And then on the other hand, was the war on heroin, and heroin was growing by leaps and bounds in the 1960s.

Of course, there were significant hard drug markets from South America to North America, but they didn't tend to make their way across the Pacific.

I'm Jen Parker.

I'm an adjunct professor at the UWA's Defence and Security Institute.

So initially, drug smugglers across the Pacific focus predominantly on marijuana.

That changed for a number of reasons.

One is that the US started to become a harder target for drugs from South America to make their way to North America.

You can see why it's kind of a needle in a haystack concept without effective intelligence.

The Houthis remained relatively quiet in the first months of the Iran war, so why are things escalating now?

I think that in some ways the Houthis have been trying to, uh, bide their time, uh, and rebuild some of their forces, given the significant strikes that they endured last year from the US, UK, uh, and also Israel.

So I think that is an element of it.

I also think that when we talk about the current conflict, we often think that the Houthis just do Iran's bidding.

But actually, the Houthis very much have their own domestic priorities, and I think clearly they have seen a moment where they can seize the initiative against the Yemeni government forces.

I think there is a third element that is not quite clear, but there was a Houthi delegation that went to the Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral in about July.

There's lots of questions about what that delegation was doing in Iran, and were they actually coordinating with Iran.

How d- how could that play out globally?

Jen, please.

Thank you.

Thank you, Sam.

That was highly entertaining.

I'm going to start my stopwatch.

My wife, who is online, embarrassed when I say this, but she says that I ramble.

Apparently it's true.

I'm ready.

Jen, please.

Thank you.

Thank you, Sam.

That was highly entertaining.

I'm going to start my stopwatch.

My wife, who is online, embarrassed when I say this, but she says that I ramble.

Apparently it's true.

I'm ready.

Hey, thanks so much for having me on.

So I am in Canberra and, uh, it's freezing cold here.

Now, uh, for those of you listening to the podcast around the world that live in real cold climates, you'll have no sympathy for me.

But I grew up in a place called Broken Hill, which is in the desert in the middle of Australia, and I now live in Canberra, which is our nation's capital.

Sydney is not the capital of Australia, by the way.

Sydney is not the capital of Australia.

So what do they hope to achieve with an exercise like this, cooperation being first and foremost, I guess?

Yeah, look, I think there's three key elements.

I think the first one you're right, with cooperation, it's about developing familiarity, but also interoperability.

Interoperability is the ability to actually work together if you're called on in a crisis or a conflict.

I think the second element is to showcase Australia.

And I think a lot of these countries, you know, Australia is very blessed by our size in many ways.

And a lot of these countries get excited about coming to Australia to be able to use our airspace and our training grounds because it is so big and so vast.

I think it's only about 2% of GDP and probably should be a lot more than that, hey?

But what you don't do is provide the infrastructure to go with it.

I think that's right.

Absolutely.

And I think, if anything, this highlights that there has to be a better solution and just providing extra car parking is not going to do it.

For starters, we've got a growing population.

By the government's own admission, we're expecting an extra 300,000 people into this region.

So an extra 100 spots at the showground and 1,100 at Talawong.

It

What's a blockade?

Yeah, no, it's not a dumb question.

Uh, it's a good question.

So look, the term blockade is thrown around a lot.

Uh, a lot of people say Iran is blockading the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran's not blockading the Strait of Hormuz.

They're attacking civilian ships with missiles and drones to the point where they don't feel safe to go through.

Hmm.

I mean, first up, how difficult is it gonna be for the US to blockade the strait and then keep it open for shipping?

Yeah, look, thanks for, for having me on.

Uh, I think that President Trump's comments have been unhelpful, but I think they're not much more than that.

And so breaking down what's actually happening, the US have reenacted a blockade on Iranian ports and the Iran coast, so any ships going in and out of Iran, not on the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, Trump's comments about charging 20% toll on the Strait of Hormuz are completely inconsistent with international law, of course, but also practically impossible to enforce, and more broadly, impacting freedom of navigation, uh, undermines US naval strategy.

So I can't see the US imposing any sort of toll across the Strait of Hormuz, no matter what's been said in the last kind of 10 hours on that point.

What I can see is potentially President Trump asking some of the Gulf states to subsidize the US operations.

Yeah, when you look at the way the conflict's going right now, do you think the US and Iran can potentially return to the negotiating table, or are we well past that?

But even if tolling and surveilling and intercepting and everything else that Iran has proven itself capable of doing is awkward longer term, even if it's illegal under the laws of the sea or whatever the proper phrase is, what's to stop a rogue nation disobeying those laws?

Yeah, look, this is a really good point.

And look, when we think about the law of the sea or, you know, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was signed in the 80s, came into force in the 90s, it's generally referred to as the Constitution of the Oceans.

It does establish transit passage, so the right for all ships to go through the Strait of Hormuz.

And it's underpinned by what is a much broader principle, which is the principle of freedom of navigation.

But you're right.

International law is one thing.

It's a possibility that for the reasonably long short term they may get worse.

Can you start by telling us why Donald Trump is so insistent about the US acquiring Greenland?

I guess this is kind of the million-dollar question right now.

I think the first thing to understand is that Donald Trump is not, in fact, the first US president to talk about acquiring Greenland.

In fact, dating back to the 19th century, various US presidents have offered to buy, uh, Greenland.

Now, the reason is because it is actually quite important to the US's national security.

Why is that? Because Greenland is the key piece of land between Europe and the US.

So what that means is that if, for example, ballistic missiles were launched from Russia or nuclear missiles launched from Russia, the quickest route for them to hit, uh, continental US would be across the North Pole through the Arctic and across Greenland.

And what about how does NATO relate to here in Australia, and could the US's actions toward its alliance impact us here?

wanted to know more about the kinds of cars that come to their races, so I talked with SCCA Hawaii Region's solo autocross chair, Jennifer Parker.

We have things from everyday drivers to fancy sports cars to trucks.

Pretty much everything in between, including pure race cars that are not street legal.

They get towed in.

And it's just a very large range of types of vehicles that are four wheels and can pass our safety check, safety inspection.

Your vehicle doesn't need to be registered with the state or safety check, but it does need to pass our technical inspection for safety purposes and ensure that there's no risk of rollover, for example.

Let's say an SUV, we do not allow SUVs because of their high center of gravity and potential for rollover.

Is that something that we should be, not so much should be worried about, but should we be more worried about it than we are?

Yeah, we should.

And I think that that was the point that Admiral Johnson was trying to bring out in his interview with Matthew Norton, the Sydney Morning Herald.

And I think we should really listen.

I mean, look, I was in defence for over 20 years.

I left three years ago.

And what I would say is when you are behind those doors and you understand the full degree of everything that is happening in the region, it is incredibly concerning.

Is this something that ties into the theory that we should be replenishing our naval assets and making them as strong as we can possibly be at this point?

Okay, so you're saying it was a bit of a coincidence?

Look, it honestly is hard to tell unless you're sitting there in the decision-making room with the People's Liberation Army Navy.

But what I'm saying is to prepare for these kind of long-range firings, which the last time China did this was in 2024.

Prior to that, they actually hadn't done it since about 1980. it does take a lot of planning to get one of these capabilities to sea with a dummy warhead.

So I think it's not certain that this coincided.

But you're right, in terms of the announcement of the defence treaty with Fiji, which China is decidedly unhappy about, they have been trying to push influence and trying to get a military foothold in the Pacific.

The timing is uncanny, but I'm not sure we can say that they are directly related.

If you were flying from Sydney to LA, for example, would there have been any threat to a commercial airliner?

So I think the underlying need for it will remain.

Yeah, look, I, I agree with Pete.

I guess when you think about, you know, the, the AUKUS conversation, often it feels like, well, if you can't demonstrate that everything will go perfectly to plan, why do we do things? And, and if you think about that from any large, whether it's defense acquisition or broader industrial project, you can never guarantee that everything will go to plan.

It's about how do you assess, how do you manage risk, and how is that managed against the reward? Um, are there problems in the UK industrial base? Absolutely.

Should we be concerned about them? Uh, absolutely.

There are, of course, as Pete mentioned, strategic incentives for the UK to make this work.

I mean, when I step back and think about, you know, why is the UK invested in this, it's not because of an Indo-Pacific tilt.

But ultimately, I think we've also got to remember that whether you're opposed to it or, or for it, we're actually about making-- we're all working for the common goal of making Australia a safer, more secure place in what is a, is a world of great strategic change and uncertainty.

And, of course, driving a wedge between the United States and Israel.

Absolutely.

I mean, we saw some reporting in the last week about a phone call between President Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu where there were profanities and yelling.

Now, of course, when these things are leaked, you always have to question why they're leaked.

Was it leaked because Trump wanted to seem to be coming down hard on Netanyahu or was it a ploy to make Iran think that the U.S. didn't support what Israel was doing.

Either way, there are clear fractures evolving in that relationship.

And I think one of the key reasons is the objectives of this conflict have been different for the U.S. than for Israel.

What lessons will China draw from this?

And then just over the last couple of hours, our time in Australia, it looks like there are reports that Iran has hit a US naval base.

Uh, yes, and in fact, that US naval base is the last base I worked at when I was serving in the Australian Navy.

It is an important naval base.

It's the headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet.

Now, how many US personnel are really working there now, 102 days into this war, is, is probably questionable.

But it's certainly a symbolic, uh, strike, uh, from Iran.

It was ...

What risks does he face by doing that, Jen? So you're basically inferring he's pushed, backed into a corner right now, and he has to take action.

Don't taxpayers, the peop- the very people listening to this episode, have a right to be a bit angry at this point about the lack of insight we, we the people funding it, have of, of this program?

program?Yeah, look, I think that's a really good point.

I, I think a lot of it has not been explained very well, and I think I've been on the public record saying I think that, you know, defense should have a defense spokesperson that gets out and has a conversation about this.

I think there should be a, a better strategic communications plan because it feels like, you know, if you don't listen to estimates, and most Australians don't listen to estimates, you're not gonna get the details.

So, so I, I do agree with you.

I think even on the cost one, you know, that's one that's often been misrepresented, uh, publicly, and I think the government would benefit from what is the cost per phase? So phase one, phase two, phase three.

For example, the French submarines, right? You'll often hear people say, "Well, the French submarines were 12 billion for 12 submarines, and AUKUS is $368 billion," and most people believe that.

Uh, Jen Parker, that makes it sound like we're, we're pretty screwed.

What do you think needs to be done to strengthen defence in the Indian Ocean?

Well, I think, you know, we have a lot of infrastructure investment going into Western Australia, including shipbuilding, including the Orcas submarine project.

But I think part of the problem with our Indian Ocean coast is we forget about northern Western Australia, where a lot of our key exports go out.

So I mentioned before, Karratha, Port Headland.

We don't have a coast guard, so we don't have coast guard bases around there.

The Navy is far south.

And so if we needed to respond to something around those ports, whether that was uncrewed underwater vehicles in those ports, whether that was mines being laid, I know that probably sounds a little bit far off to your listeners, but when we're talking about we're in our most significant strategic circumstances since World War II, And in fact, during World War I and World War II, we saw mines laid around Australia.

What did you make of those remarks?

think needs to be done to strengthen defence in the Indian Ocean?

Well, I think, you know, we have a lot of infrastructure investment going into Western Australia, including shipbuilding, including the Orcas submarine project.

But I think part of the problem with our Indian Ocean coast is we forget about northern Western Australia, where a lot of our key exports... go out so i mentioned before karatha port headland we don't have a coast guard so we don't have coast guard bases around there the navy is far south and so if we needed to respond to something around those ports whether that was uncrewed underwater vehicles in those ports whether that was mines being laid and i know that probably sounds a little bit far off to to your listeners but when we're talking about we're in our most significant strategic circumstances since world war ii And in fact, during World War I and World War II, we saw mines laid around Australia.

We would have limited ability to respond.

So I think the first thing is look at our posture in Western Australia and ask, is our basing posture and our support really allowing us to protect some of those northern bases? I think the second element is think about, okay, do we understand our dependencies on that trade that comes across the Indian Ocean and our exports going across? And how do we intend to develop our relationships across the Indian Ocean to be able to protect that in the event of a conflict?

What did you make of those remarks?

Well, look, I think we should never become complacent about AUKUS.

It is a high-risk program that goes over 50 years with a lot of moving parts.

Jennifer Parker, an adjunct professor with the University of Western Australia's Defense and Security Institute, says she suspects the US would be willing to take a short-term hit to its submarine fleet to keep AUKUS alive.

I think it is unlikely that a leader in the US would say, "We would undermine that relationship.

We would undermine Australia's submarine capability," because of three submarines in the 2030s.

But I mean, would we and other US allies at some point actually get involved in this given we've resisted for so long?

Well, the US has announced that they intend to establish what's called a maritime freedom construct at the end of this conflict.

Of course, we're not necessarily clear when the end will be.

That is about a semi-permanent force with a diplomatic arm that is meant to be ensuring freedom of navigation through the strait and applying both diplomatic and military pressure to Iran if they continue to try and attack shipping post the end of this conflict.

We know that European countries, so UK, France, have been talking about establishing their own construct or coalition.

We know that Australia's been in talks with them both militarily and diplomatically, but we don't really know what that looks like.

So will Australia become involved in ensuring freedom of navigation in the strait post this conflict? Look, I suspect we probably will.

So what, in your view though, comes next? Are we now shifting into a new stage of this war and a resumption of fighting?

Do you think that's what we're likely to see again?

Look, I think there is a lot of benefits for Iran and the US for that not to happen.

I think the US did not wanna become bogged down in Iran.

I know that when this war started just under six weeks ago, there were a lot of people comparing it to Afghanistan and Iraq.

I, I always thought that was probably an unfair comparison.

For example, in the invasion of Iraq, the US already had 250,000 troops in the Middle East and was clearly about to invade.

That was not the force posture the US had at the start of this.

Has that been achieved?

Were you surprised to see the US join in on the military attack on Iran?

No, I, I wasn't, I wasn't surprised.

And I actually don't...

You know, I know there's a narrative out there that, that Israel pulled the US into that.

I, I actually don't think that's the case, but, but let me talk through why I think that.

The US has always been concerned about Iran, particularly Iran's nuclear weapons program or, or if not program, their latent capability to try and develop a nuclear weapon if they chose to do so.

They've become increasingly concerned about Iran's ballistic missile capability.

One of the most puzzling things about this is President Trump insisting or ex-expressing his disappointment that despite not having advised his allies about the fact he was going to Iran, that they haven't come in to help, that NATO hasn't come in to help, that Australia and Japan haven't come in to help, and now he's saying, "Well, we don't need you anyway." Is this any way to run a war, Jennifer?

Can you start by telling us why Donald Trump is so insistent about the US acquiring Greenland?

I guess this is kind of the million-dollar question right now.

I think the first thing to understand is that Donald Trump is not, in fact, the first US president to talk about acquiring Greenland.

It's like dating back to the 19th century, various US presidents have offered to buy, uh, Greenland.

Now, the reason is because it is actually quite important to the US's national security.

Why is that? Because Greenland is the key piece of land between Europe and the US.

So what that means is that if, for example, ballistic missiles were launched from Russia or nuclear missiles launched from Russia, the quickest route for them to hit, uh, continental US would be across the North Pole, through the Arctic, and across Greenland.

game.And what about how does NATO relate to here in Australia, and could the US's actions toward its alliance impact us here?