Delphic Podcast by Michael R D James
Aug 18, 2026 · 7 min · 5 segments
Humanistic liberalism as conceived by Paul Ricoeur has Kantian elements in spite of Ricoeurs preference for a more interpretative view of the ethical good. Ricoeur claims that criminal law is…
Michael R. D. JamesHostHumanistic liberalism has a view of the law and politics which is Kantian, and to the extent that much Kantian ethics and politics has an Aristotelian flavour, the views of Aristotle are also considered carefully by humanists in spite of the criticisms Aristotle has received on the fronts of slavery and feminism.
We have argued in an earlier paper, with Paul Ricoeur, that politics is fragile and can be efficacious only to the extent that the citizens care about the politics of their state.
This statement has the following relation to the law, the law is an action of a government, by the people and for the people, which means that as long as a law meets the criteria of justice, an unjust law is no law at all, the people have the same duty to follow an exterior law as they do to follow an internalised moral law.
Kant argues in his third formulation of the categorical imperative that when citizens and politicians are mutually doing their duty there is a logical, in terms of the ought system of concepts, relation between citizens and their government and Kant calls such an ideal future state of affairs a kingdom of ends.
Citizens treat the government as an end in itself, as having a value in itself, and the government reciprocates by treating citizens as ends in themselves partly by guaranteeing them the maximum freedom consistent with the principle of equal freedom for all.
But although this might be how we ought to think about these matters, this is not in fact how we do think, and this, it is argued, suffices to burst the idealistic utopian bubble of the humanistic liberal.
The answer to this objection is a version of the so-called parallel argument strategy which runs as follows.
If one ought to think logically but does not, does this entail that the laws of logic which give language its meaning and truth value are to be discarded? Why, then is it relatively easy to accept the latter argument in relation to the laws of logic but not as easy to accept the former argument relating to the laws of man? Here is an account by Paul Ricoeur which might help to explain some of the difficulties we have with understanding the logical nature of the laws of men.
Humanistic liberalism has a view of the law and politics which is Kantian, and to the extent that much Kantian ethics and politics has an Aristotelian flavour, the views of Aristotle are also considered carefully by humanists in spite of the criticisms Aristotle has received on the fronts of slavery and feminism.
We have argued in an earlier paper, with Paul Ricoeur, that politics is fragile and can be efficacious only to the extent that the citizens care about the politics of their state.
This statement has the following relation to the law, the law is an action of a government, by the people and for the people, which means that as long as a law meets the criteria of justice, an unjust law is no law at all, the people have the same duty to follow an exterior law as they do to follow an internalised moral law.
Kant argues in his third formulation of the categorical imperative that when citizens and politicians are mutually doing their duty there is a logical, in terms of the ought system of concepts, relation between citizens and their government and Kant calls such an ideal future state of affairs a kingdom of ends.
Citizens treat the government as an end in itself, as having a value in itself, and the government reciprocates by treating citizens as ends in themselves partly by guaranteeing them the maximum freedom consistent with the principle of equal freedom for all.
But although this might be how we ought to think about these matters, this is not in fact how we do think, and this, it is argued, suffices to burst the idealistic utopian bubble of the humanistic liberal.
The answer to this objection is a version of the so-called parallel argument strategy which runs as follows.
If one ought to think logically but does not, does this entail that the laws of logic which give language its meaning and truth value are to be discarded? Why, then is it relatively easy to accept the latter argument in relation to the laws of logic but not as easy to accept the former argument relating to the laws of man? Here is an account by Paul Ricoeur which might help to explain some of the difficulties we have with understanding the logical nature of the laws of men.
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