Financial Services Disputes and Regulation
Oct 26, 2026 · 25 min · 12 segments
In this edition of our banking litigation podcast, we consider some recent cases that will be most relevant to in-house lawyers at banks and financial institutions. This episode is hosted by John…
John CorrieHostCeri MorganHostPhoebe FoxGuest
Right, well, today I'm going to kick things off with a county court decision in Bury and Blackhorse, which found that unfair relationships under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are not... podcasters not governed by provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 and therefore are not subject to any statutory period of limitation.
So essentially, this ruling imports the reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in THG and Zedra Trust, which, by way of reminder, found that statutory limitation periods under the Limitation Act do not apply to unfair prejudice petitions under what is now Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006.
And in fact, you might recall when we covered THG in a previous episode back in April, you asked whether that decision could create wider risks for other statutory provisions like Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act, especially given the turmoil around motor finance commission claims.
So now I'm, of course, wondering whether you have supernatural powers to see into the future.
Well, whether I have supernatural powers or not, I have to admit, I did not expect the question to be answered quite so quickly.
But the county court has now extended the logic from THG here, finding that the control mechanism for Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act, those claims lie not in the Limitation Act, but in the court's broad discretion to grant relief under Section 140B of the CCA.
So even though we discussed this as a theoretical possibility, in practice, it's still a genuinely surprising decision and one that has caused a bit of a stir in financial services circles.
So would you mind outlining the background facts of this case before we get further into the County Court's analysis?
As you mentioned, the decision arose in the context of a Motor Finance Commission claim.
And again, guess what? The claimant had purchased a car from a second-hand car dealer on finance in 2005, 21 years ago, for which the dealer received commission from the lender and remained undisclosed to the claimant.
The claimant settled the balance in 2007, 19 years ago, and issued proceedings against the lender in 2023 under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act.
Now, at first instance, the district judge held that the limitation period for such a claim ran for six years from the end of the party's relationship under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, and limitation had therefore expired.
The claimant appealed to the county court, which allowed the appeal, remitting the matter for a re-hearing on the issue of delay only.
So building on your point about the decision's significance, what I find particularly striking is the county court's rejection of the lender's argument that it was, and I quote, settled law that the Limitation Act applied to Section 140A claims, despite earlier Supreme Court decisions treating the six-year period as applying without dispute in
And the county court's answer was that it's for the parties to frame the issues in a case and for the judge to rule on those issues alone.
The court is not required, it held, to go hunting for a shared misunderstanding of the law and therefore did not see itself as bound by the earlier cases on which the lender had relied, where the Supreme Court assumed the Limitation Act applied.
So, John, although there's no statutory limitation period, presumably there is some sort of time limit for claimants wishing to bring Section 140A claims.
Well, in good news for defendants and financial institutions, the court can affirm that these claims are not completely open ended.
It confirmed that stale claims will be kept in check by the breadth of the court's own discretion to grant relief under Section 140B.
Right, well, today I'm going to kick things off with a county court decision in Bury and Blackhorse, which found that unfair relationships under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 are not... podcasters not governed by provisions of the Limitation Act 1980 and therefore are not subject to any statutory period of limitation.
So essentially, this ruling imports the reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in THG and Zedra Trust, which, by way of reminder, found that statutory limitation periods under the Limitation Act do not apply to unfair prejudice petitions under what is now Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006.
And in fact, you might recall when we covered THG in a previous episode back in April, you asked whether that decision could create wider risks for other statutory provisions like Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act, especially given the turmoil around motor finance commission claims.
So now I'm, of course, wondering whether you have supernatural powers to see into the future.
Well, whether I have supernatural powers or not, I have to admit, I did not expect the question to be answered quite so quickly.
But the county court has now extended the logic from THG here, finding that the control mechanism for Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act, those claims lie not in the Limitation Act, but in the court's broad discretion to grant relief under Section 140B of the CCA.
So even though we discussed this as a theoretical possibility, in practice, it's still a genuinely surprising decision and one that has caused a bit of a stir in financial services circles.
So would you mind outlining the background facts of this case before we get further into the County Court's analysis?
As you mentioned, the decision arose in the context of a Motor Finance Commission claim.
And again, guess what? The claimant had purchased a car from a second-hand car dealer on finance in 2005, 21 years ago, for which the dealer received commission from the lender and remained undisclosed to the claimant.
The claimant settled the balance in 2007, 19 years ago, and issued proceedings against the lender in 2023 under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act.
Now, at first instance, the district judge held that the limitation period for such a claim ran for six years from the end of the party's relationship under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, and limitation had therefore expired.
The claimant appealed to the county court, which allowed the appeal, remitting the matter for a re-hearing on the issue of delay only.
So building on your point about the decision's significance, what I find particularly striking is the county court's rejection of the lender's argument that it was, and I quote, settled law that the Limitation Act applied to Section 140A claims, despite earlier Supreme Court decisions treating the six-year period as applying without dispute in
And the county court's answer was that it's for the parties to frame the issues in a case and for the judge to rule on those issues alone.
The court is not required, it held, to go hunting for a shared misunderstanding of the law and therefore did not see itself as bound by the earlier cases on which the lender had relied, where the Supreme Court assumed the Limitation Act applied.
So, John, although there's no statutory limitation period, presumably there is some sort of time limit for claimants wishing to bring Section 140A claims.
Well, in good news for defendants and financial institutions, the court can affirm that these claims are not completely open ended.
It confirmed that stale claims will be kept in check by the breadth of the court's own discretion to grant relief under Section 140B.
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