So my initial question is, yes, discretion, but limited in terms of what do I need in order to get disclosure to do my job in this inquiry?

Yes, thank you Justice Morrow.

In my respectful submission, it is a limited and bounded discretion and it is focused on the simple question of does the commissioner have the evidence that they need to determine an access request? But within that relatively limited menu of options, there is sufficient room for a charter compliant exercise of discretion.

And we say that doesn't require interpreting Section 52 of PIPA as the Court of Appeal did to include a discretion at the end of the day when determining whether or not the disclosure to a requester is required may be refused even though the statute otherwise says so on the basis of the Charter.

These are distinct questions.

And we say that it is evident both in terms of the language of the provision being discretionary, it says may, and the fact of the practice of the commissioner in cases involving assertions of solicitor-client privilege that it is a true discretion that can be exercised in accordance with the Charter.

And we say that – and I'm thankful for Justice Kassirer raising our argument and the Solis case, which is in our condensed book at tab 10.

Where in SOLUS do we then read in this overlay of charter?

So my initial question is, yes, discretion, but limited in terms of what do I need in order to get disclosure to do my job in this inquiry?

Yes, thank you Justice Morrow.

In my respectful submission, it is a limited and bounded discretion and it is focused on the simple question of does the commissioner have the evidence that they need to determine an access request.

But within that relatively limited menu of options, there is sufficient room for a charter compliant exercise of discretion.

And we say that doesn't require interpreting Section 52 of PIPA as the Court of Appeal did to include a discretion at the end of the day when determining whether or not the disclosure to a requester is required may be refused even though the statute otherwise says so on the basis of the Charter.

These are distinct questions.

And we say that it is evident, both in terms of the language of the provision being discretionary, it says may, and the fact of the practice of the commissioner in cases involving assertions of solicitor-client privilege, that it is a true discretion that can be exercised in accordance with the Charter.

number two when considering whether how to proceed in that context you're dealing with common law you've got the statutory indication you have the common law surrounding dealing with solicitor-client privilege where in solace do we then read in this overlay of charter