Are we in a dangerous window or what are you thinking?

I've talked to Phil a lot about this, actually.

He would hasten to add that that was a be ready by date, not a go date.

And a lot of people treated it as a potential go date.

I think there are a number of things to suggest that if it's a be ready by date, they might not be ready by then.

And that there are things that would surely give them pause if they're studying the battle space of Ukraine and Russia right now.

And again, frankly, even Iran and what Iran's been able to do against the United States and what they've been able to do to take advantage of their asymmetric capabilities and their geography and so on and so forth.

defense.

Uh, but I'm worried about the day after, right? And that's when I would go to the Pentagon and say, 'Are you gonna have stuff on the shelf?'" But also, that map that I showed, this commander said, "I'm worried about having to defend, in this case, countries like Japan and South Korea and Thailand and Australia, that I'm contractually obligated to defend." So that's what you're talking about, right?

Yes.

And, you know, those, those treaties, in many cases, there's optionality.

Uh, we're, we're not, uh, in, in some instances the same as Article 5 of NATO.

Uh, so that's where it creates uncertainty on the part of our allies.

If they're, if they're facing aggression, it kicks in a consultative mechanism, and we say, "Sorry, we don't have what we need to, to do this for more than two weeks," uh, that's a real credibility issue and, and could force some uncomfortable trade-offs for our allies.

It does not at all look like the war between the US and its allies and China, right?

I think that's right, but, uh, another thing to remember is the Chinese have a pretty significant headstart when it comes to the production of ballistic and cruise missiles.

Yeah.

And if you can get through that, you know, they, they're pretty clear about what their ambitions are and their intentions are.

Um, I do think they wanna win without fighting, and so the August 1st, 2027 is a, is a be ready by date, not necessarily a go date.

And, and I suspect there are a number of things including, uh, watching, uh, Russia's experience in Ukraine, but also their own, uh, internal situation, the massive purges that have been going on in the military.

Um, the, the, you know, the Rumsfeldian lexicon, the known unknowns.

How does a military perform that hasn't seen combat since 1979? All of these things probably give them a, a degree of pause or at least understand that, that there's risk.

Um, so I think they would like to win without fighting and, and get some sort of political capitulation without having to fire a shot.

... or set conditions and actually m- make a strategic move, we just get into all these different countries are slowly making moves for their own best interests, but those own best interests just slowly nudge us towards what ends up being a cataclysmic war.

Yeah.

And if you can get through that, you know, they, they're pretty clear about what their ambitions are and their intentions are.

Um, I do think they wanna win without fighting, and so the August 1st, 2027 is a, is a be ready by date, not necessarily a go date.

And, and I suspect there are a number of things, including, uh, watching, uh, Russia's experience in Ukraine, but also their own, uh, internal situation, the massive purges that have been going on in the military.

Um, the, the, you know, the Rumsfeldian lexicon, the known unknowns.

How does a military perform that hasn't seen combat since 1979? All of these things probably give them a, a degree of pause or at least understand that, that there's risk.

Um, so I think they would like to win without fighting and, and get some sort of political capitulation without having to fire a shot.

... or set conditions and actually m- make a strategic move, we just get into all these different countries are slowly making moves for their own best interests, but those own best interests just slowly nudge us towards what ends up being a cataclysmic war.

We did, we did trade texts on this.

We traded texts, and, and he's the one who usually comes up with the, with the creative, uh, creative sounding titles.

But, um, we were founded 25 years ago.

I'm gonna steal some of his lines too because, uh, he talks about the formation of the commission.

It was when Congress granted permanent normal trade relations with China, which then, uh, paved the way for WTO entry for China.

And in the process of doing that, they lost the annual MFN, most favored nation, trading status debate.

And, and annual MFN debate was where everybody aired their concerns about China, whether that be human rights, trade practices, security issues, whatever.

That was last year.

Um, I mean, is it true that China has multiple areas now which it can use as leverage against, uh, even the United States?

It is true.

It's also true that we have, uh, leverage over China in particular areas, and we're seeing that play out as a second i- second order effect of the Iran operation, that China's feeling, uh, some degree of stress over, uh, the incre- the, the limited supply of oil and, and increases it costs for them.

90% of Iranian oil was going to China, for example.

But, um, it, it is true and, and really this is of our making.

Um, you know, our, our strides to grow a modern economy led us to have an economy that prioritized efficiencies, cost opti- optimization, profit optimization.

And so China, uh, worked their way into very dominant positions in, in certain areas because they could do things cheaply and they could do things without regard for econom- uh, pardon me, environmental fallout and the like.

I mean, how does the US see the Pacific as a strategic theater? Um, and do you think, uh, allies like Australia with Japan and New Zealand are doing enough on this front?

Quoting Donald Rumsfeld there.

Yeah, well, I, I...

Yeah.

Uh, the, the PLA has certainly been the beneficiary of a lot of investment, uh, better training, not to our quality yet, um, and certainly an operational environment with a, with a tempo that they're getting a lot of experience.

But look, when you s- when you relieve so many people, and it's so unpredictable, uh, a, a military leadership that is already known for caution and, and not risk-taking, they're gonna get even more risk-averse.

So, uh-...

I, I think on the margins, this diminishes readiness.

... not necessarily to go to war for Taiwan, right.

W- why is that kind of presence important to US interests and plans in Asia?

Well, we're a distant power, and we're reliant on friends and allies for access for our forward-deployed forces.

Uh, Taiwan is an important country to us and an important relationship for the region.

Any threat to Taiwan, we'd want to at least be positioned to respond to.

Whether or not we do so militarily is a political decision, but we want to be in position.

The Philippines is key to that.

Randy Schriver, is, um, there a misperception in Washington DC about Taiwan, uh, and is it mission impossible to defend Taiwan?

Uh, on the first, there may be among some.

Is defending Taiwan a vital US interest?

Well, our law says any threat to Taiwan is of grave concern, and that's a view that's been held for decades.

Uh, Taiwan is clearly very important to us a- across the spectrum of issues, economic and trade issues.

We all know the semiconductor story, the geography being, uh, really central in the region with proximity to things we care a lot about, South China Sea, East China Sea.

Uh, it's a partner in so many different efforts, assisting Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Ebola in Western Africa.

So it's a like-minded partner.

So I think it certainly, uh, merits at least meeting what our law says, have the capacity to resist force and help Taiwan defend itself.

Is Washington do- t- doing enough to assure Beijing that whether it's about restraining Taipei in terms of how far they're gonna go or restraining our own language about Taiwan?