And yet they're the Houthis still are.

They're the Houthi Salar, and this is the law of asymmetrical warfare, is they do have the advantage because they're fighting from their homeland and they are ideologically motivated.

And they don't need to have big, fancy infrastructure and big, fancy weapons in order to fight to a standstill.

We've learned this lesson across the Middle East again and again.

And Frankly, you know, if we look at the example of Yemen, we have all kinds of historical examples, including in the 60s, of it getting all kinds of countries bogged down in stalemate.

And, you know, I mean, it was called Egypt's Yemen once before.

Heaven forbid Egypt should get involved again and, you know, and discover that not much has changed.

So let's

[chuckles]

...you know, predates the Mecca Agreement and therefore is not part of the defense agreement, the mutual defense pact that they've signed.

Um, and so the Saudis are really, you know...

I, I think that they've made the mistake actually for, for quite some time of mistaking enormous power, influence, money, and friends in high places as, um, you know, a, a full guarantee of insulation from any consequences for their own meddling and their own military adventures in the region.

And, uh, this is, you know, as, as tragic and condemnable as these attacks are, they're also a relatively predictable escalation given what we're seeing in the rest of the region.

You know, it's not, it's not possible to fully insulate yourself despite these alliances and despite, uh, American, uh, an American, uh, best friend.

So I, I, I don't...

[laughs]

Do you think it is perhaps possibly percolating through to US high command that there maybe isn't a military solution to any of this?

I don't know if it's necessarily gotten all the way through the very thick layer of padding that is surrounding the U.S. Defense Department, or forgive me, the Ministry of War at this point in time.

But that doesn't mean that it isn't percolating and being noted by nominal U.S. allies across the Gulf region and further afield.

So if the United States is not going to come to the defense of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf, who else is going to look to reinsure elsewhere? Saudi Arabia, of course, has already reinsured with Turkey and Pakistan.

And notably, Pakistan also managed to wriggle its way out of having to intervene in the conflict with the Houthis elsewhere.

because they called it a pre-existing condition that was not covered by a new treaty arrangement, which is an incredible, you know, Pakistani sort of sleight of hand pulling from the U.S. Medicare playbook or the U.S. health insurance market.

So that being the case, if this is the way that the U.S. is treating its allies, if I were Qatar or Bahrain or even the UAE, I would certainly be thinking about, well, who else can I make friends with at this point in time?

The human toll of not having any electricity is astonishing.

What are its commitments to Saudi Arabia?

So Pakistan recently signed a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia and Turkey in August.

This is called the Mecca Defense Alliance, and it commits these three powers to come to one another's defense.

So the question is, at what point in time is the defense agreed? treaty triggered, given that Saudi Arabia is now effectively under attack from the Houthis.

And the Houthis are non-state actors.

So there's sort of a bit of, let's say, an open question about how, to what extent, you know, this defense alliance is going to be applied.

But I would say what the piece says, and what I do agree, is that Pakistan for the moment is trying to hedge on actually having to enter this conflict by seeking diplomatic back channels with Iran.

And it's been an amazing success story.

But just finally, as a sort of elaboration on what Paul was saying, does what the UAE is doing across this quite broad swath of the Middle East and Africa compare with something like China's Belt and Road, for example?

Yeah, I think there's several important distinctions between the Chinese and the Emirati model.

I mean, one is just if we look at Chinese, I would say that there's a more obvious economic dimension to what China is doing that we can probably identify why they're interested in Africa as another major resource-rich continent and what it is exactly.

They see this as a way of building resources an economic network, both supply chains and like both raw materials, supply chains and also markets for goods.

And I don't think that there is necessarily as much emotional and political complexity to what the Chinese are doing.

What's interesting about the Emiratis is that they have, as most countries in the Gulf do, they have lots of different types of vested interests in the Levant.

So Syria, Lebanon, et cetera, and also in the African region, because these are shared cultural spaces.

So my tip, Erin, is if you wanted to go into art theft and you already have the black polo neck on, don't go the obvious.

I mean, th-this article in The New Yorker has been prompted by the fact that the trade talks broke down so badly last week, uh, that people were looking like, "Well, who will be my friend now?"

Precisely, yeah.

And, I mean, this is, this is a conversation that has sort of been floated, um, in particular circles in Canada, uh, you know, for, for many years that wouldn't it be nice if we could join the EU? [laughs] That would be great.

And now it's, it's sort of spilled out of the parlor rooms, is what Ishaan says, and, and into a much more serious conversation of, well, logistically, how would this work? And I, I think, um, you know, the, the, the fact that, the fact that we are watching our closest neighbor and trading partner sort of self-destruct and drag, you know, uh, everybody within its, uh, oxygen sphere and its gravitational orbit, you know, down with it has, uh, prompted much more serious consideration of how can we realign, how can we pivot.

And, and I, I think it's an open question of, you know, how much closer we're also gonna get to Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, et cetera, in the midst of this, uh, realignment.

But closer ties with the EU is the most obvious natural, um, cultural and emotional piece for Canadians.

That's where they have the c- the closest, um, you know, affinities in terms of democracy, in terms of, uh, the types of, uh, uh, social democratic models that, that feel really comfortable to Canadians, so it makes a lot of sense that that's where they're looking first.

[laughs]

Mm

... to, you know, check whether your passport has, you know, these details and those ones.

And, um, so I, I'm very sympathetic to the project in the abstract.

What I don't understand is why this is a major focus of government attention, energy, and funding, um, and why they're signing up for this at a point in time when they seem to have bigger fish to pry, fry, and, and larger problems on their plate.

I realize that, um, President Aoun has, um, has suggested that this is because they need to get digital services to displaced residents, um, who need to, you know, register for some sort of government assistance, et cetera.

I would suggest that the money would probably be better spent on direct, like, people going [chuckles] and helping, um, displaced residents, but also getting, uh, the negotiations sorted with the Israelis so that Israel could withdraw from Lebanese territory because they currently have half of the country displaced and a large swath of territory under effective occupation.

[laughing]

The, the neighbors are disaster, and, uh, you know, they need to just find another, find another place to be.

Uh, Erin, first of all, you have a podcast adjacent or podcast-related project imminent.

I do.

I've got a podcast, um, coming out, uh, early this fall.

It's called The Cambridge Prehistory of Partitions, and it's based on a series of sold-out walking tours that I gave at, uh, at Cambridge, uh, last year when my book launched.

So basically it shares the, uh, the history of the partitions of India, Pakistan, and Palestine, Israel, how they relate to the, uh, the built architecture and to the university and the town of Cambridge.

And, uh, we had such high demand for the walking tours that we decided to record it and turn it into a podcast series.

Uh, and there's going to be a walking tour, a dinner at The Permit Room, uh, which is a Bombay speakeasy run by Dishoom in Cambridge, and, uh, the launch of the podcast all on September 18th.

Mm-hmm

Mm-hmm

... was pulling up essentially is, is fairly impressive.

[chuckles] Um, and I don't think that that, you know...

I mean, if I was him, I'd be filing my nails with a smirk on my face.

I'd be feeling really good about myself.

It's a, it's a, it's an impressive feat to have pulled off.

He seems to be moving the center of gravity increasingly toward Beijing, uh, away from European capitals, away from DC, and, uh, this is, you know, a humbling moment for, for a lot of, uh, of, of great powers.

But, but Erin, until the Europeans do get there and can plug those gaps themselves, uh, as has been suggested, i- it's not just about the personnel and the kit, is it? The fact that there is an American presence is, is part of the, uh, I, I guess the cosmetic aspect of the deterrent.