So, I mean, that's the kind of issue there is that, you know, it's not, you know, a government with the finger on the button, it's everyone in theory having access to a button somewhere.

So further to what Jake was just saying, a couple of points spring to mind.

First of all, he's completely right about the open way models.

And this is the real crux of the matter, is that America is at the moment in the lead in the frontier race.

China's just behind it, according to the Stanford report earlier this year, about 2.7-ish percent behind, which is really within touching distance, as we said.

So at the moment, yes, the frontier dangers are probably more on America's side.

But the open weight approach that China has taken, in other words, allowing those AI models to be distributed much more broadly around the world, means that if something were to happen within the Chinese system, it would be much harder for the Chinese to be able to claw it back and to put controls over it.

Is there, Sam, a potential? for it to play a meaningful role as some kind of honest broker between these two superpowers when it comes to AI?

But what's your take? Is China strengthened by what's going on in the Gulf, and if so, in, in what areas, what dimensions of power?

It's a really good question, [clears throat] and I think that it is absolutely clear that the balance of power is changing and has been tweaked, I wouldn't say massively changed, but definitely tweaked by the last few months.

China has suffered a little bit from what's going on.

So what we have to remember is that China, you know, needs GDP growth, and for this year we calculated that it's going to need about $300 billion of extra, that's extra, export to meet its GDP targets for 2026.

[lips smack] Now, the trouble is, is that with the Iran war has caused mayhem in the geoeconomic markets, meaning that it's, A, less likely that people will be able to afford all those Chinese exports, and B, those exports are going to be more expensive anyway because of the rising energy costs and, and, and the mayhem on the, on the energy markets generally.

So those are things that are pretty bad for China, and that's why it wants an end to this.

But actually behind closed doors, they will be very happy with the fact that America yet again has shown that, that it likes rampaging, to use a word that the Chinese like using, around the Middle East with not necessarily any strategic aim fully thought out, and is making bad choices with its allies, annoying its allies, whether they're in the Gulf or whether they are in Europe, and it's basically weakening America's strategic position.

Tell us in a, in a sentence or two how that differs from the Lydian Trap and what you mean by the Lydian Trap.

Um, you know, this kind of idea that domestic policy actually has very real impact on foreign policy, and vice versa, is something that I think we need to understand much more, instead of just putting them in different buckets.

I think you've absolutely hit the nail on the head there.

In the short term, it's all about not burning bridges, and so even though I have been a critic of, of British engagement, uh, with China many times over the years [chuckles], um, we are doing the right thing by keeping the, the relationship warm.

There's no benefit to the UK in just annoying them and making them into an enemy, and the same way with America as well.

But in the medium term, we have to realize that building out our own strength with m- like-minded countries is absolutely in our interest.

And it just...

You know, it's something which people don't recognize, but just today, China has such a grip of our supply chains, and we've gotta be diff- we've gotta differentiate between supply chain dom- uh, dominance and trade dominance.

Yeah, what do you think, Sam?