So we may wanna discuss that more later.

I would just like to add one thing to what Paul said, which is that, you know, the training can take different forms.

And some of it, you know, we have all kinds of things in the established mechanisms within the Department of Defense to have these standard operating procedures.

And you can imagine having similar kinds of standard procedures where if somebody has to make a decision involving nuclear weapons, that they're required to go through particular steps, and that they practice those steps so that it's not like the first time it ever happened to you and you, you know, don't have a notion of the repertoire of possibilities, including not responding with nuclear weapons, right? That that universe is available to you in a particular way, and that those kinds of protocols can be very helpful.

And, um, the example I use, the example that I think we have actually in the paper, is that when they implemented a series of checklists in American hospitals that are really simple and stupid, there are things like wash your hands, right? Like put a sticker on about which limb you're replacing or, or removing or whatever.

It saved a hundred thousand lives a year, right? And it's just because everybody had to hit certain checklists that seemed obvious that everybody should know, but you have to do it anyway.

Um, and so if you establish a similar kind of protocol where everybody has to do a certain thing a certain way, and you practice it so that people have a sense of, you know, what's involved in actually thinking that through, I think it can be really helpful to prevent inadvertent escalation in particular, or escalation in response to something that's an accident, right? So rather than having artificial intelligence tell you, "Okay, you have an incoming weapon, you have to respond," to say, "Huh, take a minute.

Because I, I thought this was both counterintuitive and really interesting and potentially significant as we look at public attitudes.