From your perspective, what ethical arguments beyond a justice-based argument would you use to say that there's a difference between two and three concurrent surrogates, for example?

That's a really good point, and I think that to some extent it's hard to be non-arbitrary.

I think what, what we find in practice is that people who are wanting to do more and more and more at the same time tend to have some other problematic circumstances, you know, like the cases that have come out in the news.

And what we really, really want to prevent is children being treated as a means to an end.

So these cases where people say, "I want to have many children because I think my, uh, my genetics are incredible and I want to spread them in the world," or I want to...

You know, people have said explicitly, "I want to have, uh, you know, many children so that they can run my business later or that I can marry them off to important families in my community." You know, that's, that's pretty disturbing stuff because you're treating that child as a means to an end.

And I, I don't know that the difference is between two and three or two and four or even two and five, but I do think that once you get higher and higher in, in the numbers of concurrent surrogacies that are being attempted at the same time, that it, it's kind of just raising a red flag.

And so I think, you know, to Professor Caplan's point, even if you try to arrange every detail in the best way that you can, I still worry that there are underlying tensions that can't be overcome.