Would you define what that is and how all that transpires?

Yeah, the Trojan driver method would actually fall under the strategic theft method because it begins with deception.

So the way we divide the two categories up is if it's just pure physically going out and stealing the theft, we call that straight theft.

If it begins with any method of deception, no matter what happens after that, we call it strategic theft because it has that deception element to it.

So with the Trojan driver, it's really kind of a copy of other methods that we've seen throughout the years.

In other words, throughout the years, we've seen some of these organized rings will plant members of their crew as warehouse workers or workers in freight brokers, capacity teams, things like that, in order to gain access to shipment information.

So cargo thieves, I've always said, are really good at return on investment.

What conditions apply in that scenario?

How do you think about interpreting those numbers?

I think the numbers, I think how you look at the numbers and if you understand the numbers is critical to assessing your risk point and really knowing what you're facing in the industry.

The first thing I would say is, you know, we consistently see these numbers thrown out there, 30 billion, 50 billion, 25 billion, for the record, those numbers are literally non-scientific there's nothing behind them there's never been any proof or evidence behind them they're just kind of made up numbers literally unfortunately they've caught on in the industry you know and people i believe most of the time when people use those numbers they don't realize that there's never been any science behind them i don't think it's an intentional use i think it's that they think because they've seen them in print before and stuff like that, they think there's some validity behind them, but there's never been any proof or science behind those numbers, which is why, for the most part, they've gone away.

The most reliable resource we have in the industry for statistics around cargo theft come from CargoNet.

I think they do a great job.

But I think what you have to understand when you're looking at the numbers is that they don't get all cargo theft.

The federal government in the United States does not track cargo theft.

your

But why why that discrepancy? Why why don't they do that? Because it seems illogical to not report.

Well, again, first of all, we're not getting the true numbers of cargo theft, right? Because CargoNet's the organization that tracks it for the industry.

They do a fantastic job, especially showing us the trends and everything like that.

But they don't get all cargo theft reported to them because they're an independent organization and it's voluntary for people to report to them.

Law enforcement reports under different crime codes, so it gets diluted.

So we just don't know what the real number is.

Why the discrepancy? Because most of the time when you take the value of a cargo theft, you're just going by what's on the bill of lading or on the shipping receipt or what the shipper has declared as the value or anything like that.

Oh,

Mm-hmm.

So I think you take that 732 million, you multiply it by 10, you're in the neighborhood.

Now, TAPA, we're in the process of doing a, uh, putting together a research project that will actually research the true theft of cargo, the true, the true value of cargo theft in the United States, and we're just gonna give it to the industry.

We're gonna give it to people like you so you can talk about it.

We're gonna give it to anybody who wants it.

We're, it's our gift to the industry.

So we're gonna be working with a university to create that study.

Oh, wow.

What are you seeing right now? What's the newest fraud tactic?

Yeah, so I would say that we're seeing quite a bit of changes and pressure testing of new methods.

You know, we talked about when we talked about the Trojan driver scheme, we talked about how they pressure test things.

And we're seeing a bit more that, you know, we've seen a big concentration around the theft of the high tech loads.

Right.

In particular, cargo that would be meant for data centers.

So from like June 3rd of 2026 to now, we've seen almost $100 million worth of that type of freight stolen.

What's negative in your opinion inside the Corka bill, Scott?

Tell me a little bit more about TAPA and what it does.

It's a fantastic organization I've been involved in, and I think for 14 or 15 years, you know, worked my way up from just being a member to being on committees to being on the board.

And now, you know, lucky enough to be the chairman.

And I served as vice chair for four years under Alan Gere, who was a great chairman.

And it's a nonprofit organization.

And I always like to make a point of that because, you know, we don't have a commercial angle.

We're not trying to profit or make a bunch of money off of people or the industry or anything like that.

What are some things to look for? Where are some kind of pinch points or pain points or opportunities for convenience, opportunities for theft? Talk about that piece.

Has anything changed in the industry that we should know about? I mean, are criminals getting smarter?

Yeah, they're- they've always been pretty smart, [clears throat] right? This new breed that we've, uh, seen over the last few years continues to, uh, advance some of their techniques.

There's a few things that I thought about, you know, that we could talk about today that, that are a little bit different.

The first thing I'll say is, the last time we met, [clears throat] we talked about that Trojan driver method, right? And how that had just kind of recently surfaced.

And I will say that since being on here with you and talking about it openly and, and presenting about it at a few conferences, I've had dozens of people call me and say, "Oh, yeah, now I know what happened.

We had that, uh, y- you know, incident occur." So I think that's worth mentioning, that that has proven itself to be a viable method, um, you know, where again, so just kind of recapping in case somebody didn't see that episode, the bad guys basically plant one of their crew members in a legitimate trucking company as a driver so that they don't have to worry about, you know, failing any vetting process, whether it's through one of the vetting platforms like the one that you have or any others, right? [clears throat] They, they actually sneak through because they're driving for a legitimate trucking company that would pass anybody's vetting, and they just drive until they're over a load that the crew wants them to steal.

Then the crew tells them, "Hey, park the load." You know, pretend you had to go home, pretend you had to go to the, the-- We've, we've seen-- Since we talked about it, I've heard exam-examples of they had to go home, they had to visit a sick family member, they had to go to the hospital themselves, they had to go to an urgent care appointment because they didn't feel well, uh, all these different things.

Currently, I know not much has really changed on this front, but what commodity is scaring you the most right now? My gut's gonna tell me you're gonna say semiconductor chips.

What are some of the top coverage gaps that you see in standard cargo policies that leave carriers exposed today?

I think one of the biggest things you wanna do is you wanna make sure you have theft coverage, right? You, you wanna, you know...

In the industry right now, there are some carriers who carve out theft, and they, you have to pay for that additionally.

Now, straight theft is usually covered.

It's on your standard cargo policy.

Straight theft is usually gonna be covered.

There's gonna be some exclusions around employee involvement, uh, employee dishonesty, things like that.

So one of the biggest questions out there is when a shipment goes sideways and there's a dispute between a carrier, a broker, a shipper, how does that g- all get sorted out at an insurance level? W- how does insurance decide who's gonna be the one holding that bag?

So when I don't have a PowerPoint, I, I grab my hotel receipt [laughs] like, and I put down all my talking points and, uh, a- and things that I have to remember for this.

So, you know, Kaney ended, uh, sort of at the, uh, towards the end of his, uh, speech, uh, talking about statistics, and that's where we're gonna start off with.

We're gonna start off a little bit with the numbers, and we always talk about the numbers, and I think that the numbers are underutilized.

I'm a-- I, I have no interest in Cargo Net.

I have no, uh, you know, I have no stake in Cargo Net, but I've always said that I think it's one of the most useful tools out there.

But I think that how we study the data, how we look at the data is critical.

It's-

And again, when you dig into how does the freight move, right? We know that because we've seen some of the biggest changes.

Could you tell us a little bit more about this Trojan driver scam and when, when you first realized it was something that was affecting our industry?

Yeah.

So, um, I would say it's, at this point, I would say it's maybe three or four months ago [clears throat] I saw the first one, and I kinda stumbled into it, right? I, I, I had, um, somebody reach out to me on a, a cargo theft that they had, and they were telling me it was a straight theft.

And the further I dug into it, I said, "There's, you know, there's just something that's not sitting right here.

I just don't, I don't think it's as straightforward as it is." And, and then, you know, dug into that one and then ended up shortly thereafter getting a couple other examples of it.

And then, you know, I, I, I belong to different intel groups and, um, different circles where we talk a- about, you know, what we're seeing and what the bad guys are doing.

And, uh, I wasn't sure, you know? Initially, I wasn't sure.

They're not.

When it comes to cargo theft, when it comes to everything happening, what do we really need to be talking and looking at that necessarily aren't the topics of discussion right now?

I think what's not talked about enough that I've been trying to talk about a lot lately is there, there's really not a culture of supply chain security across the US supply chain, and that needs to change.

And I, I kind of equate it to, you know, decades ago the supply chain decided, hey, there needs to be a culture around safety.

And so you saw advancements in safety and driver training and technology.

And now, you know, as we sit here today, the brand-new trucks come out with automatic braking and s- all sorts of sensors and cameras and everything like that.

You take that technology, and what's going on is that technology's being integrated into the training of the drivers and the training of the staff and the training of the team, and it creates a culture around safety.

Now, does it mean that everything is completely safe and it's perfect? No.

[laughs]

When it comes to cargo theft, when it comes to everything happening, what do we really need to be talking and looking at that necessarily aren't the topics of discussion right now?

I think what's not talked about enough that I've been trying to talk about a lot lately is there, there's really not a culture of supply chain security across the US supply chain, and that needs to change.

And I, I kind of equate it to, you know, decades ago the supply chain decided, hey, there needs to be a culture around safety.

And so you saw advancements in safety and driver training and technology.

And now, you know, as we sit here today, the brand-new trucks come out with automatic braking and s- all sorts of sensors and cameras and everything like that.

You take that technology, and what's going on is that technology's being integrated into the training of the drivers and the training of the staff and the training of the team, and it creates a culture around safety.

Now, d- does it mean that everything is completely safe and it's perfect? No.

[laughs]