, you know, now the Iranians seem to have, uh, uh, the chance to control shipping in the s- in the Strait of Hormuz, that the agreement with Trump does not rule out the possibility of the Iranians and Omanis charging tolls in the future.

You know, that wasn't even being discussed back in 2016.

Plus, the Iranians seem to be offered, uh, a, a $300 billion reparations package, as all we can cover it, for the damage that was done to them, which means they should get a huge influx of capital to, to rebuild themselves after this war, which again is important.

They're also getting things they never had back then, that the Marie- the MOU says the United States will withdraw forces from the proximity of Iran.

So the United States is promising to demilitarize at least the, uh, the, some area close to Iran.

Wow.

But what do you think sets Ukraine's strategy apart when it comes to the use of drones? Why might they be better? Why might they be stronger?

Well, they certainly seem better right now.

I mean, the war goes in phases.

So you can't say that where we are now is exactly where we're going to be in six months or a year.

But right now, Ukraine seems to have an advantage with its systems in a number of ways.

When it comes particularly to what's called medium-range strike, anywhere from 50 kilometers to 300 kilometers, they're really manufacturing a lot of good systems and high numbers that seem to be able to avoid Russian anti-air defense and hit targets.

So they really do seem to have a significant advantage in mid-range strike.

because

Is, is that a fair comparison to make?

I, that's a very fair comparison, and I think it, it's one [laughs] that I've made in, in, in writing, that, that, that in both cases we had rulers who are supremely confident in their own, uh, ability to make decisions.

You know, both Trump and Putin are, are very, very arrogant people who believe that they understand things and that their instincts are right.

And so they started these military preparations, not so much I would argue with a plan, but based on the assumption that they would overwhelm the enemy.

I mean, that was very much what Putin was doing, and he, he really did believe there would be a parade in Kiev a week or two [laughs], a few weeks down the road, that this would be over and Ukraine wouldn't fight, uh, or certainly not fight effectively.

And it does seem that Trump believed that the Iranians were really doomed, that they couldn't strike back against the United States, and that if he showed awesome US military power, the Iranian regime would be replaced by something more amenable to his needs.

So in both cases, it's leaders talking themselves into a position that they wanna take, and I think we can say in both cases it's them disregarding advice they didn't want to hear, that part of Putin's inner circle, at least, at least from what we can believe, were not in favor of that invasion.

What are the key weaknesses, the key vulnerabilities that you see now?

Have you got anything for us?

Yes, I can tell you that we have spoken to the Russians and made it very clear to the Russians that that we would like military operations on both sides now to end.

We believe there have been attacks on both sides that have done damage.

First and foremost, we would like attacks on both sides to stop.

and we cannot state that strongly

We are calling on our allies internationally to join with the United Kingdom to defend collectively and to fight back against such attacks.

We do not see any other European state at this point fearing that a war is about to break out.

So that is why we would like to handle this bilaterally with the British and the Russians.