What unique combination of factors makes this cluster retain its leading position?

Well, you know, I think there's three things, um, that explain this.

So the first is scale in terms of population.

So the Greater Bay Area, which Shenzhen, of course, is a part, uh, has 88 million people, which is more than the population of Germany, which is about 84 million.

The GDP of this area is 2.1 trillion US dollars, which is more than South Korea's 1.86 trillion.

And all of this is in an area of about 56,000 square kilometers.

So when you have that much economic activity, that many people In one area that's very, very powerful.

So what does that tell us about the competitiveness of China's innovation ecosystem as a whole?

Is that an understandable sentiment in Canada?

I think it is, right? Because, you know, I think there are uh...

legitimate trade issues between uh... canada united states just as there are between any countries uh... you're back can it should be resolved through negotiation uh...

but at the same time i think you the canadian public and probably the american public as well uh... see this also as a a sort of power play or the u s uh... throwing its weight around uh... you know because we look at Canada, you know, it's the 11th largest economy in the world, 40 million population.

So it sounds pretty impressive in absolute terms.

But when you compare it to the United States, you know, it's much, much smaller.

So, you know, the U.S. has an economy about 13 times the size of Canada and obviously a much, much larger population as well but also when we look at it from a trade perspective because you know this is what we're talking about you know this trade war or this conflict um in that canada is very very exposed to the u.s market whereas uh the u.s i think exports to canada or something like one percent So this creates a power asymmetry, which I think this administration, the U.S. administration, well recognizes and is using this for either to deliberately show it can bully Canada or to use a Chinese phrase, kill the chicken to scare the monkeys.

So how many cards does Canada hold in terms of retaliating against President Donald Trump's duties?

Uh, how do you see the, the synergy being created i- in, in that area, the Yangtze River Delta area, that is a, a very important economic engine of China?

Well, you're right, Guan.

I mean, it is a vitally important, uh, engine for China's economic growth, but it also is globally important as well.

So we've been expressing, uh, the Yangtze River Delta's GDP in, uh, RMB or yuan terms.

It's 4.8 trillion US dollars, which would make it the fourth largest global economy.

So this makes it, just in terms of size, very important.

So if we think about synergies, you know, what's, what's the problem here, um, is that basically the governance model that permitted this, that allowed, uh, the Chinese economic miracle, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, is sometimes called the, quote, unquote, "mayor economy," meaning that the mayor acts as a venture capitalist and acts, uh, of course, as a government official, uh, to make sure that his or her city can achieve ambitious growth and technological, uh, targets.

Uh, how does Hefei's trajectory illustrate the Yangtze River Delta's ability to, to nurture latecomer cities into global tech powerhouses, uh, using, uh, you know, patient capital and, uh, regional supply chains?

Mm-hmm

... is not necessarily causality, meaning that just because we see psychological harm to young people and they happen to use Facebook or Instagram a lot, that's think...

this is...

Meta's causing this.

And Meta's saying, "Look, we... th- you can't really prove that." Defense works or not, I think will ultimately, uh, depend on whether society or the legal system, uh, at, you know, representing society says, "Look, better safe than sorry," right? Because, you know, it's seen that if the damage, uh, to young people is so great, even though you cannot conclusively prove causality like one can do with cigarettes, right, that cigarettes are, are shown to cause certain, uh, respiratory diseases, can't do that.

It's still in the interest of society to have some sort of limitations on, on Meta's products, and perhaps the social media products of other companies as well.

How significant is this part of the lawsuit, and does it raise a broader question about whether the current US privacy protections for children are simply outdated?

No, I think that's absolutely right.

So where does this put Meta in AI race compared to major competitors?

Sure.

Well, you know, I think there's a couple things going on here at, at different levels of analysis.

So if we start with the company, and the company once known as Facebook, and of course now is called Meta, and I think the company here maybe we could say is struggling strategically, uh, to find a, a future in which it can continue to be successful.

So of course, the name change to Meta indicated that the Metaverse, uh, was going to be the, the big thing on which the company would base its future on.

And, you know, so far that hasn't turned out, I think, as well as they expected.

And then of course, the pivot to artificial intelligence, uh, paying, you know, I think upwards of $100 billion to hire top AI scientists, um, you know, might not have again, so far, led to the results they hoped for.

How do you read the timing of Meta's big open source push? Do you think it's related to the recent debate within the United States over whether to ban the Chinese open source models?

What does this development of companies in strategic technology sectors say about China's industrial upgrading, and how can China continue to move toward higher quality innovation and growth?

That's a great question, Guan.

And, you know, of course, everyone is paying a lot of attention to CXMT's, uh, IPO.

Um, but I think the more interesting story, if we want to understand, you know, China's, uh, stage of, of development and how this actually might, uh, offer lessons for other countries around the world, is we have to look behind the company to the city of Hefei.

And many people look at Hefei and say, "Oh, there's a Hefei model.

These guys were such smart venture capital investors." But there's a little bit more to this story.

So Hefei actually started with quantum computing, and they decided that, uh, that they wanted to make their municipal identity, uh, rest on frontier technology.

Andy, how would you explain the China travel rush?

Price cuts by AI model providers are nothing new, but it's pretty unusual to see the industry's three biggest players, OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic, all slashing prices at around the same time, isn't it? Then what's behind this wave of cuts? Andy, shall we begin with you?

Sure.

Well, thanks for having me on, Yun.

Well, you know, you made a comment that, um, maybe I don't completely agree with in that, that, you know, these kind of price cuts are natural or, or expected.

And I think if we look at the history of American technology, actually the exact opposite is true, unless there are some intervening forces.

So I think what's happening here is artificial intelligence, large language models, uh, really are following a pattern in the US where the dominant players seek to extract what we can call economic rents, meaning by operating a monopoly or an oligopoly, uh, they can really benefit at the expense of ultimately consumers.

So what is the intervening factor here, which we're talking about today, is that the Chinese large language model providers, because largely they're open source and they have a structural advantage in the long run that I think is going to make it difficult for American players to compete, and that is the ability to generate massive amounts of electric power at very, very competitive cost.

Right.

Why now? What message is Beijing hoping to send?

Well, I think it's important to note, Ya Wen, that, um, Beijing actually did not choose this moment.

Um, it was actually decided by Washington.

Um, you know, one of the foundational principles of diplomacy is reciprocity.

So, uh, Beijing is responding now because this is, uh, a direct, prompt, and calibrated response to, uh, American action.

And I think it's important to point out here that, um, from the Chinese side that, uh, you know, they've demonstrated a fair amount of restraint, but that this restraint is a choice, and it is not incapacity or the inability to respond with, uh, perhaps more forceful measures, and that's something I think to, to bear in mind.

How do you interpret this message? What does it tell us about Beijing's broader approach to managing economic ties with Washington?

Well, you know, I don't think there's anything new here, um, Yawen.

So, Andy, how would you look at this report assessment?

Well, Ding Hong, I think, first of all, you know, it's important to understand the American worldview from the U.S. perspective.

It wants to be number one, the global hegemon.

But at the same time, it has extreme casualty aversion, meaning that, you know, it cannot afford because of its political system to have wounded dead American soldiers on television, on social media.

So how does it then address this problem? By maintaining technological superiority.

And I think this is exactly why the US is responding the way it is, whether we're looking at NVIDIA GPUs, whether we're looking at large language models, or even advanced innovative pharmaceuticals, because again, all of this is technology.

So I think this is driving a lot of this behavior.

Do you think this observation still holds true for China today?

From your perspective, what role has stronger governance played in shaping China's economic development?

Well, you know, Anna, it plays a, an absolutely central role.

So in my book, The Innovation Machine: How China Creates and Adopts Technology through Governance, I introduce the I5 model, which aims to do, uh, what Michael Porter's Five Forces model did for competitive strategy.

Meaning, uh, provide a systematic and rigorous way for analyzing, uh, governance, uh, in particular applied to technology.

But I think we can't separate, uh, economic development from technology, especially in the digital age and the age of artificial intelligence.

So what I think I've directly observed, uh, firsthand, as well as as a student or an analyst o- of governance in China, is China's ability to take an idea Assign it to the appropriate institutions that have both custody and accountability.

So custody means they are responsible for interpreting what these ideas or these goals mean, and accountability, of course, means they're responsible for the results.

Mm.

Once in place, so what impact will this policy have on, you know, consumers and, uh, other stakeholders related to the broader automotive ecosystem or auto industry? Um, shall we begin with Andy, please?

Sure.

Well, Yun, I think, you know, again, we can't look at this in isolation because, you know, again, one of the distinctive features of Chinese governance- Uh, is that it is systematic and comprehensive, uh, at the national and the strategic level.

But at the execution level, we think about, you know, in the city or the regional level, in the initial stages, you know, there's room for a lot of experimentation and variation because often when you're doing something new and something important, no one really knows, you know, what is the thing that works.

So, so I think we should look at it, um, in this context.

But, you know, if we step back and look at what is happening in this transition, uh, to renewable energy, you know, it really is remarkable.

China's gone from zero to a global leader in terms of manufacturing of electric vehicles, um, including hybrids, uh, as well.

Hmm.

So professor, why is South Korea launching such a massive AI and semiconductor investment drive at this particular moment? So what domestic and global factors are driving the urgency?

Well, I think that's an important question, you know, and I think there's a two-part answer.

So first of all, any country, South Korea, you know, any country we think of, wants to not get left behind in this new world of artificial intelligence.

So I think, you know, this is very understandable.

But there's another aspect to this.

that when we look at what they're doing is that this actually is, I think, South Korea relying on or perhaps overly relying on American AI infrastructure.

And what do I mean by this? So first of all, South Korea has what's called the so-called Tier 1 access.

To what extent can new semiconductor clusters in southwest of the country solve these problems?

What does this tell about China's, uh, current growth model?

I think the headline here really is China Opportunity 2.0, and the message, not just to foreign businesses, but foreign governments, NGOs, is that come not just for the innovation ecosystem, but the deployment surface and the supply chain depth.

And what I mean here by the deployment surface is that China really is a 1.4 billion person test bed where new concepts, new products can be rolled out very, very quickly.

Uh, municipal governments have the opportunity to mandate adoption.

Look at electric vehicles.

So I think this really is the essence of what we're looking at when we look at this innovation driven economy, and this really is China Opportunity 2.0.

Uh, what's your reading into this?

No, that's absolutely right.

tech leadership? Or is it about slowing the rise of the Chinese presidency in terms of technology?

Well, Tingduo, I think the view from Beijing is pretty clear because we only need to look at the actual words of Undersecretary Helberg, who very clearly stated, so he's the point person for this PAC silica initiative.

And he very clearly said that Washington has reclassified artificial intelligence from an industrial sector to the organizing principle of national power.

now whether that's right or wrong uh clearly the idea compared to the behavior uh is internally coherent and here though i want to point out though uh tingo you know i think the chinese view is that this is doomed to failure and i'll use the framework the i-5 framework for my book uh the innovation machine how china creates and adopts technology through governance And that really explains how any country can take an idea and turn it into impact through the appropriate institutions, creating the appropriate institutions that apply the correct instruments that build the correct physical infrastructure that delivers the impact.

So here, if we look at this idea, again, that AI has become kind of the central principle of national power, the US needs to do everything it can to protect and maximize this power.

So that's a very clear idea.

Again, whether we agree or not, it's a very clear idea.

Is that probably an imaginable scenario?

Apart from the ticket prices, what else is driving the unprecedented revenue?

revenue?Well, certainly.

I mean, this is a quite a money machine.

The ticket sales, of course, we just talked about.

But, you know, another very, very big chunk of revenue are the broadcast rights.

So, uh, here I think it's an estimated almost $4 billion.

So that's also a very sizable amount.

Why are World Cup hotel bookings in the US disappointing?

So what key challenges is this system designed to address, and what benefits could it bring in practice?

Sure.

Well, let me just paint a picture of where this is heading.

So at some point in the future, we will have robots that not only work for us, but these are machines that deal directly with one another.

So it could be an electric car that charges and pays its own bill.

No car, no human involved.

A port crane.

China is now already a global leader in humanoid robot production, so how significant could this unified identity standard be for international robotics governance, and what impacts might it have on China's role in the global robotics industry?

Andy, do you agree with that?

Uh, no, I don't.

I mean, you know, and obviously, um, you know, it's, uh, it, it's not really much to argue about in the sense that, you know, China, again, is, is, is completely clear.

The fact is that Taiwan is a part of China.

Uh, this is the most vital core of China's core interests.

Uh, so there's nothing new here, and this is actually the foundation of the China-US relationship.

And I would say, too, that, um, you know, China, I don't think, is self-appointed [laughs] in the sense of, uh, becoming a prot- uh, being a protector of the global order.

But if that does get built, I wonder if that will forever cement the relationship between Russia and, and China, and sort of make them co-dependent on one another, more so than they already are perhaps.

What is the trial spectrum in the six gigahertz band, and what does the approval of it mean for 6G development?

Sure.

So, I mean, that does sound very dense and technical.

So if we break this down, um, so the spectrum, uh, trial spectrum, I'm sorry.

So the trial part means that, uh, it's a temporary allocation of radio frequencies, uh, that companies, research institutions, et cetera, uh, can use to test, uh, these new technologies before they're fully rolled out.

And the six, uh, gigahertz band is in- is useful to, to focus on for a bit because it actually strikes a balance between a broad bandwidth and, uh, relatively long transmission distance.

So in a way, uh, maybe the best of both worlds, uh, for mobile, mobile networks.

So how strong is China's global position right now in 6G development?

Andy, do you agree with that?

Uh, no, I don't.

I mean, you know, and obviously, um, you know, it's, uh, it, it's not really much to argue about in the sense that, you know, China, again, is, is, is completely clear.

The fact is that Taiwan is a part of China.

Uh, this is the most vital core of China's core interests.

Uh, so there's nothing new here, and this is actually the foundation of the China/US relationship.

And I would say, too, that, um, you know, China, I don't think, is self-appointed [laughs] in the sense of, uh, becoming a prot- uh, being a protector of the global order.

But if that does get built, I wonder if that will forever cement the relationship between Russia and, and China and sort of make them codependent on one another more so than they already are perhaps.

Andy, how much has China been impacted by the disruption of energy flowing from the Gulf to Asia? And how important is it to China that Iran is not further weakened by this war?

Well, Mohammed, I think first of all, you know, there is a misperception, uh, I think in Western reports about China's vulnerability to, uh, an energy shock.

And, you know, I think the truth is the US is far more vulnerable, and, and here's why.

You know, we hear about, uh, how China's so dependent on Iranian oil, but that really neglects the bigger picture, that China's total energy mix is something like 58% domestic coal.

A significant proportion of it is renewables, solar, hydro, nuclear.

So there is a portion that is dependent on oil, and that is actually a declining, uh, percentage as well.

And China has an enormous, uh, strategic petroleum reserve.

Um, from the vantage point of Chinese officials, i- is this an acknowledgement that the US, uh, by the US rather, that, that Beijing perhaps has the upper hand here?

Andy, w- what do you make of all this? What do you make of the timing o- of the trip, uh, the reason behind Araqchi's visit, and, and also how was the visit perceived by Chinese leadership?

Well, well, Mohammed, I think the timing, as we heard, was very deliberate, and this was seen, uh, I think on Iran's part as an inoculation against any potential, uh, move that China might take in its, uh, discussions with the United States.

But I think it's also very important to look at this within the broader global context, where I think it's widely recognized in China and perhaps other parts of the world that the torch of global leadership is passing from the United States to China.

And this has very, very profound implications because the US model was based, first of all, on the belief that the universal political endpoint was liberal democracies.

Uh, free markets were the engine of growth, and security was provided by the US military.

And we can see with China's peace plan, uh, regarding the, the Iranian conflict, is that the Chinese model's actually very, very different.

So first of all, there's an acceptance for pluralistic political systems.

And I think it even, uh, responded with, uh, you know, its own trump card [laughs] as it were with, with rare earth metals.