Do you want to say a few things about embodied

cognition? Okay, sure.

In terms of a background, sometimes embodied cognition is referred to under the title of 4E cognition.

So the four E's are embodied, embedded, extended, and inactive.

Embodied really says that, you know, the mind and our cognitive processes are not just in our head or only a matter of brain processes, but because the brain is very closely connected, dynamically connected with the body, then the body plays a role in a number of different ways.

And that might have to do with affect or emotion, but also very basic autonomic processes breathing heartbeat and so forth and importantly the motoric system and for example the fact that we have hands and that we use our hands to manipulate things in the world All of that falls under the heading of embodied.

Embedded, the second of the four Es, embedded seems to try to capture the idea that the environment is playing some role, some causal role in our cognitive processes.

And I think that this kind of work that you just described about embodiment, about metaplasticity, about thinking about self within this relational sense with different aspects and different patterns, clearly demonstrates that we need to be extra careful and very critical when it comes to those

So can you tell us a little bit about that?

Yes, okay.

So Parnas and the group in Copenhagen and again Thomas Fuchs in Heidelberg, they have done a good amount of work on schizophrenia and they think of schizophrenia as a self disorder.

And when they think of the self, they think of the self in these, um, terms of minimal self, which is, uh, there's a great debate right now about the minimal self, what it is and exactly how one can think of it.

But, uh, If we think of it as sort of the embodied sort of immediacy of our self-experience, phenomenologists like to talk about pre-reflective self-awareness, and that's sort of the core idea of the minimal self.

So something goes wrong with that aspect of our experience, that pre-reflective aspect of experience.

Barnas and his colleagues call this ipsaity, the immediate selfhood experience.

So I'm wondering what you've got to tell us about that and psychiatry.

So can you tell us a little bit about that?

Yes, okay.

So Parnas and the group in Copenhagen and again Thomas Fuchs in Heidelberg, they have done a good amount of work on schizophrenia and They think of schizophrenia as a self-disorder, and when they think of the self, they think of the self in these terms of the minimal self, which is – there's a great debate right now about the minimal self, what it is, and exactly how one can think of it.

But if we think of it as sort of the embodied sort of immediacy of our self-experience, phenomenologists like to talk about pre-reflective self-awareness.

And that's sort of the core idea of the minimal self.

So something goes wrong with that aspect of our self.

experience, that pre-reflective aspect of experience.

So there was a

So can you tell us a little bit about that?

Yes, okay.

So Parnas and the group in Copenhagen, and again Thomas Fuchs in Heidelberg, they have done a good amount of work on schizophrenia.

And they think of schizophrenia as a self-disorder.

And when they think of the self, they think of the self In these terms of the minimal self, which is, there's a great debate right now about the minimal self, what it is and exactly how one can think of it.

But if we think of it as sort of the embodied sort of immediacy of our self-experience, phenomenologists like to talk about pre-reflective self-awareness, and that's sort of the core idea of the minimal self.

So something goes wrong with that aspect of our experience.

So I'm wondering what you've got to tell us about that and psychiatry.