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Victor Haghani

Victor Haghani

Investor

Nov 9, 2026

38:47
Tell me why you didn't want to just index.
38:50
Well, I guess the two reasons, okay? So the first one is a sort of a logical well-grounded reason that the amount of risk that one should take in their portfolio should be proportional or a function of the attractiveness of the investment opportunity set.
39:12
So when equities have a higher expected return relative to safe alternatives, all else equal, you should want to have more of your money invested in equities.
39:23
And when equities are offering returns that are close to or much closer to risk-free alternatives, you should wanna be taking very little equity exposure.
39:35
Assuming this world of equities and risk-free assets just as a starting point, which is a good representation actually of the opportunity set.
39:44
So you do want to dynamically scale up and down when you think expected returns are higher or lower, assuming long-term risk is relatively constant.
39:55
And then the question is, well, can you observe and estimate different expected returns on equities relative to low risk assets? And the answer is, Yes, I mean, the simplest metric is using the earnings yield as an estimate of the long-term expected real return of equities.

13 MINS LATER

52:46
Oh, I have seen this,
25:06
If you've seen some of those types of kind of movements in the markets over the past 20, 30, 40 years, right, and you look at the way things are developing right now, do you feel... your gut and your head together? Do you feel as though this is an environment where maybe we are closer to the kind of end of this cycle? Or do you think that there is still a significant room to go, even though, as you point out, the CAPE ratio, right, is telling you that perhaps things maybe are kind of towards the waning side of this particular bull cycle?
25:40
Yeah, I think it's so, so difficult to call the turning point in one of these markets, you know, that they tend to go longer than everybody thinks.
25:49
And when so many people are worried about them, you know, that makes it harder for them to turn as well.
25:55
You know, a lot of people have already pulled back because they're worried about where we are.
26:00
You know, what I would say that I think could be really helpful for listeners is that, you When and if we go into a bear market, there's time to adjust yourself to that and to pull your exposures back.
26:14
You don't need to sell out at the top.
26:17
You need to have a plan for reducing exposure when we get into a crisis environment where people are doing things that they don't want to do, where there's many companies and investors who are selling and they don't want to sell.
29:22
How exactly have things shifted around in your methodology? Or have they? Or is this going kind of to your playbook and you see things developing the way that they should be given your investing construct?
15:33
Can you talk a little bit about momentum and extrapolation and how those two things are not the same?
15:40
I love this topic.
15:42
12 years ago, I was at a conference where Rob Arnott was speaking to an audience and he said, you know, the number one thing that people do to shoot themselves in the foot is to be return chasers.
15:54
This is the number one behavioral foible of investors.
15:59
And right around that time, you know, I had been reading the research on time series momentum.
16:04
And I was thinking to myself, how amazing that at the same time as Rob is saying this, which I agree with, at the same time, you know, other researchers were saying, The most salient anomaly, the single best thing you could have done as an investor historically is to be a momentum investor.
16:24
That momentum has been everywhere and at all times.

19 MINS LATER

35:16
over time and defer those gains into the future.
65:55
And if you could explain it in a way that a, a nine-year-old English literature student would understand, that would be very kind and compassionate of you.
66:02
So decisions are choices.
66:05
You know, that when we're making a decision, we're making a choice between different alternatives, and we need to be able to rank those alternatives in a sensible way.
66:15
So we need to have some kind of an objective function, some kind of a criterion that allows us to rank different outcomes relative to each other.
66:25
Now, in financial decisions, you know, we're normally thinking about uncertainty of outcomes, gambles we could call them.
66:32
And the question is, you know, how should we rank different gambles against each other? You know, what's a better gamble? What's a worse gamble? You know, sometimes it's really obvious.
66:42
You know, one gamble can look better than another gamble.

14 MINS LATER

81:10
Hmm
3:18
Tell us about "Who Killed the Random Walk?" What is the random walk? What is the work that you've been doing that shines new light on it, and why does it matter?
3:31
Oh, thanks for asking that, Jack.
3:32
This is, uh, something I haven't-- I don't think I've talked on any, uh, really publicly about this, except we've been talking at a number of seminars about this paper.
3:41
It's a piece of research that we've been working on for three or four years, and it just got accepted into the Journal of Investment Management.
3:48
It's available as a working draft on SSRN.
3:51
And, and, and basically, the starting point is that everybody who follows the stock market, uh, sees a lot of behavior in the stock market that is hard to reconcile with the idea of everybody is a, uh, rational, fully informed agent making, uh, long-term investment decisions based on expected cash flows of the stock market, which is the classical f- financial economics description of the stock market and asset pricing theory to begin with at least.
4:26
And, uh, on the other hand, we have behavioral economics that, that came up relatively recently.

1 HR 12 MINS LATER

76:25
Tell, tell me about the dynamic index investing you do and what conclusions you are drawing for your clients in terms of allocation to foreign equities to relative to the US.
31:28
Talk about how an expected utility framework could help you look at such things as a safe withdrawal rate.
31:34
So, uh, back in the late 1960s, a couple of MIT economists, uh, Paul Samuelson and his student Robert Merton, tried to, uh, solve what, uh, economists called the lifetime consumption and portfolio choice problem.
31:51
And what...
31:51
And basically this is, uh, all tied up with how do we take our wealth, whether it be our financial wealth or our human capital that we're converting into financial wealth, and, uh, how do we invest it? And then how do we decumulate and spend it and invest it, uh, you know, later in our lives? And, uh, and so the framing of the problem, uh, that they solved was basically saying, "Okay, what I'm interested in is maximizing the lifetime utility," which is the utility that I get, let's say, break it down year by year.
32:27
The utility I get each year in spending my money, right? So we have this, this relationship between spending and how much utility I'm getting, how much happiness I'm getting from that spending, and the more we spend, the more, uh, happiness we get, but at a decreasing rate.
32:44
And so the problem was set up as I want to find my policy choices between s- spending.
32:51
I have a spending choice to make and an investing choice to make, and my investing choice is how much to put into stocks and how much to have in safe assets.

9 MINS LATER

41:51
Is this something an individual can model out on their own?
10:42
Anyway, talk to us about Merton.
10:43
The Merton Share, which came out of this 1969 paper of Bob's and also Samuelson, who was his professor or advisor, wrote a version of it as well.
10:53
The Merton Share, it's a rule of thumb.
10:56
We have to realize that it's not the answer to all questions about sizing and risk-taking, but it's a rule of thumb.
11:03
And it says that the higher the excess expected return of a risky asset, the more you want to own of it and proportionally so.
11:11
And the higher its risk measured as variance, not standard deviation, the less of it you want in proportion to its variance.
11:20
And also, the more risk averse you are, the less of it you want in proportion, in inverse proportion to your risk aversion.

7 MINS LATER

18:35
So Victor, tell us all
3:23
It, it wasn't all just for fun.
3:26
I think we kind of felt guilty about it at the time.
3:29
Uh, but it was like giving an outlet to risk-taking so that if you kind of like to take risk, it was good to take the risk here and be very risk-averse [laughs] uh, in what we were doing for the firm.
3:41
So it was a, an interesting and fun example of risk-taking and risk not taking.
3:46
[laughs]
8:02
Then they have to figure out why those discrepancies might exist.
8:06
You had to explain it.
8:07
Like, okay, what, why is this the case? And then you had to decide whether the reasons that were causing it were going to get stronger and make it go further apart or whether they were going to dissipate over time and whether there would be a convergence.

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