What's it been like for you to watch that unfold and where do you think they are at this point? And can they get to a place where they can have a reasonable geostrategic arrangement with their neighbor? Sure.

Yeah, so one of my, I don't know if it's a flaw or not, but I always try to put myself in other people's shoes and try to understand why, in this case, the Gulf acted the way they did.

And it doesn't mean that I accept it, but I think it helps me then try to understand where they might be going.

I'm not sure that, I mean, maybe Vali is right that they are looking back with some regret at their attitude towards the JCPOA.

I think some of them might say, no, the problem was not that we oppose the JCPOA was that the United States didn't do everything they needed to do to weaken Iran.

And so, yes, we leave the, you know, we left the JCPOA, but it wasn't accompanied by the policies that were needed to really be firm against Iran.

They may have some self-justification, but I think Vale is probably right that they're looking back and saying, let's imagine a counterfactual where we're still in the JCPOA.

So, you know, I think both sides understand that still they need a MOU, even if not exactly this one, but it's much more difficult to get back to it.

Rob, do you want to take a stab at getting us started on that?

Sure, and it's obviously easier to say it in hindsight.

Had you asked me at the time, I'm not sure what I would have predicted.

I think it collapsed more quickly than many people certainly hoped.

I'd say there's three basic reasons.

The first is just the drafting of the MOU itself, and you don't have to be a lawyer to see that it was riddled with ambiguity and made it possible for both sides to have diametrically opposing interpretations of certain clauses, and the most important of which was what would the status be of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz, which was open before the war, which Iran closed as the war began, as its means of exerting some form of leverage over the US and the world economy, saying if this war continues, everyone will suffer because a corridor where about 20% of the energy resources of the world transits every day was going to be shut down.

Rob, you've lived this more than almost anyone

Yeah

... tear up the deal, even though they had denounced the reimposition of sanctions, they come in, and I think President Biden thought, "This is a political, you know, hot potato.

I don't wanna deal with that.

I have other priorities." I don't think...

I mean, he never cared that much about a nuclear deal with Iran, frankly.

That was his right, but it was never his priority.

And I think s- him and some of his advisors thought, "You know what? We may not have liked these sanctions, but we have them.

Yes

Tell us where you think we are.

Well, first, thanks, Aaron.

It's great to, to be on the panel.

Uh, first, I wanna echo what Alan said.

I mean, there's no outcome now that would justify the war retroactively for all the reasons he gave.

It was unconstitutional, it was unlawful, reckless, and damaging, not just to Iran and the US, but to, to much of the globe.

Let's-- But that's, that's, that's where we are.

And then how do you structure a nego- a negotiation? Or is this, or is this all not, not relevant anymore?

Mostly in New York though, right? Rather than elsewhere, I mean.

Well, it just happened in Colorado.

Yeah, last night in Colorado.

Primaries are not necessarily a good gauge of where the electorate is, but certainly there's an energy there.

I speak to Democrats, and there's some things that they assume the next candidate for the presidency is gonna have to, uh, follow certain positions that would have been considered heretical not long ago.

So A, do they take money from AIPAC, the lobby organization that is associated with the most, uh, pro-Israel, uh, positions? Are they gonna be in favor of conditionality of, of arm sales? Are they gonna be in favor of, of zeroing out all arms transfers, not sales, but just outright transfer of weapons? Are they gonna be in favor of sanctioning settlers? All these things which are now become-- maybe not the entire consensus, but a lot of these have-- are becoming more and more consensus positions among Democrats.

And then you have issues that are gonna be more controversial.

And this official said, "Well, you know, don't forget the JCPOA, the nuclear deal." And there's a more sophisticated version of that argument that the nuclear deal was fine, but then I'm sure again you disagree with this, that there wasn't enough done by the Obama administration regarding what Iran was doing at the time in Syria or elsewhere, and that is quite a strongly held sentiment in parts of the region, right?

can that sabotage or undo anything that has been done already or derail what could come?

I mean, short answer is yes.

I mean, it does seem like both sides right now have an interest in seeing this move forward.

You know, the U.S. has an interest in having the war terminated and the Strait of Hormuz open and seeing progress could be made on the nuclear flail.

And Iran has an interest in getting sanctions relief because they're facing a catastrophic economic situation.

So I think to that extent, the both sides would like this to continue despite the hiccups and sometimes worse than hiccups.

But, you know, we've already seen in the first few days what happened in Lebanon where the ceasefire was not respected.

What makes you hopeful that there will be a shift, that lessons might be learned?

In your view, how real is the possibility that the fighting in Lebanon, uh, Israel and Hezbollah neither backing off, how real is the possibility it could derail the entire process moving forward?

forward?Well, you know, this is a deal that is brimming with ambiguity, with, uh, di- discrepant interpretations, room for discord.

Nowhere, and nowhere more violently, than when it comes to Lebanon.

And that's because in that case, Israel's position is, we should have a free hand to take the action that we believe is necessary for our self-defense, for our security, and we're certainly not gonna withdraw from Southern Lebanon.

Iran takes the view that the deal provides for a comprehensive ceasefire, which they interpret as meaning respect for Lebanon's, Lebanese sever- sovereignty, and therefore, an end to the occupation.

And the US doesn't really seem to know what it wants, other than to scramble repeatedly to salvage the deal.

So it probably is the most delicate piece of the deal at this point.

Why? Where do you think it leads next?

In your view, how real is the possibility that the fighting in Lebanon, uh, Israel and Hezbollah neither backing off, how real is the possibility it could derail the entire process moving forward?

Well, you know, this is a deal that is brimming with ambiguity, with, uh, di- discrepant interpretations, room for discord.

Nowhere, and nowhere more violently than when it comes to Lebanon, and that's because in that case, Israel's position is, "We should have a free hand to take the action that we believe is necessary for our self-defense, for our security, and we're certainly not gonna withdraw from southern Lebanon." Iran takes the view that the deal provides for a comprehensive ceasefire, which they interpret as meaning respect for Lebanon's, Lebanese sever- sovereignty, and therefore an end to the occupation.

And the US doesn't really seem to know what it wants, other than to scramble repeatedly to salvage the deal.

So it probably is the most delicate piece of the deal at this point, and the question is gonna be, does the US put enough pressure on Netanyahu? Is Netanyahu prepared to alienate his political base, which is not happy about an imposed ceasefire? And is Iran prepared to turn a blind eye to some violations of the ceasefire, so long as they don't cross a threshold? And that's a delicate balancing act we've seen play out today, and I suspect we're gonna con- see it playing out over the days to come.

Why? Where do you think it leads next?

So the first thing I...

You know, for me, what is the target right now, what is the real object of criticism is the war, not this deal, this memorandum of understanding, which was necessary to end it.

In your view, how real is the possibility that the fighting in Lebanon, Israel and Hezbollah neither backing off, how real is the possibility it could derail the entire process moving forward?

Well, you know, this is a deal that is brimming with ambiguity, with discrepant interpretations, room for discord, nowhere and nowhere more violently than when it comes to Lebanon.

And that's because in that case, Israel's position is, We should have a free hand to take the action that we believe is necessary for our self-defense, for our security.

And we're certainly not going to withdraw from southern Lebanon.

Iran takes the view that the deal provides for a comprehensive ceasefire, which they interpret as meaning respect for Lebanon's Lebanese sovereignty and therefore an end to the occupation.

And the U.S. doesn't really seem to know what it wants other than to scramble repeatedly to salvage the deal.

So it probably is the most delicate piece of the deal at this point.

Why? Where do you think it leads next?

So what would need to happen next from here?

Well, there's what, what will need to happen and what at best will happen.

I think the best one could expect at this point, maybe I'll be wrong, is a very, very bare-bones deal in which the Strait of Hormuz is opened.

In other words, the US ends its blockade, Iran ends its closure.

They f- they reach some kind of deal about how that, the, the, the strait's gonna be governed.

Obviously, Iran wants to play a bigger role than the US seems prepared to accept, but they're gonna have to reach some kind of understanding.

Maybe some kind of economic relief for Iran, and maybe some broad general principles about how they're gonna deal with the nuclear program, which would then have to be negotiated over the next 60 days.

But other-

So are those people really given a rosy, unreliable picture or is there some truth to what they're saying?

We know they give this picture for reasons that have nothing, you know, for the market and the price.

But if the president wanted a realistic off ramp.

I think there is one.

If you had a realistic endgame, I think the Iranians, you know, they don't want to continue this war either.

It's hurting their economy.

They're not being able to rebuild.

How do you...

[laughs]

But, but nonetheless, I have yours.

So, um, listen, I think the m- one thing to understand is that there is, I think there is a deal to be had.

I mean, both sides need a deal.

The US needs a deal because it can't cons- continue with the Strait of Hormuz being closed, with the price of oil going up, with the stock markets going down, with all of the unpredictability that that is injecting to, to the world economy.

And Iran, for all its bravado, is also suffering enormous economic pain.

It's gonna need sanctions relief.

Yeah

Uh, your assessment of their role, uh, in all of this, and also why in all of this talk about I- Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there's on-- there's one power that does have nuclear weapons, uh, in the Middle East, Israel, a- and it is not a party, uh, to the NPT.

NPT.So first, I, I, allow me to, to— You won't be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hussein in terms of, uh, Iran's nuclear program.

I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military, uh, program.

And I-- and my, my view is that they've always...

Their view was, "We're gonna hedge.

We're gonna have a nuclear program so that if we do wanna develop a weapon, we can." I think that's , you know, one could, one, one could understand why they did, but I, I think it's pretty clear that they did have that.

So I don't think that there was anything, that there was anything...

Um, if you can explain why you, if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why anyway, um, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day, and what happened that very next day? The Iranian girls school in Minab was taken out, uh, it looks like with a US missile, and a hundred and seventy-five people about died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.

Uh, your assessment of their role, uh, in all of this, and also why in all of this talk about I- Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there's on-- there's one power that does have nuclear weapons, uh, in the Middle East, Israel, a- and it is not a party, uh, to the NPT.

NPT.So first, I, I, allow me to, to— You won't be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hussein in terms of, uh, Iran's nuclear program.

I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military, uh, program.

And I-- and my, my view is that they've always...

Their view was, "We're gonna hedge.

We're gonna have a nuclear program so that if we do wanna develop a weapon, we can." I think that's , you know, one could, one, one could understand why they did, but I, I think it's pretty clear that they did have that.

So I don't think that there was anything, that there was anything...

Um, if you can explain why you, if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why anyway, um, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day, and what happened that very next day? The Iranian girls school in Minab was taken out, uh, it looks like with a US missile, and a hundred and seventy-five people about died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.

Uh, your assessment of their role, uh, in all of this, and also why in all of this talk about I- Iran coming under some kind of international control, there is no mention of the fact that there's on- there's one power that does have nuclear weapons, uh, in the Middle East, Israel, a- and it is not a party, uh, to the NPT.

NPT.So first, I, I, allow me to, to— You won't be surprised that I have a little bit of a different appreciation from Hussein in terms of, uh, Iran's nuclear program.

I think there is some evidence, certainly at some point, that they did have a military, uh, program.

And I-- and my, my view is that they've always...

Their view was, "We're gonna hedge.

We're gonna have a nuclear program so that if we do wanna develop a weapon, we can." I think that's , you know, one could, one, one could understand why they did, but I, I think it's pretty clear that they did have that.

So I don't think that there was anything, that there was anything...

Um, if you can explain why you-- if you think this was better than what you achieved, and why anyway, um, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu attacked the very next day, and what happened that very next day? The Iranian girls school in Minab was taken out, uh, it looks like with a US missile, and a hundred and seventy-five people about died, overwhelmingly primary school girls.

Where is the potential for leadership of the Palestinian movement, the Palestinian people? Where can it come from? Does the Palestinian Authority have any possibility of doing this? Can Hamas do it? Is there some other force we don't know about that could emerge, some other person, some other organization? Because it seems to me it's going to be really hard for there to be any kind of stability if there isn't some sort of organizational leadership.

You're absolutely right.

And if we go back, I think it's It's a terrible situation for the Palestinians, which is partly self-inflicted.

I mean, the division between Hamas and Fatah, the other branch of the Palestinian national movement, the fact that there haven't been elections since 2006, you know, all of that is something that the Palestinians have to account for.

But it was mightily aided and exacerbated by outside countries, particularly European and America, that decided that they were going to make sure that there were no Palestinian elections, that the division was going to be entrenched.

Of course, Israel played a huge role as well.

So I think there was sort of a conspiracy between a whole host of parties to make sure that the Palestinians were weak, divided, and leaderless.

How do you see the role of those other actors in the region going forward?

Where is the potential for leadership of the Palestinian movement, the Palestinian people? Where can it come from? Does the Palestinian Authority have any possibility of doing this? Can Hamas do it? Is there some other force we don't know about that could emerge, some other person, some other organization? Because it seems to me it's going to be really hard for there to be any kind of stability if there isn't some sort of organizational leadership.

You're absolutely right.

And if we go back, I think it's It's a terrible situation for the Palestinians, which is partly self-inflicted.

I mean, the division between Hamas and Fatah, the other branch of the Palestinian national movement, the fact that there haven't been elections since 2006, you know, all of that is something that the Palestinians have to account for.

But it was mightily aided and exacerbated by outside countries, particularly European and America, that decided that they were going to make sure that there were no Palestinian elections, that the division was going to be entrenched.

Of course, Israel played a huge role as well.

So I think there was sort of a conspiracy between a whole host of parties to make sure that the Palestinians were weak, divided, and leaderless.

How do you see the role of those other actors in the region going forward?