Do we see any changes or, or developments in the breakdown of this investment in specific countries in the EU or in, in its distribution over different sectors, Andreas?

So if we look at the geographical distribution of Chinese FDI in Europe first, just like in two thousand twenty-four, in two thousand twenty-five, Hungary was still the largest recipient country of Chinese FDI.

In fact, Chinese FDI in Hungary increased from three point two billion euros in two thousand twenty-four to three point nine billion euros in two thousand twenty-five.

That Hungary was able to retain its spot as the top recipient country of Chinese investment in Europe was mainly due to investments in the EV supply chain.

That said, uh, relatively speaking, Hungary's position weakened from two thousand twenty-four to two thousand twenty-five, with its, uh, share of Chinese investment on the continent, uh, decreasing from thirty-two percent to twenty-three percent.

And it's also notable that there was no new billion euro, um, investment project being announced in the country in two thousand twenty-five, rather only some smaller ones.

Germany raised its share of Chinese investment in Europe from ten percent to fifteen percent, and France raised its share from five percent to twelve percent in two thousand twenty-five.

But again, right, we're not a kind of monolith in Europe, and there's different political interests, and I think, uh, on local level, you might primarily care about final assembly jobs, right? Uh, but if you think about it strategically, I think attracting Chinese investments in those niche areas where we're still, um, technologically behind and then trying to use that to catch up is certainly something that, that we are hearing a lot in, in, in conversations in Brussels and, and other capitals.