Your reaction to, to what has happened today?

I'm devastated.

I'm absolutely appalled.

Uh, I think that, uh, the entire nation is in a state of shock.

Uh, I don't think we were prepared for this at all.

Uh, I think that, uh, all Americans were the target of, of this despicable, reprehensible set of actions.

And, uh, the Arab American community, and I know this not just from my own reaction, but from, you know, uh, talking to my friends all, and my colleagues all morning long, is, is really devastated by this.

Mr. Ibish, uh, you say you feel under attack yourself as any other Americans, but even more so, do you think that there will be people who will look at Arab Americans and, and see only terrorists instead of human beings?

Well, where do we stand right now? Are we back to all-out war, or are these retaliatory attra- attacks with some kind of ceiling to keep the chances open of, uh, discussions continuing?

It's more the latter than the former.

I mean, I think we're closer than ever to a return to all-out war, but there is this diplomatic, uh, you know, pathway still open.

Uh, President Trump does not wanna go back to all-out war.

The Iranians also don't wanna go back to all-out war, but they're willing to, and I think that that's basically the difference.

This is another of a number of kind of very recent conflicts in which the n- nominally weaker party is actually advantaged by a few factors that didn't use to matter much in warfare.

One is the rise of inexpensive and accessible drone technology and similar, uh, emerging technologies that, that are cheap and effective and allow small powers, uh, Ukraine, for example, against Russia, uh, Hezbollah against Israel in Lebanon, and of course, Iran against the United States and even Israel and, and their allies in the, in the Gulf Arab countries, um, to use those technologies to level the playing field.

What sort of reaction have we seen from those states?

And it's not only reinforcing fear and intimidation when it comes to what I just asked about, just its own leverage, but does it also reinforce the concerns that Gulf Arab allies of the United States already had about how these talks are proceeding?

Very much so.

Look, they feel they were against the war.

They felt they would be hit.

They felt it would go badly.

They didn't think it was thought through.

They didn't trust Trump's judgment, honestly, and they've been proven right on all of those points so far.

Does that message

How should we think about, um, how the fighting, uh, in Lebanon is related to the prospect of a deal between the US and Iran?

Well, uh, in two ways.

First, uh, the wars are parallel and slightly overlapping, but in most ways independent.

That is say, Israel has launched the war in Lebanon, uh, because of its own interests, uh, regarding the war with Hezbollah in, um, 2023 and '24 as unfinished business and wanting to return to that, um, conflict to kind of try to, uh, render Hezbollah a neutralized threat on its, uh, northern border, if such a thing were possible, which I don't think it is under current, uh, conditions.

The US and Iran have tried to use Lebanon and the war that Israel's fighting with Hezbollah there as, um, part of their own negotiating strategy with the Iranians, um, insisting that the ceasefire, uh, extends to Lebanon [clears throat] and the US agreeing with that at some point to, to try to, as an inducement to Iran to be more cooperative in their own talks.

But the formal ceasefire that Israel and Lebanon kind of, uh, undertook, uh, to engage in, and with Lebanon kind of representing Hezbollah very grudgingly, the, the government of Lebanon kind of speaking in behalf of everyone in the country, uh, without actually controlling Hezbollah, it, it, it, you know, it's, it's not been, uh, really, um, adhered to by either side.

They've continued fighting the whole time.

Uh, uh, but talk about how the people in Lebanon are feeling because there is frustration, considerable frustration with Hezbollah as well.

Which Gulf countries at this point are most aligned with Washington and Israel, and which are more inclined to hedge their bets? I would say the

UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar all see Washington as as not just the primary security partner, which they all do, but also as the key to their national security interests in a proactive way.

The other three, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, don't try to project power in the region in any way.

Qatar does it in all ways except militarily.

And the UAE and Saudi Arabia do it in all ways, including militarily.

So all of them do emphasize the centrality of the relationship with Washington.

It's with Israel that they differ.

So what does this tell us about unity among these Gulf nations?

Yes.

There's about 400-plus kilos of uranium enriched to 60 to 70%, which is near bomb-grade material, and certainly enough to create a dirty bomb.

And, you know, that's sort of why Trump has been saying, "Well, it's buried under the rubble near Isfahan, and if the Iranians ever move to recover it, we will detect this from our satellite, uh, imaging, and we're keeping a very close eye on this area.

And, uh, if that ever happens, we will bomb them to smithereens." And the question that gets begged then is, "Well, why aren't you doing that now anyway?" And there isn't really a very good answer except, uh, one that sort of holds out for diplomacy, for an agreement to resolve the issue amicably, all the things that any rational person would prefer to violence.

And so in that respect, he gets a pass on it, but only because everyone is so keen on avoiding another round of madcap military attacks back and forth and discovering what Iran has up its sleeve next courtesy of Donald Trump.

Yeah, just remind me what the accords are and, and, and why is it not happening?

So it's, it's a byword for normalization, diplomatic and, uh, other forms of normalization with Israel.

It got that moniker because the UAE had decided a couple of years before they acted in August 2020 that they needed a regional partner in pursuing, and only Israel was acting in a similar way.

Just tell me, why was that, do you think?

Well, I think there are two reasons.

First of all, it gave the U.S.-Iranian face-to-face meetings in Islamabad a degree of gravitas that they otherwise wouldn't have had.

In other words, this is notably the highest level diplomatic face-to-face meeting between a serving Iranian official, the Speaker of Parliament Ghalibaf, who's effectively their leader at this point, I guess, or at least as far as anyone can tell, and a Vice President of the United States since the 1979 revolution.

The other reason is that Vance has been, in a quiet way, the most clearly dissident member of the Trump administration.

And there are a couple of reasons for that.

One is he's certainly of the neo-isolationist wing of the MAGA movement, but also he cannot be fired uniquely.

If that is the ultimate aim, is that feasible? Is peace possible?

Now, tell me about the letter that he posted online explaining that decision.

It is very significant because he really was a key player.

What he says in the letter, which is, you know, a formal letter of resignation, and he says, I support you, I agree with your policies, etc.

But he says three really crucial things, I think.

One is that the intelligence... does not support the claim that Iran was posing an imminent threat.

The second crucial thing is he says that while he supports Trump's agenda, basically Americans didn't vote for this.

And the third thing he says is that it's all being done because Donald Trump is responding to pressure from Israel.

We know Donald Trump keeps changing his stated aims, but what do we know about what the Israeli leader wants? What's the end game for him?

... of that?

Well, I think it's an, uh, an inflection point, at least politically.

Now, whether they can successfully disarm Hezbollah or, or limit its arms and its ability to, uh, dictate to the state or impose its will on a society without consulting anybody on matters of force, of war and peace, remains to be seen.

We, you know, the...

One of the most...

The striking thing is that it, there's virtual consensus of anger and backlash here against Hezbollah.

Everyone who isn't Hezbollah, including their Shiite, uh, allies in the previously dominant Shiite party, Amal, which includes the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, who serves this crucial role because, you know, he's politically close to Hezbollah, and he can speak to the outside world because he's not deemed a terrorist or, you know, in any way directly associated with them.

... about what Israel's end goal in this offensive against Lebanon is?

We have already seen three US servicemen die, haven't we?

Yeah, at least.

You know, Iran is not incapable.

It remains a country with some, you know, ability to strike back.

It is only prudent.

to say there will probably be more American deaths than there probably will be.

On the other hand, the extent to which goals can be met depends on what goals, right? It's very reminiscent of the 2003 invasion of Iraq where there was a mishmash of not compatible and sometimes contradictory aims articulated by the supporters of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 And therefore, there was no real metric for judging whether it was a success or a failure.

So what do you think? Is that possible? And how quickly could that be done?

What difference do you think that's going to make for people in Gaza?

Well, I, I mean, I do think it's a significant step forward.

Like, i- in terms of the, the, um, ability to prevent mass starvation, epidemic, and, uh, even worse human carnage, uh, in Gaza in the next few months than we've seen in the past two years, it's a big deal.

Uh, it, it is estimated that at least 650 to 700 truckloads of supplies are needed daily to, uh, keep, uh, you know, uh, sort of body and soul together for the two million Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

And during the conflict, during the war, it went down to about, you know, 70, 80, if at all, right? Zero.

And, uh, it's been, uh, maybe about 150 since, uh, the ceasefire, uh, you know, has taken hold.

And hopefully the opening of the border will, uh, A, allow more trucks to go through, even though Rafah is not the, the Egyptian border crossing that the Israelis are talking about opening.

... of peace can make that happen? Can it move this process ahead in a meaningful way?

... militarily.

I think that's right, but again, we're going to be back in the same unwinnable war.

Israel is not gonna do better in phase five of this war than they did in the first four phases, that I count anyway, and now they're controlling not 53%, 58%, almost all of the fertile land in Gaza is controlled by Israel, but almost all the Palestinians are huddled together on these sandy beaches where there's nothing and it's not a sustainable reality for any of the three parties.

For the Palestinian people, not at all.

For Israel, it's n- as David said, they're not gonna be satisfied, and in the end, Hamas is not going to be happy either.

So the, this war is likely to start again, especially if the Israeli e- election is already over.

I'm not sure Netanyahu wants-

Hussein Ibish, sorry, have Israel, have Hamas lived up to the ceasefire?

... "finish the job." Are they incentivized to join on the plan?

Whatever that means, yeah.

I, I mean, I have no idea what, "Finish the job" means.

Nobody knows, uh, least of all the Israeli military, which will be handed the job, which they don't want, because they don't have a mission that can be described in any coherent, intelligible sense.

Uh, look, the earlier drafts of this document that I have had described to me in detail by, uh, you know, people who have s- who know about it and, uh, you know, diplomats who are very familiar with, uh, earlier drafts, was, uh, a lot more reasonable, um, towards Hamas and towards the Palestinians.

Essentially, Netanyahu has gotten rid of, has convinced Trump to, to water this agreement down, as David said, finesse issues like p- the Palestinian right to a state, which is something Israel has never recognized, ever, um, uh, down to the point of meaninglessness.

It's, it is basically an instrument of unconditional surrender, uh, with one exception, which is the release of prisoners.

Yeah.

Yeah, and of course, the 2018 murder of the Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which the CIA concluded that MBS ordered, although he denied it.

I was coming to that.

That's, that's the big enchilada, right? For many people, including me, uh, because he was a friend of mine for 15 years.

And I, you know, I was just, I'm still scarred by it, and I think I always will be.

Um, MBS, what, what we've learned about him is that-... you know, he's not a sociopath in the sense that he's educable.

The question about him it was always, is he young and, you know, rash and doing these things because he doesn't know better? Or is he kinda nuts? And the answer is no.

He's, he's educable.

As you've been seeing this Gulf trip unfold, what do you think it means for Israel, Gaza, and America's role in all of that?

I hear you. Ex- expand on that.

Well, I think that's exactly right. I think Netanyahu wants to continue fighting, and in fact there's every evidence that he wants to go back to the future, that what he's looking for is a modified, a return to a modified version of the status quo ante where whenever, wherever Israel withdraws from Gaza, Hamas returns to a kind of quasi power, pokes its head up only to get slammed again. Israel used to call this mowing the grass, and I think they're gonna re- they're returning to that in a way, except the grass is going to be cut as soon as it's visible. You know, it's gonna be cut very close to the ground. Uh, I think there's, you know, the, the reason we're in this situation where there's no possibility of another end game other than a return to fighting is, is Netanyahu's steadfast determination over almost a year and a half to refuse to even begin discussing the possibility of an alternative to Hamas rule, uh, a Palestinian civil administration, uh, because Palestinian politics are binary. Either you strengthen Hamas or you strengthen the secular nationalists of Fatah. He wants to keep Hamas in p- in a kind of power in Gaza to continue splitting the Palestinians. This has been his strategy to prevent Palestinian statehood for 20 years. I don't think he wants to end that. I think he wants to keep the Palestinians divided, keep Gaza chaotic, keep everything going, uh, as close to some version of the status quo ante as possible, and there's no way he's going to risk allowing Palestinians to unite under the Palestinians who want to talk to Israel and make a deal, uh, even if it means propping up and supporting the quasi rule in Gaza of the Palestinians who want to kill and kidnap Israelis. I mean I think that's the gruesome truth.

And the Israelis certainly have not been, um, forthcoming in trying to make that possible.

They've allowed no alternative is the point. And, and you know, it's like, uh, taking water out of a bathtub. The, the other water will come in, you know? Uh, uh, they've got to allow the idea of a Palestinian alternative to Hamas or you're going to get Hamas. They know that. This is not accidental. This is a strategic choice. And we, I think we have to be honest about that. Uh, Netanyahu's, uh, strategy here is not just to keep the war going, but to keep the war with Hamas going. Uh, everything Aaron said about Israeli trauma is right, but it, it, you know, Israelis are not traumatized enough not to realize that in Palestinian politics you have to choose between Fatah, which wants to talk and make a deal, or Hamas, which wants to kill and kidnap and, and mutilate and everything Aaron said. And the, the sad part is that Netanyahu apparently would prefer to deal with Hamas in Gaza than in any way strengthen the hand of those who might one day succeed in creating a Palestinian state, because the ultimate goal is annexation in the West Bank, and that, that is the paramount goal.