But certainly, that sort of, that decade or so, what sort of effects did he have in, in reality on foreign policy?

I think, you know, there's been both continuity and change since Narendra Modi has been India's prime minister, uh, in, since to 2014.

I think on the one hand, you've seen continuity and perhaps doubling down on that diversification strategy, uh, that I mentioned, and it is really the most consistent element of India's foreign policy.

It hasn't mat- mattered which government, uh, and it's shown up in different forms.

In the Cold War, it used to be called non-alignment.

The Modi government calls it multi-alignment.

Essentially, it's a diversification strategy of maintaining a diversified portfolio of partners, which has included, and you'd asked about Europe, Europe has always been...

Um, how do we really understand this, this, this five-year period when it suddenly seems, um, that India is taking such a different direction?

What is the message, do you think, that Modi was trying to send? And how much weight should we really place on these comments?

I think there are a couple of things going on here.

I think, one, these comments did go further than those 2022 comments about this is not an era of war, which is kind of a passive, like, wind this up, you know, it's hurting everybody's interests.

This was a pretty straightforward kind of end this war.

And a message that for India's own interest, you know, not on behalf of anybody, for India's own interest, that it would like to see an end.

And sometimes people will say, oh, India's been supportive of Russia.

It's wanted to maintain its partnership, but it has never, at least the Indian government, whatever you say about folks outside, the Indian government understands that this has adversely affected several Indian interests.

But, you know, what are your expectations for the visit? And, you know, do you see this as kind of part of a broader rapprochement, which is kind of, again, a word that you're hearing a lot along with detente in the Indian press?

[laughs]

uh, with the frequent flyer miles that he's, he's started up over the years.

He does, I think because of the reasons I outlined, thinking about how intimately connected India is to the world and how i- important the world is to India's objectives.

He, he does engage a lot in terms of, uh, foreign policy.

It is perhaps the most consistent element of Indian polic- uh, foreign policy to have what I call a strategy of diversification.

Uh, I know these days everybody's diversifying, but India has long had this idea of no permanent allies, lots of good friends.

And so because they have, for two reasons.

So how is he kind of hedging between these two giants, or how are the relationships changing there?

Do you think that's likely to be the same situ- situation this time?

We've seen both sides essentially indicate that they do not want an all-out war or conflict.

Uh, for India, it is not in Indian interest, uh, to get diverted from its broader strategic and economic objectives, uh, including, uh, uh, tackling its, uh, its rivalry with China, uh, as well as economic growth and the need to create jobs at home, uh, and to play a leadership role in the region.

Uh, for Pakistan as well, it has been, uh, facing political and economic headwinds, uh, it is, it has very few partners these days that are backing it, uh, and so going into a war situation for neither side, uh, would make sense.

Having said that, you have seen calls at least, uh, to exercise a military option of some sort, uh, to have that calibrated kinetic option on the part of India.

Pakistan has made clear that it will respond.

Is there a role for the US to, uh, help diffuse tensions? It has played that role in the past.

You've already seen, I think, the US, uh, play somewhat of a role.