Welcome.

I am John

Peter, you have a question?

Thank you, John, and good evening, Mr.

President.

It's great to be with you.

My name is Peter Rao.

I'm a senior fellow here and direct the Center on Europe at Hudson Institute.

How would you characterize what's happening? And are we witnessing really a fundamental shift in Trump's approach? Or do you think that this is more temporary and tied to the midterm elections?

Well, the diesel deal, I think Occam's razor, the president says so openly, and we should probably take him at his word, is tied to the midterm elections.

There are questions and doubts about the Russia's ability to export large volumes of diesel that will actually make a difference on the world stage and probably also logistical questions even on how and who would transport that diesel out of Russia.

There is a second, more cynical interpretation that the president, frustrated by the high price of oil brought on by Operation Epic Fury, is now shifting attention to Ukraine.

I actually support a lot of what the president's doing vis-a-vis Iran, so I wish he would just give an address to the American people saying that there may be some temporary pain associated with containing the Iranians.

That's not really the president's modus operandi in general, and so that cynical interpretation is out there.

I'm not really here to judge his motives on that or whether or not it's true, but I thought I'd at least mention it for the listeners.

Question? I can run with

Uh, what do you think then Russia is trying to accomplish by sending drones into NATO airspace? Is this to test defenses? Is it for intimidation or something else?

Well, there are a couple of factors.

For one, the Ukrainians have been striking deep into the Russian hinterland, taking on petrochemical installations, refineries, even warehouses where dual use items are produced.

And the Russians, in return, can hit Ukraine, but they can't really hit Ukrainian resupply in NATO countries because that would be what amounts to a dramatic act of war and could potentially pull in all of the NATO alliance, including the United States.

So I think they are walking right up to the red line of trying to coerce, cajole, intimidate the NATO allies away from supporting Ukraine, so they can isolate it in a one-on-one matchup where its superior size and weight can be brought to bear without crossing that red line.

And this form of gray zone warfare, whether it be the drones or assassinations, sabotage operations, arson, any number of techniques that the Russians have utilized in recent months and years are part and parcel of that campaign.

Uh, d, what does an effective drone wall consist of, and how fast can it be up and running?

These are really high technology sensors and systems that are stitched together to create what amounts to not an impenetrable wall, but a great early warning system with response mechanisms connected to them.

I mean, we're only a couple of days after it, so I don't know that we've gotten a lot of definitive readouts, but why don't you tell us what you think we've learned from that visit?

Well, I think the negotiations have essentially been, for lack of a better word, frozen now for several months.

In part, that's because at the highest levels, the US government has been focused on Operation Epic Fury and the back and forth with the Iranians, but also because the negotiations had just ground down.

Um, I do think the Russians may have felt like they were losing some momentum on the diplomatic track, or the Ukrainians were, um, gaining some of their own.

Um, that includes President Zelensky's most recent meeting with President Trump, the ongoing talks about potential licensing of US Patriot interceptors.

There's nothing definitive there, but nonetheless, the ongoing, uh, negotiations, the request that the Ukrainians have put in for Starlink access for their strikes into the Russian territory.

Uh, the most recent, um, definitive statement from Secretary Bessent on the sidelines of the G20, uh, the economic ministerial in Asheville, North Carolina, where he made clear to his Russian counterpart that there would be no economic normalization until the war itself, um, had been resolved.

Mm-hmm.

But two, it has a big question on why we would try to seek to continue to force the Ukrainians into territorial concessions at the negotiating table when I don't want to say the world was going their way, but things were going much better for them in their in the campaign.

Well, for starters, the KIA numbers really are astounding.

And if anyone thought that they had plateaued at 30,000, which seemed fantastical just a few months ago, the Russians are now reportedly starting to bump up to the 40,000 mark.

Not to mention the percentage of those that is killed rather than the wounded is also really low.

Without precedent, there's something like 50, 60, 65% of the Russian casualties are KIAs, 40% or so, 35, 45%, depending upon sourcing, are wounded in action.

So that's really an incredible number.

And I think a lot of the Russian...

What are your sources telling you? What is your intuition? Do you think that was the number one reason why he went? And then I'll ask you after that about what does this gray zone Russia campaign look like?

But can you kind of give the audience, our listeners, a update as to exactly where we are, what's transpired in the last year or so and kind of what you've seen looking forward in the future?

Sure.

And I couldn't resist that oxymoron of Republican royalty getting consistent with one another.

But to return to the issue at play, the war in Ukraine, right now, I think we're really seeing what amount to two battles taking place in a broader war.

The first battle is what we can basically describe as the land war in the eastern part of Ukraine.

This is what some of your listeners might have heard on TV or radio or read in the newspapers as the so-called Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.

It's a short form for the Donetsk Basin, a blend of the river Donetsk and the word basin.

What is your sense as to the likelihood that Putin will look to expand the war and draw on NATO?

Peter, I was wondering if you could give us your top lines on the NATO summit.

Great.

Well, first of all, Michael, it's wonderful to be with you and Beacon Global Strategies, which I almost think of as like its own CIA substation here in Washington, given that everywhere you look, there are Beacon analysts picking up data and information and converting that into policy advice and strategy advice.

And to be paired with the inimitable Alina Polyakova is a real honor.

So thanks for having me.

I'll just start by saying I think of this summit as the fifth in a five-part play.

The first was just after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Madrid summit, which brought Sweden and Finland or began the process of bringing Sweden and Finland into the alliance and reoriented NATO to focus on the Russia threat with a new policy document, strategic guidance called the Strategic Concept.

policy where the president might, instead of pressuring Zelensky to compromise, begin to pressure Putin to compromise to get to his goal of a ceasefire?

[laughs]

...

Beacon analysts picking up data and information and converting that into policy advice and strategy advice.

And to be paired with the inimitable Alina Polyakova is a real honor, so thanks for having me.

I'll just start by saying I think of this summit as the fifth in a five-part play.

Um, the first was just after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the, uh, Madrid Summit, which brought Sweden and Finland, or began the process of bringing Sweden and Finland into the alliance, and reoriented NATO to focus on the Russia threat with a new policy document, strategic guidance called, um, the Strategic Concept.

Next came the meeting in Vilnius, when that strategic concept, which reoriented the alliance on Russia, put together a series of battle plans that were ratified for how to resource and, uh, defend the alliance, where different countries were assigned, um, various capabilities that were required to take on the Russians.

How real, first, is the Ukrainian progress? And will this lead to a change in US policy where the president might, instead of pressuring Zelensky to compromise, begin to pressure Putin to compromise to get to his goal of a ceasefire? Um, Peter, why don't we start with you?

Also wie ist die US-Perspektive auf Trump gewesen in den letzten Tagen und Wochen bis Davos bei dieser Grönland-Frage?

Ich hatte nicht den Eindruck, dass hier eine große neue Initiative gestartet worden ist von Trump, sondern dass er auf Anfragen Journalisten seine bisherige Position immer wieder vorgetragen hat.

Am Rückflug von, ich glaube, es war Mar-a-Lago, nach, äh, der Operation gegen Maduro in Venezuela wurde ja auf Air Force One zu Grönland befragt und er hat, das ist jetzt nicht vielleicht das genaue Zitat, aber ungefähr in der Richtung, äh, geantwortet: „Warum werde ich jetzt über Grönland gefragt? Ich möchte gar nicht über Grönland reden, das können wir später mal machen." Aber man hat immer wieder, glaube ich, aus den Medien, äh, sozusagen, ähm, den, den Faden zwischen Venezuela und Grönland aufgespannt, ähm, und nachgefragt.

Trump wird sich dann nicht zurücklehnen und quasi seine, äh, Position irgendwie abwässern oder schwächern.

Und seine Mitarbeiter haben ihn da natürlich gefolgt, denn er ist der Präsident und der gibt der Linie der amerikanischen Außenpolitik vor.

Das heißt, ich hab da eigentlich nicht wirklich was Neues entdeckt.

Und, ähm, dann kam auch dieser Bericht, dass Marco Rubio in einer Sitzung mit dem Senat hinter verschlossenen Tür angekündigt hat, dass man versuchen wird, Grönland zu kaufen.

Also beim Thema Iran, wie sehen das die Republikaner? Muss er da jetzt handeln oder ist die Sorge größer, dass das Ganze dann, ähm, ja auch innenpolitisch so bewertet werden könnte? Moment mal, das war doch eigentlich der, ähm, der da nicht in den Kriegen in der Außenpolitik so eine große Rolle spielen wollte.