what this means is that disinformation is not just a peripheral irritant to nuclear governance it is structurally embedded in the highest risk scenarios you cannot separate the information environment from the risk environment they are the same environment let me ask you this What helped you actually analyze that? And why did the Open Nuclear Network take a cross-sectoral approach rather than staying within nuclear case studies?

So one of the key insights from our work is that radiological nuclear disinformation does not really behave differently from disinformation in other domains.

It relies on the same psychological triggers and targeting strategies.

That matters because it means nuclear stakeholders are exposed to the same influence mechanisms.

And cross-sectoral approach means that we deliberately step outside of this nuclear silo.

And instead of analyzing RN disinformation only through the cases of radiological and nuclear disinformation, we also asked a more fundamental question.

How does disinformation work as a phenomenon? What does that mean to the radiological and nuclear domain? So we drew on psychology, media studies, political marketing, strategic communication, and information technologies.

So what can your approach tell us about how disinformation affects such settings? Are multilateral institutions structurally equipped to respond?