Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-4 – Lucas Ziller – “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China”

Your article argues that the current U.S. deterrence by denial strategy suffers from critical flaws.

Why does a purely military force-centric posture fail to resonate with the Chinese Communist Party's decision-making calculus?

Appreciate that question.

So I wrote the article primarily because I felt that there was a fairly simple question that my research drove me towards, and that's, you know, is the U.S. trying to deter China from forced reunification with Taiwan? in a way or a method that China actually makes decisions.

I think a lot of discussion about Taiwan focuses on the military capabilities of all sides, how many ships are involved, how many missiles, how many aircraft, how many troops all sides have.

Those things absolutely matter.

I'm not trying to argue otherwise.

But deterrence isn't just about military capability.

It's also about psychology.

It's about how a adversary perceives things like costs, risk, and opportunities at hand.

So the more I studied both deterrence theory as well as Chinese strategic thinking, the more I felt that there was a gap between the United States' deterrence approach vis-a-vis China, forceful unification with Taiwan.

I think U.S. policymakers assume Beijing will evaluate a Taiwan contingency primarily through a rational cost-benefit calculation.

But Taiwan is tied to...

Chinese regime legitimacy, nationalism, Chinese Communist Party identity.

Because of that, military costs alone may not have the desired deterrent effect that U.S. policymakers are looking for.

So that led me to ask whether the American approach towards deterrence is complete.

And my conclusion wasn't that deterrence by denial is wrong necessarily, it's now by itself probably isn't enough.

And that kind of drove my analysis as well as my conclusion recommendations.

Your article argues that the current U.S. deterrence by denial strategy suffers from critical flaws.

Why does a purely military force-centric posture fail to resonate with the Chinese Communist Party's decision-making calculus?

Appreciate that question.

So I wrote the article primarily because I felt that there was a fairly simple question that my research drove me towards, and that's, you know, is the U.S. trying to deter China from forced reunification with Taiwan? in a way or a method that China actually makes decisions.

I think a lot of discussion about Taiwan focuses on the military capabilities of all sides, how many ships are involved, how many missiles, how many aircraft, how many troops all sides have.

Those things absolutely matter.

I'm not trying to argue otherwise.

But deterrence isn't just about military capability.

It's also about psychology.

It's about how a adversary perceives things like costs, risk, and opportunities at hand.

So the more I studied both deterrence theory as well as Chinese strategic thinking, the more I felt that there was a gap between the United States' deterrence approach vis-a-vis China, forceful unification with Taiwan.

I think U.S. policymakers assume Beijing will evaluate a Taiwan contingency primarily through a rational cost-benefit calculation.

But Taiwan is tied to...

Chinese regime legitimacy, nationalism, Chinese Communist Party identity.

Because of that, military costs alone may not have the desired deterrent effect that U.S. policymakers are looking for.

So that led me to ask whether the American approach towards deterrence is complete.

And my conclusion wasn't that deterrence by denial is wrong necessarily, it's now by itself probably isn't enough.

And that kind of drove my analysis as well as my conclusion recommendations.