S7 Ep48: How politicians co-opt bureaucrats

How can we cut corruption in government, procurement that generates kickbacks for local politicians? We could hire officials on merit. Across the developing world, many governments now do exactly that. So why do public contracts still go to political friends? In this week's VoxDev Talk, Sarah Brierley (LSE) tells Tim Phillips why merit-based hiring is not enough. If politicians cannot choose who gets the job, they can often control what happens next: where officials work, and whether they are promoted. This power may be sufficient to co-opt them. In Ghana, where she did much of her research, nearly half of senior local officials say contracts in their district go to firms that fund the ruling party.  The research behind this episode: Brierley, Sarah. 2026. The Co-opted State: How Politicians' Control Over Bureaucrats' Careers Threatens Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Open access. To cite this episode: Phillips, Tim, and Sarah Brierley. 2026. "How politicians co-opt bureaucrats.” *VoxDev Talks* (podcast). **About the guest** Sarah Brierley is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research spans the state, corruption, bureaucracy, and election campaigns, with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She holds a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship for a project on political finance in Africa. **Research cited in this episode** **Clientelism.** Politicians hand out public resources, such as schools, jobs or contracts, in return for votes. Most research assumes that officials simply do what politicians ask. Sarah argues that officials have real control over who gets what, so politicians must first win them over. **Hiring on merit.** Sarah checks whether senior local officials in Ghana are hired on merit in three ways: expert surveys, a survey of the officials themselves, and staff records. Of those hired between 2010 and 2016, 67% sat an exam. When the governing party changed after the 2008 election, the kind of people hired into professional jobs did not change. The kind of people hired into low-skilled jobs did. **Randomised response technique.** A way to ask survey questions that people would rather not answer. Each person rolls a die where the interviewer cannot see it. On one number they must say "yes", on another "no", and otherwise they tell the truth. Nobody knows what any one person meant, but the odds of each roll are known, so the true share of "yes" answers can be calculated across the whole survey. Using this method, Sarah found that 46% of 864 senior officials in 80 local governments say contracts go to firms that fund the ruling party. **Career control tools.** Sarah's name for the ways politicians can shape an official's career after hiring: promotions, the work they are given, and where they are posted. Transfers are the main tool in Ghana. Officials who think their mayor can easily move them are more likely to report corruption. In a second survey question, 58% of officials said that exposing misconduct would likely get them transferred. **Whistleblower protection.** Ghana's Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720) protects people who report wrongdoing from punishment, including unwanted transfers, and can pay them a reward. But in a small local office it is almost impossible to stay anonymous, so the protection counts for little in practice. **Local electoral competition.** Competition between parties at national level is usually good for reform. Sarah finds that close contests at local level have the opposite effect. When seats are won and lost on small margins, campaigns cost more, and politicians have more reason to get money out of public contracts. **India and Indonesia.** Both countries hire senior officials through competitive exams. In India, members of the Indian Administrative Service change jobs on average every 16 months, and transfers become more likely when state leadership changes (Iyer and Mani 2012). Proposals to set a minimum time in post have not been adopted. In Indonesia, politicians also interfere in promotions. **Promotion panels.** In Ghana's local government service, promotions are decided by panels that include professional officials, so politicians rarely use them as a threat. Sarah suggests using similar panels to approve transfers, so no single politician can move an official at will. **Campaign spending caps.** Limits on how much candidates can spend. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have none. India has them, but candidates routinely spend far more (Chauchard 2018). Sarah points to the UK's Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883, which set strict limits that were enforced in court. Total campaign spending fell by 40% between the 1880 and 1885 elections (Rix 2008). **More VoxDev Talks episodes** Why civil service reform fails (and what actually works). Martin Williams looks at 131 attempts to reform the civil service in six African countries, and why none fully succeeded. **Related reading on VoxDev** Bureaucracy, the VoxDevLit review of the evidence on how officials are selected, paid and managed. Autonomy, incentives, and the effectiveness of bureaucrats, on evidence from Nigeria and Ghana that civil servants with more freedom complete more of their projects. Should civil servants be allowed to serve in their home areas? Evidence from India, on what happens when officials are posted close to home.